State v. Williams
| Decision Date | 26 April 2013 |
| Docket Number | NO. 2012 KA 1600,2012 KA 1600 |
| Parties | STATE OF LOUISIANA v. SIDNEY WILLIAMS, III |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
Appealed from the
32nd Judicial District Court
in and for the Parish of Terrebonne, Louisiana
The defendant, Sidney Williams, III, was charged in a multi-count bill of information with attempted first degree murder (count one), possession with intent to distribute hydrocodone, oxycodone, and cocaine (counts two, three, and six), possession of propoxyphene and butalbital (counts four and five), and attempted disarming of a police officer (count seven). See La. R.S, 14:27; La. R.S. 14:30; La. R.S. 40:968(A)(1) & (C); La. R.S. 40:967(A)(1); La. R.S. 40:969(C); La. R.S. 14:34.6. See also La. R.S. 40:964, Schedules II, III, & IV. The defendant pled not guilty on all counts. After a trial by jury, he was found guilty on count one of the responsive offense of aggravated battery (a violation of La. R.S. 14:34), and guilty as charged on the remaining counts. On each of counts one, two, and three, the trial court imposed ten years imprisonment at hard labor. On both counts four and five, the trial court imposed five years imprisonment at hard labor. On count six, the trial court imposed thirty years imprisonment at hard labor, with the first two years to be served without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. Finally, on count seven, the trial court imposed two and one-half years imprisonment at hard labor. The trial court ordered that the sentences be served concurrently.
The defendant now appeals, challenging the evidence to support the convictions on counts one through six, the State's compliance with the rules of discovery, the trial court's denial of motions to strike jurors for cause, the trial court's ruling allowing a police officer to testify as an expert witness, and the constitutionality of the sentencing. For the following reasons, we affirm the convictions and sentences.
On the evening of February 17, 2009, Trooper Brian Harding of Louisiana State Police, Troop C, was patrolling in Terrebonne Parish in a marked unit. At approximately 7:15 p.m., while traveling northbound on Louisiana Highway 315 (Bayou Dularge Road), Trooper Harding approached a Chevrolet GMC truck as it also traveled northbound. Trooper Harding noticed that the driver, later identified as the defendant, was veering off of the roadway causing the passenger side tires to cross the fog line to the shoulderof the road. Trooper Harding began to observe the defendant as he continued northbound. When defendant made a right turn to cross the Houma Navigational Canal Bridge and stopped on the shoulder before approaching the bridge, Trooper Harding passed him. After the defendant got right back on the road behind him, Trooper Harding, suspicious, pulled onto the shoulder himself and allowed the defendant to pass ahead of him. After crossing the bridge, Trooper Harding activated his police lights and DVD and audio recording device, and conducted a traffic stop in an adjacent parking lot.
After they pulled into the parking lot, Trooper Harding exited his unit, approached the defendant's vehicle, told him to step out, and informed the defendant of his identity and the reason for the stop. Trooper Harding further requested the defendant's driver's license, insurance information, and proof of vehicle registration. The defendant immediately began to attempt to explain his erratic driving and informed the officer that his driver's license was expired. Trooper Harding used his portable communication radio to report the traffic stop and request a canine. As Trooper Harding continued to collect information and question and observe the defendant, the defendant abruptly fled into an adjacent field. Trooper Harding followed him, and a physical struggle took place. As they struggled, the defendant gained possession of Trooper Harding's taser, placed it directly to the officer's neck, and pulled the trigger. Trooper Harding used his legs to break the contact of the taser. As Trooper Harding felt the defendant tugging his holstered handgun, Trooper Harding rolled over, kicked the defendant, drew his weapon, and shot the defendant. After the defendant fell to the ground, Trooper Harding re-holstered his handgun and was eventually able to handcuff the defendant as he continued to struggle with the officer. At that point, the backup officers began to arrive on the scene and tended to Trooper Harding and the defendant until they were taken to the hospital. The officers also secured the scene and marked several evidentiary items for collection by the Louisiana State Police Crime Laboratory personnel who arrived on the scene. Among the items were a wide assortment of tablets and a white crystalline substance.
In assignment of error number one, the defendant contends that the evidence in support of the drug-related convictions is insufficient. The defendant notes that Trooper Harding did not observe him discard anything and argues that there was insufficient evidence to show that he possessed the drugs found in the field. The defendant further contends that given the struggle in the field where the cocaine was located, the cocaine residue found on his clothing was explainable. In arguing that there was insufficient evidence of intent to distribute in this case, the defendant contends that the amount of hydrocodone and cocaine seized was consistent with personal use. The defendant notes that the State presented expert testimony that one ounce of cocaine has a street value of seven hundred dollars, further noting that the six hundred dollars seized from his pants pocket was enough to purchase the amount of cocaine seized in this case. The defendant concludes that the State failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, critical elements of the drug-related charges.
In assignment of error number two, the defendant contends that the evidence in support of the aggravated battery conviction is insufficient. The defendant specifically argues that a taser is not a dangerous weapon. The defendant notes that officers testified during the trial that the electrical current produced by a taser is designed to incapacitate the individual by causing momentary numbness without producing bodily harm. The defendant further notes that when a taser is used in drive stun mode as indicated in this case, sometimes it can incapacitate an individual and sometimes it does not.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, a Louisiana appellate court is controlled by the standard enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 LEd.2d 560 (1979). That standard of appellate review, adopted by the Legislature in enacting La. Code Crim. P. art. 821, is whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that all of the elements of the crime had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. State v.Brown, 2003-0897, p. 22 (La. 4/12/05), 907 So.2d 1, 18, cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1022, 126 S.Ct. 1569, 164 L.Ed.2d 305 (2006), The Jackson standard of review is an objective standard for testing the overall evidence both direct and circumstantial, for reasonable doubt. When analyzing circumstantial evidence, La. R.S. 15:438 provides that, in order to convict, the trier of fact must be satisfied that the overall evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. State v. Graham, 2002-1492, p. 5 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/14/03), 845 So.2d 416, 420, When a case involves circumstantial evidence and the trier of fact reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the defense, that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty unless there is another hypothesis that raises a reasonable doubt. State v. Moten, 510 So.2d 55, 61 (La. App. 1 Or.), writ denied, 514 So.2d 126 (La. 1987).
As the trier of fact, a jury is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness. State v. Richardson, 459 So.2d 31, 38 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1984). Moreover, where there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. Richardson, 459 So.2d at 38. A reviewing court is not called upon to decide whether it believes the witnesses or whether the conviction is contrary to the weight of the evidence. State v. Smith, 600 So.2d 1319, 1324 (La. 1992). In the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with physical evidence, one witness's testimony, if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient support for a requisite factual conclusion. State v. Thomas, 2005-2210, p. 8 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/9/06), 938 So.2d 168, 174, writ denied, 2006-2403 (La. 4/27/07), 955 So.2d 683.
The jurisprudence has not established precise guidelines as to what constitutes "possession" of drugs under the narcotics laws. State v. Trahan, 425 So.2d 1222, 1226 (La. 1983). However, one need not physically possess a controlled dangerous substance to violate the prohibition against possession; constructive possession is sufficient. A person not in physical possession of the drug is considered to be in constructive possession of a drug when the drug is under that person's dominion andcontrol. Factors to be considered in determining whether a defendant exercised dominion and control sufficient to constitute constructive possession include: (1)...
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