State v. Williams

• Decision Date: 25 February 2014
• Docket Number: No. WD 74285.,WD 74285.
• Citation: State v. Williams, 420 S.W.3d 713 (Mo. App. 2014)
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Trent L. WILLIAMS, Appellant.

420 S.W.3d 713

STATE of Missouri, Respondent,

v.Trent L. WILLIAMS, Appellant.

No. WD 74285.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

Feb. 25, 2014.

Chris Koster, Attorney General, Evan J. Buchheim, Assistant Attorney General, Jefferson City, MO, for Respondent.

Laura G. Martin, District Defender, Kansas City, MO, for Appellant.

Before Division I: CYNTHIA L. MARTIN, Presiding Judge, and MARK D. PFEIFFER and KAREN KING MITCHELL, Judges.

MARK D. PFEIFFER, Judge.

Trent Williams (“Williams”) appeals the judgment of the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri (“trial court”), finding him guilty, after a jury trial, of the class A felony of murder in the first degree and sentencing him to life imprisonment without the possibility of probation or parole. Williams challenges his conviction and sentence in light of Miller v. Alabama, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). Williams also asserts that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for new trial based on a claim of newly discovered evidence and in admitting certain gun evidence. Williams's evidentiary claims lack merit, but his sentencing claim is meritorious in light of recent changes in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Therefore, we affirm in part and reverse in part and remand for further proceedings consistent with our ruling today.

Facts and Procedural History ¹

On June 7, 1993, Williams and his brother Sean ² were watching television at their parents' house on East 68th Terrace in Kansas City, Missouri, when Sean's girlfriend stopped by to show Sean her new car. Sean and his girlfriend went for a ride around the neighborhood. When they drove by someone the girlfriend thought was Cameron Sheppard (“Victim”), Sean's demeanor changed. He became angry and told his girlfriend to drive back to his parents' house. Once inside, Williams and Sean left their parents' house together.

At about 12:10 a.m. the next day, Williams, Sean, and the Victim were standing on the sidewalk across the street from 4014 East 67th Terrace having words with each other. Williams was holding an assault rifle; Sean was holding a pistol grip 12–gauge shotgun; the Victim was unarmed. Williams shot the Victim first, then Sean shot him,³ and the Victim fell to the ground. Williams and Sean ran from the scene through an alley. A third person was in the alley with Williams and Sean, but the third person did not have a weapon.

When Sean's girlfriend left Sean's parents' house and got into her car, Sean and Williams came up from behind. Sean told her to open the trunk, and he would go with her to her Kansas residence. He put a bag in the trunk. Williams and another man were with Sean, who appeared winded, agitated, and excited. She dropped the unidentified man off down the street and drove Williams and Sean to her residence, where Williams and Sean spent the night. In the morning, she drove Williams and Sean to the house Sean shared with their brother Darwin.

The Victim died from multiple high velocity gunshot wounds (at least ten were found by the medical examiner) and at least one shotgun wound to the left side of his back, left arm, and left side of the head. Investigators found five live shotgun shells and two spent shotgun shells at the crime scene, as well as twenty-two spent PMC 7.62x39 shell casings. Impact marks caused from a gun being fired in a downward position were found at the crime scene, indicating that the Victim was lying on the ground while being shot.

About a week after the shooting, the police searched Sean and Darwin's house and found a PETA SKS 7.62x39 millimeter rifle, a 12–gauge Winchester shotgun shell slug on the box springs under the mattress, a rifle magazine loaded with live ammunition, and ten live rounds head-stamped PMC 7.62x39 millimeters.⁴

On January 27, 2009, a petition was filed in the Family Court Division of the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, alleging that on June 8, 1993, ⁵ Williams, a juvenile,⁶ committed murder in the first degree, § 565.020, RSMo Cum.Supp.1992. Williams was also charged with armed criminal action, § 571.015. The juvenile officer moved for a hearing pursuant to section 211.071 on whether Williams should be transferred from Family Court to a court of general jurisdiction. After a hearing held on February 11, 2009, the Family Court dismissed the juvenile officer's petition and transferred jurisdiction over Williams to the court of general jurisdiction for the purpose of prosecuting him as an adult. Thereafter, Williams was charged by indictment in the Jackson County Circuit Court with murder in the first degree and armed criminal action.⁷

Williams's first trial in December 2010 ended in a mistrial because of a hung jury. He was re-tried on June 13–17, 2011, and the State presented the evidence summarized above. While Williams did not testify at trial, he called several witnesses who testified that he was not involved in the shooting. Sean testified that he and a man named Trevor Wilson, who died prior to Williams's trial, shot the Victim and that Williams was not involved. The jury was instructed on both first- and second-degree murder and found Williams guilty of first-degree murder and assessed punishment at life imprisonment. Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Williams to life imprisonment without the possibility of probation or parole.

Williams timely appeals.

Points I and II—Sentencing

In Points I and II, Williams claims that the first-degree murder statute, § 565.020, is unconstitutional as applied to him in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Miller v. Alabama, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). In Point I, Williams argues that in the absence of a valid penalty provision for juvenile offenders, section 565.020 is unenforceable against him; therefore, his conviction and sentence for first-degree murder should be reversed, and either he should be discharged, or a judgment of conviction for murder in the second degree should be entered, and he should be re-sentenced. In the alternative, in Point II, Williams claims that he should be re-sentenced on first-degree murder to an authorized term of imprisonment for a class A felony.

Standard of Review

The Missouri Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction in cases involving the validity of a state statute under article V, section 3 of the Missouri Constitution. However, a party's mere assertion that a statute is unconstitutional does not necessarily deprive this court of jurisdiction unless that issue is real and substantial and not merely colorable. State v. Davis, 203 S.W.3d 796, 801 (Mo.App.W.D.2006). Where “the Missouri Supreme Court has already twice ruled on the precise issue presented by the Defendant, the court of appeals has jurisdiction, but must ... follow the rule decided by the Supreme Court.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). See also Austin W. Road Mach. Co. v. City of New Madrid, 185 S.W.2d 850, 851 (Mo.App.1945) (“No construction of the constitutional provision is called for, but merely its application.... Hence, this court has jurisdiction.”).

The issues raised by Williams concerning the constitutionality of the first-degree murder statute as applied to juvenile offenders in light of Miller and the sentencing procedures upon remand were decided by the Missouri Supreme Court in companion cases handed down July 30, 2013: State v. Hart, 404 S.W.3d 232 (Mo. banc 2013), and State v. Nathan, 404 S.W.3d 253 (Mo. banc 2013). Therefore, we have jurisdiction to consider Williams's appeal.

Analysis

Williams was found guilty of first-degree murder under section 565.020, which in 1993 ⁸ provided:

1. A person commits the crime of murder in the first degree if he knowingly causes the death of another person after deliberation upon the matter.

2. Murder in the first degree is a class A felony, and the punishment shall be either death or imprisonment for life without eligibility for probation or parole, or release except by act of the governor; except that, if a person has not reached his sixteenth birthday at the time of the commission of the crime, the punishment shall be imprisonment for life without eligibility for probation or parole, or release except by act of the governor.

§ 565.020, RSMo Cum.Supp.1992. At the time of trial in 2011, Williams was not eligible for the death penalty due to his age,⁹see Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (holding that the death penalty was categorically prohibited for juvenile offenders). Therefore, the only other punishment authorized by section 565.020.2 was life in prison with no possibility of probation or parole.

The United States Supreme Court held in Miller that “the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders” when the sentencer has not considered an “offender's youth and attendant characteristics.” 132 S.Ct. at 2469, 2471. In Hart, a first-degree murder case involving a juvenile, the Missouri Supreme Court acknowledged Miller's holding: ¹⁰

Miller does not categorically bar sentencing a juvenile offender who commits first-degree murder to life without parole. Instead, Miller holds that such a sentence is constitutionally permissible as long as the sentencer determines it is just and appropriate in light of the defendant's age, maturity, and the other factors discussed in Miller.

Hart, 404 S.W.3d at 237–38. Thus, Hart expressly rejected Williams's argument in Point I that in the absence of a valid penalty provision for juvenile offenders, section 565.020 is unenforceable against him.

Our decision in this case is controlled by Hart:

[defendant's] sentence of life without parole for first-degree murder violates the Eighth Amendment because, as in Miller, it was imposed with no individualized consideration of the myriad of factors discussed in the Miller decision. Accordingly, [defendant] must be re-sentenced in accordance with Miller's...