State v. Williams, KCD

• Citation: 573 S.W.2d 75
• Decision Date: 30 October 1978
• Docket Number: No. KCD,KCD
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Steven Lydell WILLIAMS, Appellant. 29144.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)

Page 75

573 S.W.2d 75

STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Steven Lydell WILLIAMS, Appellant.

No. KCD 29144.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Kansas City District.

Oct. 30, 1978.

Bruce W. Simon, Kansas City, for appellant.

John D. Ashcroft, Atty. Gen., Carson W. Elliff, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

Before SHANGLER, P. J., SWOFFORD, C. J., and WASSERSTROM, J.

WASSERSTROM, Judge.

Following a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of felony murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. He assigns the following points on this appeal: 1) the court erred in failing to declare a mistrial when witness Falkner testified that he and defendant had planned another robbery different from the one which led to this fatal shooting, because that evidence constituted proof of separate criminal activity unrelated to the issue of trial; and 2) the court erred in admitting certain exhibits on behalf of the State. Neither point is well taken, and we therefore affirm.

Defendant does not undertake the impossible task of challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction, so it is necessary only to recite enough of the evidence to place the issues stated above in factual context. James Falkner was the chief architect of a plan to rob North Hills Bank in Clay County, Missouri, and he enlisted a group of young men, including defendant, for that purpose. These men met in a Kansas City apartment, where Falkner outfitted defendant and two others with guns, coveralls, gloves and ski masks. Those three then drove to Clay County where they entered the Bank and commenced upon the planned robbery. However, the Bank guard resisted, whereupon defendant shot the guard who later died from the wounds.

Immediately after this shootout, the three robbers fled the scene. One was seen running uphill away from the Bank and struggling out of a suit of coveralls. The other two were seen fleeing in an automobile, one of them wearing sun glasses. Various members of the group were soon apprehended. Falkner turned State's evidence and testified in great detail as to the above facts.

With respect to defendant's first point, the testimony which defendant claims gave him a right to a mistrial occurred during the cross-examination of Falkner: "Q. After you and Mr. Berry and Mr. Rollie set up this bank deal, how many people did you discuss it with ? A. Just Mr. Williams, really Mr. Williams. Mr. Williams was supposed to have been advised of another bank, but it was scratched."

Defendant's counsel moved to strike that answer as not responsive and further requested a mistrial on the ground that the testimony purported to involve the defendant in another and different bank robbery. The trial court did order the testimony stricken and advised the jury to disregard the answer; but the court denied the motion for a mistrial.

It is not necessary to decide whether this testimony did in fact interject evidence of another crime, as claimed by defendant, or whether on the other hand (as claimed by the State) the testimony showed no crime because the prior contemplated bank robbery had been "scratched" and therefore such a separate crime never actually occurred. Assuming, however, that this testimony should be deemed in effect evidence of other unconnected criminal activity, still the court's refusal to grant a mistrial was not reversible error.

The grant of a mistrial constitutes drastic action which is to be used only under extraordinary circumstances; whether the situation does rise to such a level of prejudice rests largely in the discretion of the trial court and is to be reviewed on appeal only for abuse of discretion. State v. Lewis, 482 S.W.2d 436 (Mo.197...