State v. Williams
| Decision Date | 23 June 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 66630,66630 |
| Citation | 385 So.2d 214 |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana v. John WILLIAMS a/k/a Kwablah Mthawabu a/k/a Edward Johnson. |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., James D. Caldwell, Dist. Atty., John D. Crigler, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
Raymond L. Cannon, Tallulah, for defendant-appellant.
This case arises from an incident in which four armed men wearing stocking masks entered the Earl Lessley residence just outside of Waterproof, Louisiana. The men tied up the Lessley children who were alone in the house and began to search for valuables. When the children's parents returned from a shopping trip, Earl Lessley was shot by one of the intruders with a 16 gauge shotgun. Mrs. Lessley was tied up and prevented from aiding her wounded husband. The men left the house in Lessley's car, taking with them Earl Lessley's wallet, several guns and an old coin collection. Earl Lessley died from his wounds that same night.
Lee Andrew Carroll, Cornelius Washington and Darnell Washington were arrested in connection with the crime. Based on information they gave the police the defendant was also arrested and subsequently prosecuted for armed robbery. At the defendant's trial, Cornelius Washington testified that he, Willie Washington, Lee Andrew Carroll and Rowan Williams (the defendant's son) were the ones who had entered the Lessley home that night, but that the defendant had participated in the planning of the crime and had supplied the weapons used. He also was said to have received some of the money that was stolen. Willie Washington and Darnell Washington gave similar testimony. Ten of the twelve jurors found the defendant to be guilty of armed robbery, and he was sentenced to serve fifty years at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence.
The defendant has argued five of his seven assignments of error to this court.
Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to change venue, based on alleged prejudice in the public mind against him, arising from journalistic accounts of the crime and his arrest. The defendant assigns the trial court denial of that motion as error.
C.Cr.P. 622 provides:
In order to obtain a change of venue a defendant must prove more than a mere knowledge by the public of the facts surrounding the offense. The burden of proof is on the defendant to show that such prejudice exists in the collective mind of the community that a fair trial cannot be obtained. State v. Felde, 382 So.2d 1384 (La.1980); State v. Simmons, 381 So.2d 803 (La.1980); State v. Sonnier, 379 So.2d 1336 (La.1980).
In State v. Bell, 315 So.2d 307, 313 (La.1975), this court noted that:
In the instant case, the record amply supports the trial court's conclusion that it was possible to empanel an impartial jury in Tensas Parish. Although of the twelve persons questioned in a "dry run" voir dire, five indicated in some way that they thought that the defendant was guilty, only one prospective juror testified that she thought that she would have to find the defendant guilty no matter what the evidence. The other prospective jurors expressing an opinion indicated that they would be impartial and decide the case on the evidence.
All of the prospective jurors questioned in the "dry run" voir dire indicated that they had some knowledge of the crime, obtained for the most part from the newspapers and television. The press coverage might therefore be considered extensive within the limited geographical area involved. The press coverage does not appear from the record, however, to have been of such a nature as to render it impossible for the defendant to get a fair trial. All but one of the newspaper articles introduced by the defendant at the hearing on the motion were purely factual accounts, either of the crime, the ensuing investigation, or the defendant's arrest and subsequent indictment. 1 The involvement of the police or the prosecutor in the pretrial publicity was limited to the release of the facts of the crime and the investigation, and the appearance of police officers in newspaper photographs and a television news segment on the crime. No one representing the state expressed an opinion as to the defendant's guilt or innocence. All but one of the articles introduced appeared within two weeks of the defendant's arrest (from June 13, 1979 to June 27, 1979). The remaining article, which reported simply that the defendant had been indicted, appeared on July 25, 1979. The trial did not begin until some two more months had passed, on September 26, 1979.
In light of the noninflammatory nature of the pretrial publicity, and the fact that most of the publicity appeared some three months before trial, the pretrial publicity was not so extensive or prejudicial that the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion.
That conclusion is supported by the defendant's failure to introduce at the hearing any direct evidence of any widespread prejudice against the defendant by examination of the prospective jurors. None of the persons questioned testified that they felt any public pressure to modify or hide their feelings about the defendant on voir dire examination. Several of them stated that the defendant should and could get a fair trial in Tensas Parish. There was no evidence of any events in the community at large that would indicate that the community or the individuals in it were prejudiced against the defendant.
The defendant having failed to show that he could not get a fair trial in Tensas Parish, either by showing prejudicial pretrial publicity or evidence of prejudice on the part of prospective jurors, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to change venue.
This assignment of error lacks merit.
By this assignment the defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his challenge for cause of juror Michael Grover. Grover had approached the trial judge and stated that he was a friend of a man who had been the victim of a theft in which the defendant had been implicated. When questioned in court, however, Grover indicated that he had been seeking to be excused from jury duty so that he could see to his crops. He stated affirmatively that he could give the defendant the benefit of every reasonable doubt, and that he could set aside whatever personal feelings he had about the case.
Before the denial of a challenge for cause will be considered reversible error on appeal, the defendant must show that the denial was error and that he exhausted all of his peremptory challenges. State v. McIntyre, 381 So.2d 408 (La.1980); State v. Allen, 380 So.2d 28 (La.1980). A trial court is vested with broad discretion in ruling on challenges for cause, and its ruling will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of abuse. State v. McIntyre, supra; State v. Allen, supra.
In the instant case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Grover stated that he would follow the instructions of the court to give the defendant the benefit of every reasonable doubt, and to put aside his personal feelings. In addition, he stated that he did not feel that he would have difficulty with his friends if, after listening to the evidence, he voted not guilty. The defendant was unable to impeach his statements that he originally approached the judge and told him of his friendship with the theft victim in order to escape jury duty to take care of his crops. The record does not support the defendant's argument that the state coached Grover as to his answers. It was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion to deny the defendant's challenge for cause.
This assignment of error lacks merit.
The defendant assigns as error the trial court's denial of a motion to suppress evidence seized in a search of the defendant's house. The fruits of that search included the shotgun that was used to kill Lessley and other incriminating evidence. The search was conducted pursuant to a search warrant issued on the basis of an affidavit by a police officer which recounted statements made by Lee Andrew Carroll and Darnell Washington. The affidavit indicated that the two men had admitted their involvement in the Lessley case. Carroll was said to have told the affiant that he had taken the shotgun to the defendant's house after the killing and left it there. Washington was said to have admitted placing the shotgun and other weapons in the cesspool on the Williams property.
In challenging the search the defendant argues that the statements made by Carroll and Washington to the police were involuntary and illegal, and that a search warrant obtained on the strength of...
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