State v. Williams

Citation299 Kan. 911,329 P.3d 400
Decision Date27 June 2014
Docket NumberNo. 102,036.,102,036.
PartiesSTATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Marlin WILLIAMS, Appellant.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Kansas

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Syllabus by the Court

1. Generally, if there is no constitutional defect in the application of the statute to a litigant, the litigant does not have standing to argue that the statute would be unconstitutional if applied to third parties in hypothetical situations. This general rule does not apply, however, when a litigant brings an overbreadth challenge that seeks to protect First Amendment rights, even those of third parties. Instead, an exception has been recognized because the mere existence of the statute could cause a person not before the court to refrain from engaging in constitutionally protected speech or expression.

2. A litigant arguing a statute is unconstitutionally vague cannot base the challenge on the grounds that the statute may be unconstitutional in circumstances other than those before the court.

3. The criminal offense of aggravated trafficking as defined in K.S.A. 21–3447(a)(2) is not unconstitutionally overbroad.

4. The identical offense sentencing doctrine does not apply to aggravated trafficking under K.S.A. 21–3447(a)(2) and the offense of promoting prostitution under either K.S.A. 21–3513(a)(4) or K.S.A. 21–3513(a)(7) because the offenses do not have identical elements.

5. Under the facts of this case, the offense of promoting prostitution under K.S.A. 21–3513(a)(4) and K.S.A. 21–3513(a)(7) is not a more specific offense than aggravated trafficking under K.S.A. 21–3447(a)(2).

6. A prosecutor does not commit misconduct by explaining legitimate factors a jury may consider in assessing witness credibility or arguing why any such factors established by the evidence in the case should lead to a compelling inference of a witness' truthfulness.

7. If during closing arguments defense counsel suggests the jurors should infer that any potential witness not called by the State would be favorable to the defense, it is within the wide latitude given to prosecutors for a prosecutor to rebut the defense argument by pointing out a defendant can subpoena witnesses to court. Such a comment, refuting a purported inference, is not an impermissible shifting of the burden of proof.

8. A district court's use of a defendant's prior convictions when computing the defendant's criminal history score without requiring the criminal history to be included in the complaint and proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt does not violate the defendant's constitutional rights under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000).

Michelle A. Davis, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.

Matt J. Maloney, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Nola Tedesco Foulston, district attorney, and Steve Six, attorney general, were with him on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by LUCKERT, J.:

After considering Marlin Williams' appeal from a jury conviction for aggravated trafficking in violation of K.S.A. 21–3447(a)(2), the Court of Appeals, in State v. Williams, 46 Kan.App.2d 36, 257 P.3d 849 (2011), upheld the constitutionality of K.S.A. 21–3447(a)(2), concluding the provision is not overbroad. Also, because Williams' conduct clearly fell within the terms of K.S.A. 21–3447(a)(2), the Court of Appeals determined that Williams lacked standing to raise an argument that the provision is unconstitutionally vague. The Court of Appeals also rejected Williams' other arguments in which he claimed: The charged offense of aggravated trafficking is identical to the offense of promoting prostitution, promoting prostitution is a more specific offense than aggravated trafficking, the prosecutor committed misconduct, and the district court should have submitted the question of his criminal history to a jury.

On review, we agree with the Court of Appeals, although we occasionally depart from its reasoning, and affirm Williams' conviction and sentence.

Facts and Procedural Background

On May 4, 2007, a Dallas, Texas, police detective was patrolling an area known for prostitution activity when he observed a young girl walking along the street. A Ford Explorer, which the detective recognized as the vehicle of a known prostitute, pulled up near the young girl, but the young girl kept walking when she spotted the clearly marked patrol car. The girl's youthful appearance and behavior aroused the detective's suspicions, causing him to follow her to a gas station where he stopped her and asked for her name and birth date. She offered a birth date that seemed obviously false to the detective, so he continued to talk to her. She eventually told him her real name—L.M.—and her date of birth date—October 10, 1991. Upon learning L.M.'s true identity and that she was only 15 years of age, the detective investigated further and discovered L.M. had been reported as a runaway from Wichita, Kansas. L.M. was transported to Dallas police headquarters for an interview. In the interview, L.M. explained she met a pimp in Wichita named “Pressure” in late April or early May. Pressure recruited her to join his prostitution ring and then drove her from Wichita to Dallas so she could work for him. L.M. gave detectives permission to examine the phone she had with her; the detectives found a phone number with a Wichita area code labeled “Preasure.”

L.M. was returned to Wichita. Once there, she learned that Pressure's real name was Marlin Williams. She reported this to law enforcement officers in Wichita.

After an investigation, the State filed charges against Williams alleging that “on or between the 1st day of April, 2007 and the 5th day of May 2007 Williams unlawfully recruited, harbored, transported, provided, or obtained by any means L.M., a child under 18 years of age, knowing L.M., with or without force, threat or coercion, would be used to engage in sexual gratification of the defendant or another in violation of K.S.A. 21–3447(a)(2).

At trial, L.M. provided details about her first contact with Williams; her first encounter was at a party, and the second was when Williams drove to the place she was living. During this second meeting, Williams, who was accompanied by a female prostitute, recruited L.M. to join in his prostitution ring.

L.M. explained that several weeks before she met Williams she had run away from the Wichita Children's Home. By the time L.M. met Williams, her living situation was rocky. She was living with a woman who had been unable to pay her rent or utility bills for several months; the water had been shut off, and they were losing electricity that week. We never really ate much, and if we did, we always went to Save–A–Lot and stole stuff.” Consequently, when Williams asked her to work as a prostitute, she agreed because she “didn't have no choice; it was just the first choice that came up.” She admitted, “I knew what I was getting myself into.”

After L.M. agreed to go with Williams and they drove away in his car, he asked if she wanted to immediately travel to Texas. She agreed but asked to call the woman with whom she had been living and to get her clothes and belongings. Williams refused, fearing she would change her mind. He promised to buy her clothes and whatever she needed once they got to Dallas, although L.M. testified that he never did. He also laid down some rules, telling L.M. that he didn't like his girls—which is the word he used; let's make that clear, girls—to look at any other man. He wanted them to look down and don't speak unless you're spoken to unless I say you can respond.”

Before leaving Wichita, Williams stopped at a house. The female prostitute—whom L.M. estimated to be about 20 years of age—and L.M. stayed in the car, and L.M. asked the woman what prostituting was like, whether Williams would buy her condoms, and what he would do if she looked at anyone. Williams then took L.M. and the woman to an apartment where he told L.M. to undress so he could look at her. After the inspection, Williams drove to another location and picked up a man he called “Casper” and then to a hotel where the woman was staying so she could get her belongings. Before they left Wichita, Williams told L.M. she should not be working the streets because she “is far too pretty for that” and once he had enough money she would be working in a club. Williams also told L.M., “My ho's make money.”

The woman and Casper accompanied Williams and L.M. to Dallas. Once they got to a hotel, Williams told L.M. to perform oral sex on him. When during the trial L.M. was asked why she obeyed, L.M. responded, “That's just what you have to do. And I believe he said that to[o], like, ... You got to do what I say.” Soon after Williams' demand and within hours of arriving in Dallas, Williams told L.M. the minimum amount she should charge for various sex acts and the minimum she had to make before she returned to the hotel. He then gave her a beeper phone and sent her out to walk the streets.

L.M. testified she and Williams stayed in three hotels over the next several days. After the first day, L.M. worked 10 to 12 hours a day, starting at the times Williams directed. According to L.M., she made about $1,000 per day and she gave all of that money to Williams, except for a relatively small amount of cash she had on her when she was taken into custody by the police. Williams would periodically check on her, asking her where she was and how much she had made. Every few hours she would return to the hotel to give Williams the money she had been paid and to shower. She only ate when Williams would bring her food; she denied ever using the money she made to buy food or drink.

Managers of two Dallas hotels also testified at trial. One manager testified Williams stayed at his hotel on April 29, 2007, in a one-person room. The other indicated Williams checked into a four-person room and stayed May 3 and 4,...

To continue reading

Request your trial
77 cases
  • League of Women Voters of Kansas v. Schwab
    • United States
    • Kansas Court of Appeals
    • 17 Junio 2022
    ...statute could cause a person not before the court to refrain from engaging in constitutionally protected speech or expression." State v. Williams , 299 Kan. 911, Syl. ¶ 1, 329 P.3d 400 (2014).I view this to be binding authority. Therefore, the majority should recognize that this exception a......
  • Stueckemann v. City of Basehor
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • 24 Abril 2015
    ...P.3d 1114 (2014) (a specific statute controls over a general one when the relevant provisions overlap); see also State v. Williams, 299 Kan. 911, 930, 329 P.3d 400 (2014) (rule that general statute should yield to specific one is rule of interpretation used to determine which statute legisl......
  • State v. Charles
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • 22 Abril 2016
    ...denied 290 Kan. 1102 (2010). This court has recently emphasized the use or lack of use of the phrase “I think.” See State v. Williams, 299 Kan. 911, 935, 329 P.3d 400 (2014) (no prosecutorial misconduct, noting absence of phrase “I think” when prosecutor discussed witness credibility); Stat......
  • State v. Harris
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • 17 Julio 2020
    ...This principle runs so deep it can negatively impact a defendant's standing to even pursue the issue. See State v. Williams , 299 Kan. 911, 918, 329 P.3d 400 (2014) ("Generally, ‘if there is no constitutional defect in the application of the statute to a litigant, [the litigant] does not ha......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
3 books & journal articles
  • Kansas Sentencing Guidelines
    • United States
    • Kansas Bar Association KBA Bar Journal No. 86-7, August 2017
    • Invalid date
    ...drug paraphernalia with intent to manufacture a controlled substance, a severity level 4 drug felony). [146] See, e.g., State v. Williams, 299 Kan. 911, 329 P3d 400 (2014) (rejecting argument that the identical offense doctrine applied to aggravated trafficking and promoting prostitution); ......
  • Kansas Sentencing Guidelines
    • United States
    • Kansas Bar Association KBA Bar Journal No. 86-7, August 2017
    • Invalid date
    ...drug paraphernalia with intent to manufacture a controlled substance, a severity level 4 drug felony). [146] See, e.g., State v. Williams, 299 Kan. 911, 329 P.3d 400 (2014) (rejecting argument that the identical offense doctrine applied to aggravated trafficking and promoting prostitution);......
  • Appellate Decisions
    • United States
    • Kansas Bar Association KBA Bar Journal No. 88-4, April 2019
    • Invalid date
    ...affected her ability to premeditate. Three claims of prosecutorial error are examined. First, applying principles in State v. Williams, 299 Kan. 911 (2014), prosecutor did not suggest Blansett bore the burden of disproving the crimes charged when prosecutor told jury that defense had power ......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT