State v. Williams

Citation102 Wn.2d 733,689 P.2d 1065
Decision Date18 October 1984
Docket NumberNo. 49749-4,49749-4
PartiesThe STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. John L. WILLIAMS, Petitioner.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Washington

Raymond H. Thoenig, Washington Appellate Defender Association, Seattle, for petitioner.

Norman K. Maleng, King County Prosecutor, Barbara L. Corey-Boulet, Deputy Pros. Atty., Seattle, for respondent.

ROSELLINI, Justice.

Petitioner, John L. Williams, was convicted of second degree burglary and first degree theft. The charges were based, in part, on evidence found in the course of a search of petitioner's vehicle following his detention by police for questioning. The trial judge denied petitioner's motion to suppress the evidence, and the Court of Appeals, Division One affirmed ( State v. Williams, 34 Wash.App. 662, 663 P.2d 1368 (1983)). We reverse.

On April 7, 1981, Kirkland Police Officer Bruce Johnson responded to a radio dispatch request to investigate a burglar alarm sounding 1 in a nearby residence. As Officer Johnson approached the house in his vehicle, he spotted a car parked in front of it. The car appeared to be empty but as the officer drove closer, the headlights went on and the car started to move.

Officer Johnson called for a backup and pulled his squad car directly across the other vehicle's path. He told the driver (petitioner) to shut the car off, throw the keys outside and put his hands on the interior roof of the car. When Johnson's backup officer arrived, petitioner was ordered out of the car, patted down, handcuffed, advised of his rights, and placed in the back seat of one of the patrol cars.

Officer Johnson next advanced towards the house and noted that the front door was closed but unlocked. He then returned to his car and requested a canine unit.

Officer Johnson then turned to the petitioner, who was still being held in the other squad car, and asked him what he was doing in the area. The petitioner informed Johnson that he was looking for a friend's house. When Officer Johnson asked for the address, petitioner stated that he didn't know it. Responding to Officer Johnson's question concerning why he left when Johnson approached, petitioner stated that he had had problems with his headlights and was just pulling away.

Upon arrival of the canine unit, the police searched the interior of the house. They discovered that the master bedroom had been ransacked, the rear sliding door had been left ajar and the kitchen window left opened. Outside the house, the police discovered a portable television left sitting near the carport.

Police Officer Ivy "inventoried" the car for valuables and discovered a black jewelry box underneath the driver's seat. He opened the box, saw it contained jewelry, and returned the box to its original place. The car was then sealed and transported to Redmond Yard for safekeeping until a search warrant could be obtained. Petitioner was taken to the police station.

Prior to trial, petitioner moved to suppress evidence seized from the car. This motion was denied. Petitioner was convicted of second degree burglary and first degree theft.

Division One of the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. This court granted review to decide whether the evidence found in petitioner's car was the product of an illegal search or seizure. For the reasons stated below, we reverse.

We start with the basic principles governing the Fourth Amendment and Const. art. 1, § 7. The core of these protections is the right of the individual to be protected against unreasonable searches and seizures. As a general rule, warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971). There are, however, a few " ' "jealously and carefully drawn" exceptions' " to the warrant requirement which provide for those cases where the societal costs of obtaining a warrant (such as danger to officers or the risk of loss or destruction of evidence) outweigh the reasons for prior recourse to a neutral magistrate. State v. Houser, 95 Wash.2d 143, 149, 622 P.2d 1218 (1980) quoting Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 2590, 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979). The burden is on the State to show that the particular search or seizure falls within one of these exceptions. Houser, 95 Wash.2d at 149, 622 P.2d 1218.

In the present case, the State relied on two different exceptions to the warrant requirement: the Terry investigative stop, and the search incident to arrest doctrine. The State's argument can be summarized as follows: The police initially engaged in an investigative stop which matured into a valid arrest when petitioner was unable to account for his presence in an area where a burglary had recently occurred. Evidence seized as a result of this arrest, concludes the State, was seized pursuant to a valid search incident to arrest or, alternatively, pursuant to a routine inventory search.

The Court of Appeals agreed; we do not. We find that the initial investigative stop, although properly initiated by suspicion of illegal activity, exceeded both the scope and purpose of such detentions permitted under Const. art. 1, § 7.

We turn first to the issue of whether petitioner's initial detention was a valid investigative stop.

Prior to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), it was generally understood that to stop and search an individual, police officers were required to have probable cause sufficient to arrest that person. Nonetheless, it was a time-honored procedure for police officers to stop suspicious persons for questioning and, occasionally, to search these individuals for dangerous weapons. 3 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 9.1(a), at 4 (1978). In Terry, the United States Supreme Court squarely confronted the issue of whether such stops were constitutional. The Court held that a stop-and-frisk is a sui generis "rubric of police conduct" which is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if based upon the officer's reasonable belief that the suspect is armed and dangerous. Terry, at 20, 88 S.Ct. at 1879. The Court subsequently applied the Terry standard to permit a "brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information". Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1923, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972).

Under Terry, the Court has generally approved pat-down searches for weapons, and brief, on-the-spot questioning, see, e.g., Adams v. Williams, supra, but disapproved of more intensive seizures without consent. For instance, in Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979), the Court held that the police had illegally seized a murder suspect when, after getting a "lead" from a police informant, they brought him to the station for questioning. In finding that the subsequent interrogation of the defendant was illegal, the Court rejected a balancing analysis and concluded that

detention for custodial interrogation--regardless of its label--intrudes so severely on interests protected by the Fourth Amendment as necessarily to trigger the traditional safeguards against illegal arrest.

Dunaway, at 216, 99 S.Ct. at 2258.

Three recent United States Supreme Court cases highlight the parameters of the federal Terry -stop rule.

First, in Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983), airport police stopped an individual whose appearance, mannerisms, luggage and actions matched the so-called drug courier profile. The defendant, Royer, had just purchased a 1-way ticket to New York City with cash. The police officers approached Royer, identified themselves and asked to speak to him. Royer, upon request, produced his ticket and driver license. The airline ticket carried a different name than that on Royer's driver license. Royer explained that a friend had made the reservations for him. The police did not return the ticket but instead led Royer to a room where he was held while his luggage was retrieved and then opened. The Court held that Royer's confinement had exceeded the limited restraint permitted by Terry v. Ohio, supra. The Court observed that the scope of a permissible Terry stop will vary with the facts of each case, but noted that it is "clear" that Terry requires that an investigative detention must be temporary, lasting no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Similarly, the investigative methods employed must be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time. Royer, 103 S.Ct. at 1325.

In rejecting the State's contention that Royer's stop was not an arrest without probable cause, the Court emphasized that the temporary seizure of the defendant must relate to the purpose of the investigation.

The second recent decision involving the permissible scope of Terry stops is Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983). In Long, the Court emphasized that a major concern underlying Terry itself was the dangers presented to officers who must make quick decisions whether or not to search for weapons. The Court therefore held that a Terry frisk for weapons may extend to the passenger compartment of the detained person's vehicle. The Court apparently concluded that the extension of the "frisk" into the car is reasonable in view of the risk presented to the officer. The Court specified, however, that such a search must be premised upon a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is dangerous and may gain access to a weapon in the vehicle.

The Court's third decision was United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983). The Court first held that Terry permits investigative detentions of luggage as well as of persons. The Court then held, however, that the detention of the luggage in that case--for 90 minutes--exceeded the permissible limits...

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