State v. Williams

• Decision Date: 27 January 2010
• Docket Number: 977-KA.,No. 44,44
• Citation: 32 So.3d 902
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Jessie James WILLIAMS, Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

32 So.3d 902

STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Jessie James WILLIAMS, Appellant.

No. 44,977-KA.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.

January 27, 2010.

Louisiana Appellate Project by Paula C. Marx, for Appellant.

Charles Rex Scott, District Attorney, R. Bennett Langford, II, Kodie Smith, Catherine M. Estopinal, Assistant District Attorneys, for Appellee.

Before BROWN, PEATROSS and MOORE, JJ.

MOORE, J.

The defendant, Jessie James Williams, was convicted of attempted second degree murder. He was adjudicated a second felony habitual offender and sentenced to 100 years at hard labor to run consecutively with the remainder of his paroled conviction for forcible rape and with credit for time served. The defendant now appeals. We affirm.

FACTS

On August 2, 2008, police were called to the scene of a stabbing at an abandoned house in the 2800 block of Hardy in Shreveport. Upon arrival they found the victim, Carolyn Taylor, sitting on the front porch with an injured leg and with gashes in her throat bleeding profusely. The victim was able to identify her assailant, the defendant, Jessie James Williams.

At trial, Ms. Taylor testified that she had known the defendant about a month and a half, and during that time, their interactions consisted mostly of smoking crack cocaine and having sex. She said that the defendant wanted a romantic relationship with her, but she told him when they first met that she was not interested in having a relationship, especially since she was a prostitute. Ms. Taylor stated that she tried to avoid the defendant.

On the evening of the attack, Ms. Taylor was attending a barbeque. She called Williams and asked him to bring her something to eat because she was hungry, and the barbeque was not ready. The defendant brought her a ham sandwich and remained at the gathering. Soon another man named Rico, who was a friend of Ms. Taylor's nephew, arrived at the gathering. He spoke with Ms. Taylor for a few minutes. Then, she and Rico then went to an abandoned house down the street to engage in sexual intercourse.

According to Ms. Taylor, this entire encounter took place within approximately 15 minutes. Afterwards, she asked Rico to exit the house first so the neighbors would not see them together. Immediately after Rico left the house, Ms. Taylor saw the defendant charging at her. The victim recalled feeling pain and falling to the floor. She testified that she kicked the defendant and stuck him with a piece of glass before he grabbed her purse and jumped out of the window. The victim's injuries were so substantial she was unable to stand and had to slide herself across the floor and out the door in order to scream for help. The police arrived at the scene soon after, and the victim was taken to receive medical treatment.

The defendant was later found at a friend's house where he voluntarily surrendered. Upon examination, he was found to have lacerations on his hand and thigh.

The defendant was charged by bill of information with the attempted second degree murder of Carolyn Taylor. The jury returned a unanimous verdict of guilty as charged. The state filed an habitual offender bill of information charging the defendant as a second felony habitual offender, of which he was subsequently adjudicated. The defendant was sentenced on April 23, 2009, to the maximum sentence of 100 years at hard labor, to run consecutively with the remainder of his sentence for forcible rape for which he had recently been released on parole. The defendant now appeals alleging that the evidence does not support the crime of conviction.

DISCUSSION

The defendant contends that his offense was actually attempted manslaughter committed in sudden passion or heat of blood caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool reflection. He therefore contends that the jury verdict of attempted second degree murder cannot stand, and the lesser offense of attempted manslaughter should be substituted.

As the state observes, the defendant's assignment of error is essentially a sufficiency of evidence claim that the evidence was not sufficient to convict of attempted second degree murder in light of the mitigating factors indicating manslaughter. The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence claim is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Tate, 2001-1658 (La.5/20/03), 851 So.2d 921, cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905, 124 S.Ct. 1604, 158 L.Ed.2d 248 (2004); State v. Carter, 42,894 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1/9/08), 974 So.2d 181, writ denied, 2008-0499 (La.11/14/08), 996 So.2d 1086. This standard, now legislatively embodied in La. C. Cr. P. art. 821, does not provide the appellate court with a vehicle to substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the fact finder. State v. Pigford, 2005-0477 (La.2/22/06), 922 So.2d 517; State v. Robertson, 96-1048 (La.10/4/96), 680 So.2d 1165. The appellate court does not assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La.10/16/95), 661 So.2d 442. A reviewing court accords great deference to a jury's decision to accept or reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in part. State v. Hill, 42,025 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/9/07), 956 So.2d 758, writ denied, 2007-1209 (La.12/14/07), 970 So.2d 529.

Second degree murder is defined, in pertinent part, as "the killing of a human being: (1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm." La. R.S. 14:30.1 A.

Manslaughter is defined, in relevant part, as a "homicide which would be first or second degree murder, but the offense is committed in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool reflection." La. R.S. 14:31 A(1); State v. Quiambao, 36,587 (La.App. 2 Cir. 12/11/02), 833 So.2d 1103, writ denied, 03-0477 (La.5/16/03), 843 So.2d 1130. Provocation shall not reduce a homicide to manslaughter if the jury finds that the offender's blood had actually cooled, or that an average person's blood would have cooled, at the time the offense was committed. La. R.S. 14:31 A(1).

Finally, La. R.S. 14:27, which defines "attempt," reads in pertinent part:

A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.

B. Mere preparation to commit a crime shall not be sufficient to constitute an attempt; but lying in wait with a dangerous weapon with the intent to commit a crime, or searching for the intended victim with a dangerous weapon with the intent to commit a crime, shall be sufficient to constitute an attempt to commit the offense intended.

Thus, in order to convict for attempted second degree murder, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the specific intent to kill. State v. Bishop, 2001-2548 (La.1/14/03), 835 So.2d 434, citing State v. Huizar, 414 So.2d 741 (La.1982). Proof of specific intent to inflict great bodily harm is insufficient. State v. Martin, 92-811 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/31/94), 638 So.2d 411. Specific intent may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the offense and the conduct of the defendant. La. R.S. 14:10(1); State v. Bishop, supra, citing State v. Butler, 322 So.2d 189 (La.1975), and State v. Martin, supra.

The law is clear that although specific intent to kill is not necessary for a conviction of manslaughter; however, specific intent to kill is required for a conviction of attempted manslaughter. State v. Hutcherson, 34,540 (La.App. 2 Cir. 4/4/01), 785 So.2d 140, 147; State v. Jones, 43,963 (La.App. 2 Cir. 2/25/09), 4 So.3d 950.

"Sudden passion" and "heat of blood" are not elements of the offense of manslaughter; rather, they are mitigatory factors in the nature of a defense which exhibits a degree of culpability less than that present when the homicide is committed without them. State v. Lombard, 486 So.2d 106 (La.1986). A defendant is required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted in "sudden passion" or "heat of blood" for a verdict of manslaughter to be appropriate. State v. Robinson, 32,794 (La.App. Cir. 3/01/00), 754 So.2d 311, writ denied, 00-0989 (La.3/23/01), 787 So.2d 1008.

In reviewing a defendant's claim that he met that burden, the appellate court must determine whether a rational trier of fact, upon reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could have found that these mitigating factors had not been established by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Robinson, supra: State v. Lewis, 28,973 (La.App. 2 Cir. 12/11/96), 685 So.2d 1130, writ denied, 97-0122 (La.5/16/97), 693 So.2d 797.

The defendant claims that this was not a premeditated crime. He argues that he acted in "sudden passion or the heat of blood" because he was devastated when he saw the woman he wanted a relationship with having sex with another man. The defendant further contends that because no more than 15 minutes had passed between the time the defendant saw the victim and Rico go into the house, and then attacked the victim, there was no time for cool reflection. Finally, the defendant argues that the provocation of seeing the victim with another man was sufficient to deprive an average person of self-control and cool reflection. Accordingly, he argues, a rational trier of fact, upon a preponderance of the evidence, would have found the defendant guilty only of attempted manslaughter, which is the lesser responsive verdict for attempted...