State v. Williams

• Decision Date: 10 July 2015
• Docket Number: No. 2014AP1099–CR.,2014AP1099–CR.
• Parties: STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Maltese Lavele WILLIAMS, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

364 Wis.2d 126

867 N.W.2d 736

STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff–Respondent

v.Maltese Lavele WILLIAMS, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 2014AP1099–CR.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Argued April 21, 2015.

Decided July 10, 2015.

For the defendant-appellant, there were briefs by John A. Pray and the Frank J. Remington Center, University of Wisconsin Law School, and oral argument by John A. Pray.

For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by Daniel J. O'Brien, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was Brad D. Schimel, attorney general.

Opinion

DAVID T. PROSSER, J.

¶ 1 This case is before the court on certification by the court of appeals, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.61 (2011–12).¹ The court of appeals certified the case asking this court to clarify precedent related to erroneous jury instructions in criminal trials.

¶ 2 Maltese Lavele Williams (Williams) and two accomplices attempted to rob Michael Parker (Parker) in Parker's home on the evening of January 14, 2013. During the robbery, Parker and a houseguest, Authur Robinson (Robinson), were shot and killed. At trial, the jury was given an instruction indicating that they could convict Williams of the felony murder of Robinson if the defendants had attempted to rob Robinson and the attempted robbery caused Robinson's death. However, the State presented insufficient evidence at trial that the defendants had attempted to rob Robinson. Instead, the State relied primarily on the theory that the men attempted to rob Parker. The jury convicted Williams of felony murder in Robinson's death even though they found Williams not guilty of the attempted robbery of Robinson.²

¶ 3 The parties do not dispute that a valid theory of felony murder for the death of Robinson would be that Williams, as party to a crime, caused the death of Robinson while engaged in an attempted armed robbery of Parker. However, Williams argues that the jury was obligated to follow the instructions given to them on felony murder, and that the evidence presented was insufficient for the jury to convict him under the instructions given. The State counters that any error in the jury instructions only increased the burden on the State, and that it is clear that had the jury been given the proper instruction, the jury still would have found Williams guilty of felony murder.

¶ 4 We are presented with two seemingly conflicting precedents that address the question at issue. The first case is State v. Wulff, 207 Wis.2d 143, 557 N.W.2d 813 (1997), in which we held that a defendant cannot be convicted on a theory of a crime not presented to a jury. The second case is State v. Beamon, 2013 WI 47, 347 Wis.2d 559, 830 N.W.2d 681, in which we upheld the conviction of a defendant even though the jury was given an instruction that inaccurately added an element—not required by the statute—to the crime of fleeing or evading a police officer.

¶ 5 In certifying this case for our review, the court of appeals noted that “[e]ach of these three cases, Wulff, Beamon , and now Williams, appears to present a subtle variation of the same issue,” and observed that it was “uncertain whether Williams is more like Wulff or more like Beamon. ” State v. Williams, No. 2014AP1099–CR, 2014 WL 5732861, unpublished certification (Wis.Ct.App. Nov. 6, 2014). The court of appeals also noted that two other issues on appeal—ineffective assistance of counsel claims related to trial counsel's decision not to strike a juror and not to object to the admission of crime scene photographs—involved the application of settled law.

¶ 6 We hold that a jury instruction may be considered erroneous when it describes a theory of criminal culpability that was not presented to the jury or it omits a valid theory of criminal culpability that was presented to the jury. Convictions under erroneous jury instructions are subject to harmless error review. When an erroneous instruction has been given but it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have convicted the defendant had the proper instruction been given, the jury verdict can be affirmed.

¶ 7 Here, based on the strength of the evidence presented and the statutory elements that the jury found, it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury still would have convicted Williams of felony murder had the jury instruction accurately reflected the State's theory of the crime. We therefore hold that the defect in the jury instructions was harmless error. Furthermore, we conclude that Williams was not prejudiced by his trial counsel's decision not to strike a juror and not to object to the admission of crime scene photographs. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's judgment of conviction.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ 8 In the early morning hours of January 15, 2013, Milwaukee police responded to a double homicide at a house on Milwaukee's south side. The investigators later learned that the killings occurred during a failed drug heist. The first homicide victim, Michael Parker, was found dead in the snow across the street from his home. The second victim, Authur Robinson, was found dead on the floor of Parker's kitchen. Both victims died from bullet wounds

.

¶ 9 Police recovered a cell phone at the scene of the murders and traced the phone to an individual named Dajuan Collins. Collins, in turn, led the police to Williams, who was arrested around 3:00 p.m. on January 21, 2013.

¶ 10 Milwaukee Police Detective Kent Corbett interviewed Williams the next day at the Milwaukee Police Department. Williams first denied knowing Parker or Collins, but eventually admitted to knowing both. Williams also admitted that he had arranged the drug deal and was at the scene when the homicides occurred. He said that Collins had killed Parker.

¶ 11 Williams explained that the events leading up to the killings began when Collins called Williams seeking an ounce of marijuana. Williams knew that Parker sold similar quantities, so Williams arranged a deal. Some time later, Williams met up with Collins and a third individual, Maurice Dixon. The three of them then walked to Parker's home.

¶ 12 When the trio arrived at Parker's home, Williams and Collins went inside, while Dixon remained outside. Williams noticed Robinson sleeping in the living room. Parker called Williams into the kitchen, and as Parker and Williams were discussing Parker's marijuana, Collins burst into the room pointing a gun and demanding the marijuana.

¶ 13 Parker attempted to flee and Collins opened fire. Collins fired one shot in the kitchen and then followed Parker into the living room where Collins fired several additional shots.

¶ 14 In spite of being shot three times, Parker managed to escape through the front door of his home. After getting outside, however, Parker ran across the street, collapsed in the snow and died.

¶ 15 Williams explained to Detective Corbett that he remained in the kitchen until after the initial fusillade. Williams then returned to the living room and saw Collins and Robinson fighting for control of the gun. Williams said that he exited the house through the front door while Collins and Robinson continued to fight.

¶ 16 In the initial information filed February 5, 2013, after a preliminary examination, Williams was charged with two counts of felony murder, with an attempt to commit armed robbery as party to a crime as the underlying offense.³ An amended information, filed March 13, 2013, amended the charges to two counts of first-degree intentional homicide as party to a crime, and two counts of attempted robbery as party to a crime.⁴ Following some preliminary motions, jury selection for Williams' trial began April 22, 2013.⁵

¶ 17 During jury selection, prospective jurors were informed that they might “have to look at photographs from the scene that have blood on them, that have people deceased, people with gunshot wounds

, the victims in this case. You may have to look at other photographs.” When asked whether viewing this type of evidence would cause problems for anyone, several jurors expressed reservations about their capacity to examine such evidence. Juror No. 21 explained that her children were the source of her reservations about dealing with that type of evidence. In response to a follow-up question, she reiterated her doubts, stating, “I don't know if I can look at the pictures.” Juror No. 6 expressed similar reservations, stating, “As far as the pictures, I can't do that.” Juror No. 12 said: “It would be totally gross, grossed out in that situation.” Jurors Nos. 8 and 9 said they shared these concerns.

¶ 18 A short time later, the prospective jurors were again asked whether any of them “would not be able to listen to all the facts, to hear the testimony and weigh the evidence and make a decision in this case? Anyone feel they would not be able to do that?” Despite their reservations about seeing the photographs, none of the jurors raised their hands.

¶ 19 Still, Williams' attorney returned to the photograph issue. Juror No. 6 said the photos would make her uncomfortable and would probably be something she'd think about all day. Juror No. 6 denied that the photos would anger her, but agreed that she would find them difficult to view. Juror No. 12 said he felt the same as Juror No. 6.

¶ 20 When asked if the photographs might affect deliberations, Juror No. 12 answered: “Really hard to say. I don't know if I would have a bias or not.” This prompted the court to interject with the comment that “everybody would agree they're not pleasant pictures to look at.... The question is whether or not it would impair your ability to come to [a] fair and just result in the matter after listening to the testimony.” Juror No. 12 responded that he thought he would be a little biased. Williams' attorney immediately sought clarification of Juror No. 12's comment. After a brief exchange, Juror No. 12 agreed that what he was trying to convey was that looking at the pictures would make him feel sympathy for the victims.

¶ 21 Although potential...