State v. Williams

Citation88 A.3d 534,311 Conn. 626
Decision Date29 April 2014
Docket NumberNo. 19103.,19103.
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut
PartiesSTATE of Connecticut v. Chumell WILLIAMS.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Neal Cone, senior assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Timothy J. Sugrue, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Maureen Platt, state's attorney, Jayne Kennedy, senior assistant state's attorney, and Jennifer F. Miller, special deputy assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER, ZARELLA, EVELEIGH, McDONALD, ESPINOSA and VERTEFEUILLE, Js.

ESPINOSA, J.

The sole issue in this appeal is whether we should overrule our precedent holding that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement under the state constitution applies to a closed container located in the trunk of a vehicle. The defendant, Chumell Williams, appeals 1 from the judgment of conviction, rendered following his conditional plea of nolo contendere; see General Statutes § 54–94a; of one count of possession of narcotics with intent to sell by a person who is not drug-dependent in violation of General Statutes § 21a–278(b), one count of possession of narcotics with intent to sell within 1500 feet of a school in violation of General Statutes § 21a–279(d), and one count of possession of a weapon in a motor vehicle in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 29–38. On appeal, the defendant challenges the denial of his motion to suppress with respect to the narcotics and handgun that were found in a plastic bag inside the trunk of his vehicle. In doing so, the defendant asks this court to decide whether article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution 2 prohibits the warrantless search of a closed container located in the trunk of a vehicle conducted during an otherwise constitutional warrantless search of an automobile. We answer the question in the negative and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In its oral decision on the defendant's motion to suppress, the trial court made the following factual findings. “On March 25, 2010, three Waterbury police officers were patrolling Waterbury streets in an unmarked police vehicle and in plainclothes. At approximately 9 p.m., the officers stopped their vehicle at a red light at the intersection of East Farm [Street] and North Main Street. This intersection is part of a high crime area where the police have made numerous arrests for narcotic and firearm offenses. The area is well lit and the visibility was good that evening.

“While stopped at the intersection they observed the defendant's vehicle, a black Maxima, parked along the curb on West Farm [Street], very close to the intersection of West Farm [Street] and North Main Street. East Farm [Street] becomes West Farm [Street] after it crosses North Main Street. An individual was standing at the driver's window of the defendant's vehicle. The police then observed the driver hand a small item to the individual standing outside the window. The driver of the defendant's vehicle subsequently turned out to be the defendant.

“Based on the officers' training and experience, they reasonably suspected that they may have just witnessed a drug sale and decided that they should investigate further. Accordingly, the officers drove [their] vehicle through the intersection and parked further down along the curb on West Farm [Street]. They exited the vehicle and proceeded on foot toward the defendant's vehicle with their police badges displayed around their necks. As the officers neared the man, later identified as Shawn Warner, standing outside of the vehicle, they demanded that he show the officers his hands. Warner then proceeded to drop on the ground a small plastic bag containing a white rock like substance, which the officers, based upon their training and experience, reasonably concluded was cocaine. Having witnessed Warner drop this item, the officers more than confirmed their reasonable and articulable suspicion that Warner and the defendant had been engaged in a narcotics transaction.

“One of the officers placed Warner under arrest while another began to direct his attention to the black Maxima and the driver of the vehicle. A strong odor of unburnt marijuana was coming from the car. There were four occupants in the car: two in the front seats and two in the rear seats. The officer immediately demanded that the defendant show him his hands. The defendant did not immediately comply, but instead appeared to place his hands in the center console of the vehicle. It reasonably appeared to the officer that the defendant was either trying to conceal an item or to reach for a weapon. The officer again demanded that the defendant show him his hands, and the defendant subsequently complied. The defendant was removed from the vehicle and placed in handcuffs. The officers then called for backup assistance on their radio. Once backup arrived, the other individuals were removed from the car.

“At this point, one of the officers opened the center console and discovered what reasonably appeared to be crack and powder cocaine. While doing so, he also observed what reasonably appeared to be four bags of marijuana on the front passenger side floor. After these items were removed from the vehicle, the officers continued to smell a strong odor of marijuana in the car, which reasonably led them to believe that ... additional quantities of marijuana [were] still in the car. The smell was strongest in the backseat area and appeared to be emanating from behind one of the seats.

“While searching the backseat area, the officers pushed a button on one of the rear seats which then permitted the seat to be flipped down. This mechanism thereby allowed anyone sitting in the rear seat to easily access a portion of the trunk of the vehicle. Behind the seat, the officers immediately observed a dark plastic bag that smelled strongly of marijuana. The officers opened the bag and saw what reasonably appeared to be powder cocaine, marijuana, and a second opaque black plastic bag. The second bag was heavy and conformed around an object that appeared to be a handgun. [An] officer opened the bag and confirmed that it, in fact, did contain a firearm. All of the evidence was seized, [and] the defendant [was] arrested and charged with narcotics and firearm offenses.” On the basis of these findings, the trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress. The defendant subsequently entered a conditional plea of nolo contendere and the court rendered judgment of guilty in accordance with the defendant's plea. This appeal followed.

On appeal, the defendant does not challenge the search of the passenger compartment of his vehicle or the seizure of the narcotics found in the center console and on the passenger side floor. Nor does he argue that the police did not have probable cause to search the trunk. The defendant's sole claim is that the search of the bags inside the trunk, which revealed powder cocaine, marijuana and a handgun, could not be conducted within the automobile exception to the warrant requirement under the state constitution. The defendant contends that when the police have probable cause to believe that an item contains contraband or evidence of a crime, after a proper seizure, they must obtain a warrant to search any such item unless exigent circumstances exist.

In support of his argument, which requires us to reconsider our prior holdings that our state constitution allows the police to conduct a warrantless search of a closed container located in an automobile pursuant to the automobile exception, the defendant claims that a Geisler3 analysis demonstrates that our state constitution affords greater protections than the federal constitution. He first details the sociological and policy considerations that weigh in favor of excluding the search of closed containers located in vehicles from the ambit of the automobile exception under the state constitution. He identifies several instances in which this court has diverged from search and seizure jurisprudence as it has been applied under the federal constitution, and highlights a number of sister states that also have taken such an approach. Acknowledging that the fourth amendment to the federal constitution permits the search of a closed container located in a vehicle that properly is being searched pursuant to the automobile exception, the defendant urges this court to recognize an additional exigency requirement to the search of a closed container under the state constitution. 4 Applying the Geisler factors, we reject his claim and conclude that the state constitution does not afford greater protections than the federal constitution under the facts of this case.5

We do not lightly overrule precedent. [T]he doctrine of [s]tare decisis, although not an end in itself, serves the important function of preserving stability and certainty in the law ... [and] a court should not overrule its earlier decisions unless the most cogent reasons and inescapable logic require it.... Stare decisis is justified because it allows for predictability in the ordering of conduct, it promotes the necessary perception that the law is relatively unchanging, it saves resources and it promotes judicial efficiency.... It is the most important application of a theory of decisionmaking consistency in our legal culture and ... is an obvious manifestation of the notion that decisionmaking consistency itself has normative value.... We, therefore, will respect our prior decisions unless strong considerations to the contrary require us to reexamine them....” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bateson v. Weddle, 306 Conn. 1, 9–10, 48 A.3d 652 (2012).

In considering whether this court should overturn the holdings of State v. Dukes, 209 Conn. 98, 120, 547 A.2d 10 (1988), which recognized the automobile exception under the state constitution, and State v. Longo, 243 Conn. 732, 739, 708 A.2d...

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12 cases
  • State v. Skok, SC 19415
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • September 15, 2015
    ...is permissible under article first, § 7." (Citation omitted; footnote added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Williams, 311 Conn. 626, 634, 88 A.3d 534 (2014). Furthermore, because Connecticut courts have not yet considered whether article first, § 7, provides greater protection ......
  • State v. Kono, SC 19613
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • December 22, 2016
    ...Corp., 317 Conn. 357, 402–403, 119 A.3d 462 (2015) ; State v. Kelly, 313 Conn. 1, 12, 95 A.3d 1081 (2014) ; State v. Williams, 311 Conn. 626, 628–29, 88 A.3d 534 (2014) ; State v. DeFusco, 224 Conn. 627, 631–32, 620 A.2d 746 (1993) ; State v. Marsala, 216 Conn. 150, 159–61, 579 A.2d 58 (199......
  • State v. Saturno
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • July 19, 2016
    ...permitted under the fourth amendment is permissible under article first, § 7.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Williams, 311 Conn. 626, 634, 88 A.3d 534 (2014). The defendant fails to provide any historical insights into the intent of the framers that support his position. Acco......
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    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Iowa
    • June 30, 2017
    ...(Ark. 2013) ; People v. Zuniga, 372 P.3d 1052, 1056 (Colo. 2016) ; People v. Edwards, 836 P.2d 468, 471 (Colo. 1992) ; State v. Williams, 311 Conn. 626, 88 A.3d 534, 547 (2014) ; Reeder v. State, Nos. 552,1999, 583,1999, 2001 WL 355732, at *2 (Del. Mar. 26, 2001) ; State v. Betz, 815 So.2d ......
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