State v. Williams

Decision Date13 June 1996
Docket NumberNo. 517A93,517A93
Citation471 S.E.2d 379,343 N.C. 345
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE of North Carolina v. James Edward WILLIAMS.

Michael F. Easley, Attorney General by John G. Barnwell, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

Ann B. Petersen, Chapel Hill, for defendant-appellant.

ORR, Justice.

The defendant, James Edward Williams, was found guilty of first-degree murder both on the basis of premeditation and deliberation and under the felony murder rule. He was also found guilty of common law robbery. After a capital sentencing hearing, the jury recommended a sentence of death for the first-degree murder conviction; Judge Greeson sentenced defendant accordingly and additionally sentenced defendant to a consecutive term of ten years' imprisonment on the robbery conviction.

The evidence tended to show that defendant and Bernice Sikes were "boyfriend-girlfriend." While Sikes was in prison in January of 1991, defendant told her by phone on several occasions that he knew a lady that had a car and that he could get it by killing her.

On 14 February 1991, defendant, Sikes, and defendant's cousin, Hammonds, who were all living at the Thomasville home of defendant's mother, left the house at about 5:00 p.m. to go bowling in High Point. They stayed at the bowling alley for about an hour, then rode around the area, stopping at an ABC store. Next, they stopped at a Burger King and then a game room, where defendant bought a six-pack of beer. The three played pool at the game room, returned to the bowling alley about 9:00 p.m., and left the bowling alley about 11:00 p.m. While Hammonds drove, defendant gave directions to the Trinity home of the victim, Elvie Rhodes. Hammonds dropped off defendant and Sikes at Rhodes' home. Defendant told Hammonds to tell his mother that somebody picked him up at the bowling alley.

Sikes testified that she and defendant waited outside the home of Elvie Rhodes while defendant finished his six-pack of beer. Defendant told her that they were at the house of a woman he had gone out to supper with several times. He then told Sikes to wait outside and entered the house. After a short interval, Sikes knocked on the door, which defendant opened wearing only his underpants. He later told Sikes he had undressed to keep from getting blood on his clothes. Sikes entered the house and saw Ms. Rhodes with a bloody face and eyes swollen shut. Defendant kicked and slapped Ms. Rhodes; rubbed his hand on the side of her face and licked the blood off; hit her in the head with a pole from a kitchen chair; and told her, "You know I'm going to kill you, don't you?" Next, defendant took Ms. Rhodes to the bathroom so that she could see her face, then he took her back to the living room and threw her to the floor. Defendant told Sikes to clean up the blood in the kitchen. He then said to Sikes, "She won't die, baby." Sikes further testified that she looked in the living room and saw defendant's arm around Ms. Rhodes' throat, choking her. Then defendant stomped Ms. Rhodes in the stomach, chest, and throat. He then gave Sikes his knife and told her to go cut the venetian blind cord. Defendant used the cord to choke Ms. Rhodes until she died.

Next, defendant instructed Sikes to clean up the blood and fingerprints and to look for money. Sikes then helped defendant wrap Ms. Rhodes' body in a quilt and put it in the trunk of Ms. Rhodes' car. They left in the car at around 6:00 or 6:30 a.m. and subsequently threw a bag containing poles from the kitchen chair and the cloth that the blood had been cleaned up with into a trash bin behind a car wash in Thomasville. They proceeded from there to Hardee's and bought breakfast. Later that day, they disposed of the body in some woods near Farmer, where Sikes used to live. Ms. Rhodes' car was found parked and abandoned outside a restaurant in Thomasville. A latent palm print on the trunk was identified as defendant's.

When Sikes was first arrested, she told police that she committed the murder. At trial, she testified that she had falsely confessed to protect defendant because he told her she would get in less trouble than he

would because she was a mother of three, while he had a bad prior record.

JURY SELECTION
I.

Defendant contends that the trial court improperly excused for cause potential juror Vernell Honeycutt based on her opinions about the death penalty. We disagree.

The test for determining whether a prospective juror may be properly excused for cause for his views on the death penalty is whether those views would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath." Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 852, 83 L.Ed.2d 841, 851-52 (1985)....

We have recognized that a prospective juror's bias may not always be "provable with unmistakable clarity [and,] [i]n such cases, reviewing courts must defer to the trial court's judgment concerning whether the prospective juror would be able to follow the law impartially." State v. Davis, 325 N.C. 607, 624, 386 S.E.2d 418, 426 (1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 905, 110 S.Ct. 2587, 110 L.Ed.2d 268 (1990).

State v. Green, 336 N.C. 142, 158-59, 443 S.E.2d 14, 24 (citation omitted), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1046, 115 S.Ct. 642, 130 L.Ed.2d 547 (1994). The trial court's ruling will not be disturbed absent abuse of discretion.

Defendant claims that potential juror Honeycutt should not have been excused for cause because she said that she would be willing to follow the law and the evidence. However, a review of the entire voir dire transcript supports a finding that Honeycutt's views against the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair the performance of her duties as a juror. "[A] potential juror's equivocation on the subject of the death penalty may stem from a 'conscientious desire to do his duty as a juror and to follow the court's instructions in the face of recognizing his personal inability to impose the death penalty.' " State v. Miller, 339 N.C. 663, 679, 455 S.E.2d 137, 145 (quoting State v. Yelverton, 334 N.C. 532, 544, 434 S.E.2d 183, 190 (1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 242, 133 L.Ed.2d 169 (1995)). Here, Honeycutt continually stated to the prosecutor and to the trial court that she did not believe that she could vote for the death penalty under any circumstances. When the court asked if she knew of any circumstances that she could think of when she could vote to impose the death penalty, Honeycutt replied, "No, I don't know of any." The trial court properly could have concluded that Honeycutt's statement that she would follow the court's instructions arose out of her desire to perform her duties as a juror according to the dictates of the law. The voir dire transcript supports the trial court's finding that Honeycutt would be unable to perform her duties and unable to apply the law impartially in the case. The court's excusal for cause of potential juror Honeycutt was not an abuse of discretion. This assignment of error is overruled.

II.

Defendant next contends that during jury selection, the State exercised its peremptory challenges to remove black jurors on the basis of race in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). We hold that no error occurred involving the State's use of peremptory challenges in jury selection.

Defendant assigns error to the peremptory challenges of two of the five black jurors who were in the venire. The other three were removed for cause. Defendant objected to the peremptory challenges during jury selection. The trial court ruled that defendant had not made a prima facie case, but agreed to defendant's request that the prosecutor give his reasons for excusing the jurors for the record. The prosecutor stated as his reasons for peremptorily challenging the first juror that

[s]he had a brother that was charged with assault in Virginia with a shotgun, and also she had a sister that was murdered. She also has [sic] her niece is seeing a psychiatrist, and she related that, and also she wasn't particularly paying any attention to what was going on and her demeanor is not----She also was having trouble whether The prosecutor stated as his reasons for excusing the second juror

to judge somebody or not. She has a problem in that she could not judge anybody now but she was hesitant, in my opinion, and also on the death penalty, in my judgment.

her demeanor and her answers to me. Also she had had----She knew Ms. Hole and she also knew Ms. Hedrick from a court case in court in which she and an officer had a--she tore up a ticket and threw it in the officer's face. We were aware of that, and she had a relationship with Ms. Hole that was not----was unlike her answers to me and I do not feel that her answers, her attitude was such that she was definitely not----just did not feel comfortable with her answers and her demeanor. And she lied about knowing Ms. Hedrick.... And she has a significant traffic record.

Defendant argues that the court erred both in not making findings after the prosecutor gave his reasons for excusing the jurors and in not finding that a Batson violation occurred.

As summarized in State v. Jackson, 322 N.C. 251, 368 S.E.2d 838 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1110, 109 S.Ct. 3165, 104 L.Ed.2d 1027 (1989), the Supreme Court held that in Batson v. Kentucky

a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in the selection of a petit jury may be established on evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges at the trial. In order to establish such a prima facie case the defendant must be a member of a cognizable racial group and he must show the prosecutor has used peremptory challenges to remove from the jury members of the defendant's race. The trial court must consider this fact as well as all relevant circumstances in determining whether a prima facie case of discrimination...

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