State v. Williams, 24609

Citation326 S.C. 130,485 S.E.2d 99
Decision Date08 January 1997
Docket NumberNo. 24609,24609
PartiesThe STATE, Respondent, v. Brad Edward WILLIAMS, Appellant. . Heard
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of South Carolina

Chief Attorney Daniel T. Stacey, of South Carolina Office of Appellate Defense, Columbia; and Ray E. Thompson, Jr., Spartanburg, for appellant.

Attorney General Charles Molony Condon, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Assistant Attorney General Robert F. Daley, Jr., Columbia; and Solicitor Holman C. Gossett, Spartanburg, for respondent.

FINNEY, Chief Justice:

Appellant was convicted of murder and received a life sentence. He raises several issues on appeal, including a claim that the State unconstitutionally intimidated a potential defense witness, causing the witness to refuse to be interviewed by appellant's counsel. We find appellant has established prejudicial error on this ground, and reverse and remand.

The State's theory was that appellant was the driver of a van from which shots were fired into a church parking lot following a heated basketball game. There is no contention appellant actually fired the shots. A coach of one of the basketball teams was the victim. The evidence tended to show that the fatal shot was fired out of the driver's window of the van, which had been rolled down, while the van cruised by slowly with its headlights off. Following the shooting, the van careened through several neighborhoods, hitting several cars, before being pulled over. The gun from which the fatal bullet was fired was never found.

Marion Lindsey was a passenger in the van. He was represented by Attorney Johnston, and had negotiated a plea agreement. Appellant's attorney learned from Johnston that Lindsey had given an oral statement to the police in which he stated that at the same time the shooter in the van was firing shots, other shots were being fired by an unknown gun man (or men) outside the van. This information would be exculpatory as to appellant since his liability for murder rested on the fatal shots being fired from the van. Further, while several witnesses heard shots being fired in the area after the game, only one other witness 1 would testify he heard the other shots fired contemporaneously with those fired from the van. Lindsey did not testify at appellant's trial.

At trial, appellant alleged that the State had unconstitutionally interfered with his due process right to establish his defense by intimidating Lindsey from speaking to appellant's counsel. See Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 93 S.Ct. 351, 34 L.Ed.2d 330 (1972). The circuit court conducted an in camera hearing. At this hearing, appellant's attorney testified Attorney Johnston agreed to allow appellant's attorney to interview Lindsey, conditioned on informing the solicitor's office of the meeting, which the attorney did by letter dated April 11. An investigator (McGraw) for the solicitor's office called appellant's attorney on April 13, the day before the scheduled interview, and told him "that it would be improper for me to interview Marion Lindsey and that the Solicitor's Office would not allow the interview." This statement is uncontradicted in the record since the State failed to call Investigator McGraw at the hearing.

Attorney Johnston testified that he conditioned appellant's interview of Lindsey on the "permission" of the Solicitor's Office. He testified that Assistant Solicitor Mabry spoke to him and "expressed disapproval" of the planned interview, and told Attorney Johnston it would not be in Lindsey's "best interest" to allow him to be interviewed by defense counsel. Attorney Johnston perceived from Mabry's comments that allowing the interview to go forward could jeopardize the plea offer, and communicated this "implication" to Lindsey and his mother, 2 who then declined to speak with appellant's attorney. A lawyer who was representing a third codefendant, and who had hoped to interview Lindsey along with appellant's attorney, testified and supported the testimony of appellant's attorney and Attorney Johnston.

Assistant Solicitor Mabry said that while he told Attorney Johnston that he could not tell his client not to talk to another attorney, 3 he did tell him he believed it was not in his client's "best interest" to talk to another defendant's attorney because hat attorney might "shake him up" and cause Lindsey not to cooperate and therefore lose his deal. He admitted telling Attorney Johnston that he did not want Lindsey to go through with the interview.

The trial judge ruled that he understood "from the testimony and evidence and questions by the Court that Mr. Johnston did not in anyway feel that the State prevented this witness from being interviewed or talking with anyone else. But that it was a decision made by the two of them that it would be in his best interest not to testify, but the ultimate decision [sic], or to be interviewed, but the ultimate decision of an individual as to whether or not they talk with a defense attorney or anyone else is made by them." The findings of the circuit court are binding on this Court unless unsupported by the evidence or clearly wrong, or controlled by an error of law. State v. Thrift, 312 S.C. 282, 440 S.E.2d 341 (1994). We agree that the evidence shows that the decision not to talk to appellant's counsel was made by Lindsey, but that finding is not dispositive of the issue raised by the appellant: whether that decision was influenced by improper governmental interference? On this point, we find the only evidence in the record shows improper interference.

"Improper intimidation of a witness may violate a defendant's due process right to present his defense witnesses freely if the intimidation amounts to 'substantial government interference with a defense witness' free and unhampered choice to testify." ' United States v. Saunders, 943 F.2d 388, 392 (4th Cir.1991) (citations omitted). Generally, courts have found unconstitutional intimidation where the government has advised a potential defense witness that it would not be in his "best interest" to talk to the defendant or his attorney. See, e.g., United States v. Terzado-Madruga, 897 F.2d 1099 (11th Cir.1990)(error cured by subsequent governmental advice that witness was free to talk to defense); United States v. Wellman, 830 F.2d 1453 (7th Cir.1987)(while "best interest" advice susceptible of construction as veiled threat, where witness none-the-less gave...

To continue reading

Request your trial
11 cases
  • State v. Edwards
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • June 21, 2007
    ...factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Quattlebaum, 338 S.C. 441, 527 S.E.2d 105 (2000); State v. Williams, 326 S.C. 130, 485 S.E.2d 99 (1997); State v. Patterson, 367 S.C. 219, 625 S.E.2d 239 (Ct.App.2006) cert. pending; State v. Landis, 362 S.C. 97, 606 S.E.2d 503 (C......
  • State v. Rice
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • October 5, 2007
    ...findings unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Quattlebaum, 338 S.C. 441, 454, 527 S.E.2d 105, 111 (2000); State v. Williams, 326 S.C. 130, 135, 485 S.E.2d 99, 102 (1997); State v. Patterson, 367 S.C. 224, 625 S.E.2d 239, 241 (Ct.App.2006) cert. pending State v. Landis, 362 S.C. 97, 1......
  • State v. Inman
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • January 25, 2012
    ...constitutional right of a defendant to call witnesses requires that they be called without intimidation from the State. State v. Williams, 326 S.C. 130, 485 S.E.2d 99 (1997). In Williams, this Court explained: [395 S.C. 562] “Improper intimidation of a witness may violate a defendant's due ......
  • State v. Needs, 24856.
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • November 23, 1998
    ...baseless threats or charges at a potential defense witness in an effort to prevent the witness from testifying. See State v. Williams, 326 S.C. 130, 485 S.E.2d 99 (1997) (improper intimidation of witness may violate defendant's due process right to present defense witnesses freely if the in......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT