State v. Williams
| Decision Date | 04 September 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 64017,64017 |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana v. Ronald WILLIAMS. |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
James M. Buck, Kramer & Laird, Alexandria, for defendant-appellant.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Edwin O. Ware, Dist. Atty., R. Greg Fowler, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
Ronald Williams was charged with possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, a violation of R.S. 40:966. On August 25, 1978, after a jury trial, he was found guilty as charged. A hearing to impose sentence was held on November 9, 1978 at which time defendant requested that his court-appointed attorney be relieved and that he be allowed to retain his own. On November 17, 1978 defendant appeared in court without an attorney and was sentenced to ten years at hard labor. On this appeal defendant relies on five assignments of error 1 for reversal of his conviction and sentence. Three of the assignments are clearly without reversible merit; only assignments four and six present close issues and will be discussed at length in this opinion.
Testimony at trial established the following facts: Early on the morning of June 13, 1978, Audie Authur, Jr., a friend of defendant, attempted to break into defendant's automobile. While doing so he cut himself badly and began to bleed profusely. In an attempt to get medical aid Authur proceeded to 114 Logan Drive nearby in Pineville, Louisiana and attempted to wake a friend. While doing so, Authur broke the glass in one of the windows of the residence. He then returned to his home and in the morning went to the hospital for treatment of the cut arm.
Responding to a report of a possible burglary at 114 Logan Drive, the Pineville city police discovered the broken window at that address and a trail of blood which appeared to lead from the residence. Assuming that a would-be burglar cut himself on the broken glass, the police followed the blood trail to defendant's car which was parked in front of his house. The door of the car was open and there was blood inside and outside of the car. Officers also noticed a hole torn out of the back seat creating a small opening into the trunk. After tracing the car to defendant, the officers knocked on his door and requested permission to search the vehicle. Defendant gave permission for the search but stated that he did not have the keys to the trunk. Officers then entered the automobile and looked through the hole in the back seat into the trunk where they observed a quantity of material they believed to be marijuana. Officers then seized the material and arrested defendant on the instant charge.
This argument arose when a state witness, Audie Authur, testified concerning the events which led him to attempt to break into the defendant's automobile. Authur testified that while at a party at which the defendant was also present, an unidentified man told him that defendant had "dope" in his car, and because defendant Williams owed him money, he broke into the car to get some of the drugs to hold as security for the debt. Defense counsel objected to that part of the testimony relating that the unidentified man said defendant had "dope" in his car on the grounds that it was inadmissible hearsay. The state argued that Authur's testimony was not offered for the truth of the statement made by the unidentified third person but only to show Authur's motive for breaking into defendant's vehicle.
The trial judge in overruling the objection told the jury the hearsay evidence in this instance was admissible, not to prove the truth of the matter related to the witness but to establish the fact that it was said to the witness. That ruling would be correct if the mere fact that the statement was made were a relevant and important fact. State v. Launey, 335 So.2d 435 (La.1976); State v. Green, 282 So.2d 461 (La.1973). While close, the ruling was probably incorrect. The witness' motivation in breaking into the car could have been established by his relating something short of what was fully stated to him, i. e., that defendant had told the informing person that defendant had dope in his car.
Nonetheless, we do not find reversible error here. Counsel for defendant risked what occurred when he allowed the witness to ramble, or testify in narrative form, rather than answer responsively to successive questions, and objected only after the testimony was given in the presence of the jury. Additionally, the trial judge admonished the jury that the testimony could not be used to prove the truth of the third person's statements and limited the use of the evidence to "establishing the fact that those words were said to (the witness)." Advising the jury not to consider the out-of-court statement as evidence of the facts related therein is not significantly different from telling the jury to disregard the testimony. Therefore the court's error, if any, did not substantially prejudice defendant. La.Code Crim.Pro. art. 921. This assignment lacks merit.
By this assignment of error defendant contends that the sentence imposed by the trial court was excessive. At the hearing to impose sentence held November 17, 1978, at which the defendant was not represented by counsel, the trial court sentenced defendant to ten years at hard labor, the maximum under the law.
In accordance with La.Code Crim.Pro. art. 894.1, the trial judge stated his reasons for imposing the maximum sentence. In particular he related what he considered to be certain aggravating factors. The court's stated reasons do not reflect that it considered any mitigating factors or the absence of them in imposing the instant sentence.
Because defendant was not represented by counsel at the sentencing hearing, no mitigating factors were argued. When the trial judge asked defendant if he had anything to say in his behalf, d...
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State v. Hall
...waiver of his right to counsel, any sentence imposed in the absence of counsel is invalid and must be set aside. State v. Williams, 374 So.2d 1215, 1217 (La.1979). Both the docket master and minute entries from the date of sentencing state that defendant's counsel was present for sentencing......
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State v. Coates
...for his objection when making it and point out the specific error which the trial court is making. La.C.Cr.P. art. 841; State v. Williams, 374 So.2d 1215 (La.1979); State v. Brown, 481 So.2d 679 (La.App. 1st Cir.1985), writ denied, 486 So.2d 747 (La.1986). The grounds of objection must be s......
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State v. Salgado
...court ruling where there is no basis for the objection stated and no error pointed out presents nothing for us to review. State v. Williams, 374 So.2d 1215 (La.1979); State v. Powell, 325 So.2d 791 (La.1976). Accordingly, this assignment of error has no With regard to the fourth assignment ......
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State v. Sopczak, No. 2009 KA 0400 (La. App. 12/23/2009), 2009 KA 0400.
...waiver of his right to counsel, any sentence imposed in the absence of counsel is invalid and must be set aside. State v. Williams, 374 So.2d 1215, 1217 (La. 1979); State v. Hall, 99-2887, p. 16 (La. App. 4st Cir. 10/4/00), 775 So.2d 52, 63. A competent election by the defendant to represen......