State v. Williams, 14041

• Decision Date: 15 August 1986
• Docket Number: No. 14041,14041
• Citation: 716 S.W.2d 452
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Charles Edwin WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.

Page 452

716 S.W.2d 452

STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Charles Edwin WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 14041.

Missouri Court of Appeals,

Southern District,

Division One.

Aug. 15, 1986.

Motion for Rehearing or to Transfer to

Supreme Court Denied Sept. 9, 1986.

Application to Transfer Denied Oct. 14, 1986.

William L. Webster, Atty. Gen., John M. Morris, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for plaintiff-respondent.

Holy Simons, Columbia, for defendant-appellant.

GREENE, Presiding Judge.

On July 20, 1982, defendant, Charles Edwin Williams, was charged by indictment in Jasper County with the crime of capital murder for killing Karen Hedges. After jury-trial, he was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. Our Supreme Court reversed the conviction on the grounds that evidence of "excited utterances" made by Williams within 15 seconds after the killing to the effect that "the gun was unloaded," and "I didn't mean to shoot her," had been improperly excluded by the trial court. State v. Williams, 673 S.W.2d 32 (Mo.banc 1984). The case was remanded for a new trial.

An information in lieu of indictment was filed on October 2, 1984, charging Williams with second degree murder for the killing of Ms. Hedges. This information was subsequently amended, on October 16, 1984, to allege that Williams was a prior and persistent offender by reason of two separate prior convictions for assault and robbery.

The case was jury-tried on October 18, 1984. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of manslaughter and, after a finding by the trial court that Williams was a prior and persistent offender, sentenced him to 15 years' imprisonment. This appeal followed.

On appeal, Williams does question the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict. As was said in State v. Williams, supra, 673 S.W.2d at 33, "this case presents a sordid tale of unrestrained and violent behavior." It suffices to say the evidence at trial shows that on the evening of July 16, 1982, Williams was informed that Karen Hedges, his former live-in girl friend, had gone out with another man. While Williams was searching for Karen, she and her date drove up in a pickup. Williams dragged Karen out of the truck, slapped her and "kicked her up the steps" of the mobile home where Karen was living. Once inside the trailer, Williams slapped Karen into unconsciousness, revived her by pouring iced tea on her face, and kicked her several more times. After warning Karen that, "If you want, I'll go get a gun and shoot us all," Williams went to his nearby mobile home, obtained a .22 caliber revolver, returned, and shot Karen in the head. She died from the wound.

Williams' first point relied on is that the trial court erred in refusing to quash the jury panel because the procedures used in Jasper County to select a jury panel were not in substantial compliance with the statutes governing jury selection in second class counties.

This identical contention was raised and rejected by this court in State v. Stephens, 699 S.W.2d 106, 107 (Mo.App.1985). That decision is controlling here. The point has no merit.

Williams next asserts that the trial court erred in denying him the right to proceed pro se at the trial level.

While a defendant in a criminal case has a constitutional right to self-representation, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), such right is conditional. There must be a showing that the defendant is competent to make an intelligent waiver of counsel, State v. Blackmon, 664 S.W.2d 644, 648 (Mo.App.1984), and that his request to proceed pro se is unequivocal. State v. Freeman, 702 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Mo.App.1985).

Here, there was no conclusive evidence that Williams unequivocally stated his desire to represent himself. Instead, Williams stated that he would prefer, rather than accept representation from the public defender of Jasper County, to represent himself. Williams said he would accept the public defender of Cole County and that, "I have no specific attorney in mind other than outside of this county." The trial court denied the request for self-representation, whereupon Williams said, "Your Honor, I signed the waiver here about being self-represented." The court responded, "Yes, but then you went ahead and said there are parts of it that you don't want to waive and so I think that would be making error if I let you represent yourself under those circumstances." Under those facts, the court's refusal to let Williams represent himself was justifiable. An indigent defendant cannot specify who his attorney shall be. All he is entitled to is competent counsel. See Freeman, supra, 702 S.W.2d at 871-73. The point has no merit.

In his third point relied on, Williams contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for change of judge, which he contends he was entitled to as a matter of right under Rule 32.08(c). ¹ Williams requested and was granted a change of judge prior to the first trial. After reversal of his conviction and remand to the circuit court, Williams requested another change of judge. This request was properly refused. A party is entitled to only one change of judge as a matter of right, regardless of how many times the case is tried. State v. Sullivan, 486 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Mo.1972). See also Rule 32.09(a). The point has no merit.

Williams next alleges the trial court erred in excluding certain testimony of Hans Ytell, the ambulance attendant who was called to the scene after Karen was shot. At trial, Williams' counsel made an offer of proof that Ytell would testify that when...