State v. Williams, 661

• Decision Date: 31 January 1969
• Docket Number: No. 661,661
• Citation: 165 S.E.2d 481,275 N.C. 77
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE, v. Carl Leonard WILLIAMS and Eddie Joel Williams.

Page 481

165 S.E.2d 481

275 N.C. 77

STATE, v. Carl Leonard WILLIAMS and Eddie Joel Williams.

No. 661.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Jan. 31, 1969.

T. Wade Bruton, Atty. Gen., and Harry W. McGalliard, Deputy Atty. Gen., for the State.

MacRae, Cobb, MacRae & Henley, Fayetteville, for defendant appellant Carl Leonard Williams.

Charles G. Rose, Jr., Fayetteville, for defendant appellant Eddie Joel Williams.

BOBBITT, Justice.

Defendants assign as error the action of the court 'in excusing from the jury those jurors who expressed the personal conviction that they were opposed to capital punishment.' This assignment is based solely on the following statement in the agreed case on appeal: 'In the selection of the jury the court excused from the jury all those jurors who stated that they were opposed to Capital Punishment. EXCEPTION NO. 1.' Defendants rely upon Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776.

A jury had convicted Witherspoon of murder And had fixed his penalty at death. In granting Certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States limited consideration to the following question: 'Whether the operation of the Illinois statute providing that the state could challenge for cause all prospective jurors who were opposed to, or had conscientious scruples against, capital punishment deprived the petitioner of a jury which fairly represented a cross section of the community, and assured the state of a jury whose members were partial to the prosecution on the issue of guilt or innocence, in violation of the petitioner's rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.' Witherspoon v. Illinois, 389 U.S. 1035, 88 S.Ct. 793, 19 L.Ed.2d 822.

In Witherspoon, Mr. Justice Stewart, expressing the views of five members of the Court, stated: 'Specifically, we hold that A sentence of death cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed or recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction. No defendant can constitutionally Be put to death at the hands of a tribunal so selected.' (Our italics.) 391 U.S. at 521--523, 88 S.Ct. at 1776--1777, 20 L.Ed.2d at 784--785.

Directly pertinent to the present case, Mr. Justice Stewart stated: 'We simply cannot conclude, either on the basis of the record now before us or as a matter of judicial notice, that the exclusion of jurors opposed to capital punishment results in an unrepresentative jury on the issue of guilt or substantially increases the risk of conviction. In light of the presently available information, we are not prepared to announce a Per se constitutional rule requiring the reversal of every conviction returned by a jury selected as this one was. * * * It has not been shown that this jury was biased with respect to the petitioner's guilt.' 391 U.S. at 517--518, 88 S.Ct. at 1774--1775, 20 L.Ed.2d at 782--783. Footnote 21 of the majority opinion includes the following: 'Nor does the decision in this case affect the validity of any sentence Other than one of death. Nor, finally, does today's holding render invalid the Conviction, as oppose(d) to the Sentence in this or any other case.' A separate opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas, who considered the basis of decision too narrow, epitomizes the holding of the majority in these words: 'Although the Court reverses as to penalty, it declines to reverse the verdict of guilt rendered by the same jury.' 391 U.S. at 531, 88 S.Ct. at 1782, 20 L.Ed.2d at 790.

It is noted that Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice White dissented from the decision in Witherspoon.

In State v. Bumper (erroneously designated Bumpers), 270 N.C. 521, 155 S.E.2d 173, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of rape with recommendation that the punishment be imprisonment for life. Upon this verdict the court, in compliance with the mandate of G.S. § 14--21, pronounced judgment imposing a sentence of life imprisonment. This Court found 'No error.' In Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 20 L.Ed.2d 797, the Supreme Court of the United States reviewed out decision on the two grounds on which it was attacked by Bumper, namely, (1) that his constitutional right to an impartial jury had been violated because the prosecution was permitted to challenge for cause all prospective jurors who stated their opposition to capital punishment, and (2) that a rifle introduced in evidence against him was obtained by a search made in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Our decision was reversed on the ground the search was unlawful and therefore the rifle should not have been admitted in evidence.

With reference to Bumper's claim that his constitutional right to an impartial jury had been violated, Mr. Justice Stewart, expressing the views of five members of the Court, said: 'In Witherspoon v. State of Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776, decided today, we have held that a death sentence cannot constitutionally be executed if imposed by a jury from which have been removed for cause those who, without more, are opposed to capital punishment or have conscientious scruples against imposing the death penalty. Our decision in Witherspoon does not govern the present case, because here the jury recommended a sentence of life imprisonment. The petitioner argues, however, that a jury qualified under such standards must necessarily be biased as well with respect to a defendant's guilt, and that his conviction must accordingly be reversed because of the denial of his right under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to trial by an impartial jury. (Citations.) We cannot accept that contention in the present case. The petitioner adduced no evidence to support the claim that a jury selected as this one was is necessarily 'prosecution prone,' and the materials referred to in his brief are no more substantial than those brought to our attention in Witherspoon. Accordingly, we decline to reverse the judgment of conviction upon this basis.' 391 U.S. at 545, 88 S.Ct. at 1790, 20 L.Ed.2d at 800--801.

The foregoing is quoted with approval by Higgins, J., in State v. Peele, 274 N.C. 106, 113--114, 161 S.E.2d 568, 573--574, certiorari denied 393 U.S. 1042, 89 S.Ct. 669, 21 L.Ed.2d 590, which, like Bumper, did not involve a death sentence and is direct authority in this jurisdiction for decision herein.

In Bumper, Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring in result, expressed the view that reversal should have been based also on the ground Bumper had been denied 'the right to trial on the issue of guilt by a jury representing a fair cross-section of the community' since the record showed 'that 16 of 53 prospective jurors were excused for cause because of their opposition to capital punishment.'

The views of the majority in Crawford v. Bounds, 4 Cir. 1968, 395 F.2d 297, seemingly are in accord with those expressed in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in Bumper. It is noted that the Supreme Court of the United States in Bounds v. Crawford, 393 U.S. 76, 89 S.Ct. 234, 21 L.Ed.2d 62, vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals 'for further consideration in light of Witherspoon v. Illinois,' supra, 'and for consideration of the other constitutional questions raised in the case.'

Here, as in Bumper and Peele, death sentences are not involved. In accord with Witherspoon, Bumper and Peele, we reject the idea the jurors are biased in favor of conviction simply because they do not have conscientious or religious scruples against capital punishment.

'Each party to a trial is entitled to a fair and unbiased jury. Each may challenge for cause a juror who is prejudiced against him. A party's right is not to select a juror prejudiced in his favor, but to reject one prejudiced against him.' State v. Peele, 274 N.C. at 113, 161 S.E.2d at 573. See also, State v. Spence, 274 N.C. 536, 538, 164 S.E.2d 593, 594. In State v. Peele, supra, Higgins, J., in his opinion for the Court, cites federal cases substantially in accord with the stated North Carolina rule.

Nothing in the record before us indicates that any member of the jury which tried defendants was biased in favor of conviction or otherwise prejudiced against defendants on account of his views on capital punishment or otherwise. Nor does it appear that the jury included any juror who was challenged by defendants. In accord with the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Bumper, and our own decision in Peele, we hold the record fails to show prejudice to defendants in respect of the manner in which the jury was selected. Although distinguishable factually in certain particulars, 1968 decisions generally in accord with the views expressed herein include the following: Commonwealth v. Wilson, 431 Pa. 21, 30, 244 A.2d 734, 739; Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 239 N.E.2d 5, 11 (Mass.); People v. Speck, 242 N.E.2d 208, 225--228 (Ill.).

At the close of the evidence, each defendant moved for judgment as in case of nonsuit and excepted to the court's denial thereof. Assignments of error based on these exceptions are without merit.

The only reasonable inference that may be drawn from the evidence is that Mrs. Hargrove did not accompany defendants voluntarily at any time or under any circumstances but that she was forcibly put in their car by defendants and confined in their custody continuously by force, threats of force and fear from the time and point of collision on the Reilly Road until she was brought back and left there. Hence, there was ample evidence to support the convictions of kidnapping in violation of G.S. § 14--39. State v. Bruce, 268 N.C. 174, 182--183, 150 S.E.2d 216, 223, and cases cited.

The only reasonable inference that may be drawn from the evidence is that Mrs. Hargrove did not consent that either of defendants have sexual...