State v. Williams, 4986

Decision Date08 September 1987
Docket NumberNo. 4986,4986
CourtConnecticut Court of Appeals
PartiesSTATE of Connecticut v. Joseph WILLIAMS.
G. Douglas Nash, Asst. Public Defender, with whom, on the brief, was Joette Katz, Public Defender, for appellant (defendant)

Susann E. Gill, Deputy Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, was Arthur C. Hadden, Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (state).

Before HULL, DALY and BIELUCH, JJ.

BIELUCH, Judge.

The defendant appeals from his judgment of conviction rendered in accordance with the jury's verdict of guilty on the following charges: possession of narcotics with intent to sell or dispense in violation of General Statutes § 21a-277(a); 1 possession of narcotics in violation of General Statutes § 21a-279(a); 2 possession of The jury could reasonably have found the following facts: On June 27, 1985, at approximately 12:30 p.m., several members of the New Haven police department executed a search warrant for an apartment at 11 Northwest Drive, New Haven. The apartment was rented to Alexis Laing, who lived there with the defendant and her son.

                marijuana in violation of General Statutes § 21a-279(c); 3 and possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of General Statutes § 21a-267(a).   He claims in this appeal that his convictions on the first and second counts for possession of narcotics with intent to sell and possession of narcotics, respectively, violate the federal and state prohibitions against double jeopardy.   He also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's finding in the third count that the defendant possessed the marijuana found in the bedroom dresser.   Finally, the defendant claims that the court's use of examples to illustrate the element of possession constituted an illegal expansion of that element.   We find error
                

One of the officers executing the warrant, Fredrick Hurley, knocked on the door of the apartment and, after hearing no response, entered through the front door. Upon his entry, he immediately went to the master bedroom on the second floor. There he found the defendant alone, lying naked on the bed, and wearing only a pair of socks. The defendant was seen rising from a reclining position on the bed. The only occupant of the apartment at that time was the defendant.

On the bed, approximately at an arm's length from the defendant, was a sandwich bag box from which protruded a plastic bag containing what was determined to be cocaine. A search of the sandwich bag box uncovered a smaller plastic bag containing cocaine, seventeen small tin foil packets or envelopes of cocaine, and two glassine bags. One of the glassine bags contained quinine and procaine. The second glassine bag contained a mixture of heroin, cocaine and quinine.

A further search of the bedroom yielded three manila envelopes containing marijuana. These envelopes were found in the top drawer of the dresser. Other items seized from the top of the dresser included razor blades, small manila envelopes, a roll of aluminum foil, a set of measuring spoons, cigarette rolling paper and a small grinder or strainer. In the first floor kitchen, aluminum foil, bottles of inositol, and a cent-o-gram scale were seized by the police.

The total amount of narcotics seized was as follows: 79.72 grams (2.81 ounces) of cocaine; 80 milligrams (.10 ounce) of heroin; and 4.97 grams (.17 ounce) of marijuana.

The defendant was arrested and subsequently charged in four counts as follows: count one, possession of narcotics, to wit, cocaine, with intent to sell, a violation of General Statutes § 21a-277(a); count two, possession of narcotics, to wit, heroin, a violation of General Statutes § 21a-279(a); count three, possession of marijuana, a violation of General Statutes § 21a-279(c), and count four, possession of drug paraphernalia, a violation of General Statutes § 21a-267(a). He pleaded not guilty to the charges and elected to be tried by a jury.

At the close of the state's case, the defendant made an oral motion requiring the state to elect between the first and second counts of the information, arguing that it was a violation of double jeopardy to convict and sentence the defendant for both possession of a narcotic substance with intent to sell, and possession of a narcotic

                substance.   The trial court denied the motion.   At that time, the defendant also moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the defendant had in-hand possession of the narcotics and marijuana or exclusive possession of the apartment in which they were found.   This motion was also denied.   Thereafter, the defendant presented his evidence and the case was submitted to the jury, which rendered a verdict of guilty on all four counts.   The defendant was sentenced accordingly
                
I DOUBLE JEOPARDY

The defendant's first claim on appeal is that his conviction on count one, possession of narcotics with intent to sell, and on count two, possession of narcotics, violates the federal and state prohibitions against double jeopardy and the right to due process. A claim of double jeopardy which is adequately supported by the record is reviewable under the doctrine of State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 327 A.2d 576 (1973). See, e.g., State v. Devino, 195 Conn. 70, 73, 485 A.2d 1302 (1985); see also State v. Kitt, 8 Conn.App. 478, 485, 513 A.2d 731, cert. denied, 202 Conn. 801, 518 A.2d 648 (1986) (double jeopardy violation recognized as plain error). We find this claim is proper for an Evans review.

"The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the United States constitution provides: 'nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.' Connecticut common law also secures this right. See State v. Johns, 184 Conn. 369, 373 n. 6, 439 A.2d 1049 (1981).... Double jeopardy analysis in the context of a single trial is a two-step process. First, the charges must arise out of the same act or transaction. Second, it must be determined whether the charged crimes are the same offense. Multiple punishments are forbidden only if both conditions are met. See State v. Frazier, 194 Conn. 233, 238, 478 A.2d 1013 (1984)." State v. Devino, supra, 195 Conn. at 73-74, 485 A.2d 1302.

For the first step of this analysis, we look at the state's information. Counts one and two of the information charge the defendant with violations of General Statutes §§ 21a-277(a) and 21a-279(a), respectively, and allege criminal conduct of the defendant at approximately 12:30 p.m., on June 27, 1985. There can be no doubt that the offenses for which the defendant was charged and convicted arose out of the same act of possession of the two narcotic substances simultaneously at the same time and place. See State v. Devino, supra, at 74, 485 A.2d 1302.

The state argues that the narcotics violations alleged in counts one and two do not constitute the same act or transaction because count one referred to the possession and sale of cocaine, and count two referred to the possession of heroin. We note, however, that there is no indication that the legislature intended to authorize multiple punishment for the simultaneous possession of more than one narcotic. 4 State v. Rawls, 198 Conn. 111, 121, 502 A.2d 374 (1985). Although the crimes of possession and possession with intent to sell both prohibit illegal transactions involving narcotic substances, a prosecutor may not create one offense of each from a single transaction by particularizing various narcotic substances in separate counts. Id., 120. We find, therefore, that this distinction relied upon by the state is insufficient to base a finding that the two offenses were not the same act or transaction.

"With respect to the second condition, 'where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not.' Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). In making this determination Applying this test to the crimes for which the defendant was convicted, we conclude that a person could not commit the greater offense of possession of a narcotic substance with the intent to sell without, likewise, having committed the lesser offense of simple possession. State v. Amaral, supra, at 243, 425 A.2d 1293; see State v. Goldson, 178 Conn. 422, 423 A.2d 114 (1979) (conviction of possession of heroin and of transportation of heroin violated the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy); see also State v. Nieves, 186 Conn. 26, 438 A.2d 1183 (1982) (possession of narcotics treated as lesser included offense of possession with intent to sell); cf. State v. Devino, supra, 195 Conn. at 75, 485 A.2d 1302 (conviction for possession of narcotics and for illegal sale of narcotics not a violation of double jeopardy; one may either possess narcotics legally yet sell them illegally or sell narcotics without possessing them).

                we look only to the information and the bill of particulars.   State v. Troynack, 174 Conn. 89, 96-97, 384 A.2d 326 (1977).  'The test for determining whether one violation is a lesser included offense in another violation is whether it is possible to commit the greater offense, in the manner described in the information or bill of particulars, without having first committed the lesser.   If it is possible, then the lesser violation is not an included crime.'   State v. Brown, 163 Conn. 52, 61-62, 301 A.2d 547 (1972).   Viewed schematically, a lesser included offense is a concentric circle within the greater offense whereas separate but overlapping offenses may be seen as intersecting circles."   State v. Amaral, 179 Conn. 239, 242-43, 425 A.2d 1293 (1979)
                

"[E]ven if offenses are the same under Blockburger v....

To continue reading

Request your trial
21 cases
  • State v. Patterson
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • 22 Abril 1993
    ... ... 7, 1992 ... Decided April 22, 1993 ... Page 1148 ...         [31 Conn.App. 279] David M. Cohen, with whom was Gregory J. Williams, Stamford, for appellant (defendant) ...         James M. Ralls, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, were Eugene Callahan, ... ...
  • State v. Williams
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • 14 Octubre 2008
    ...State v. Alfonso, supra, 195 Conn. at 636, 490 A.2d 75 (Parskey, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); State v. Williams, 12 Conn.App. 225, 237, 530 A.2d 627 (1987). If the defendant's reasoning that the jury could not infer that the defendant had constructive possession the drugs......
  • State v. Flynn, s. 4132
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • 5 Abril 1988
    ... ... State v. Devino, 195 Conn. 70, 73, 485 A.2d 1302 (1985); State v ... Page 1009 ... Williams, 12 Conn.App. 225, 229, 530 A.2d 627 (1987) ...         The fifth amendment to the United States constitution declares that no person ... ...
  • State v. Glenn
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • 6 Abril 1993
    ... ... See State v. Williams, 12 Conn.App. 225, 236, 530 A.2d 627 (1987) ...         Thus, the jury could reasonably and logically have found from the evidence elicited ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT