State v. Williams

• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Before ULRICH; ULRICH, Chief Judge
• Citation: State v. Williams, 956 S.W.2d 942 (Mo. App. 1997)
• Decision Date: 09 December 1997
• Docket Number: No. WD,WD
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Lionel WILLIAMS, Appellant. 53086.

Page 942

956 S.W.2d 942

STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Lionel WILLIAMS, Appellant.

No. WD 53086.

Missouri Court of Appeals Western District.

Dec. 9, 1997.

Andrew A. Schroeder, Asst. Appellate Defender, Kansas City, for appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, Philip M. Koppe, Asst. Atty. Gen., Kansas City, for respondent.

Before ULRICH, C.J., P.J., and SMART and ELLIS, JJ.

ULRICH, Chief Judge, Presiding Judge.

Lionel Williams appeals his conviction for second degree burglary, section 569.170 ¹, and sentence to twelve years imprisonment. He claims that the trial court erred in 1) admitting the testimony of a police officer regarding a shoe print he observed at the crime scene; 2) overruling his Batson challenge to the State's removal of a venireperson; and 3) failing to suppress his statement to police. The judgement of conviction is affirmed, and the case is remanded to the trial court with directions.

FACTS

Gerald Cox, a Kansas City Missouri Police Officer, was on patrol in the early morning hours of September 29, 1995, when he was directed to investigate an alarm at the Family Dollar Store located at 7133 Prospect. Upon arriving at the scene, he turned off his headlights and parked the car he was driving on the street to wait for assistance. As Officer Cox sat in his patrol car, he heard a second alarm activate and decided to examine the building.

When Officer Cox approached the building, he noticed that the rear door of the store was open and that a man was quickly walking away from it. He stopped, frisked, and arrested the man, who was later identified as the appellant, Lionel Williams. He then radioed for a K-Nine Unit, a "paddy wagon," and an additional officer.

After the K-Nine Unit arrived, the inside of the building was searched for additional suspects. No one was found in the store. Police observed a hole in the ceiling of the store with pieces of roofing and insulation laying on the floor beneath the hole. A subsequent investigation of the roof revealed that a vent on the roof had been pried open making a hole. A shoe print was also discovered in tar near the hole. Officer Cox then examined Mr. Williams's sandals and determined that their soles looked "very similar" to the shoe print found in the tar on the roof. He also noticed debris on Mr. Williams's clothing that appeared similar to the insulation found on the floor of the store.

The manager of the store was called to the scene and discovered that stereos and electronic equipment were missing. She reviewed a videotape made by the store's surveillance camera and observed two men stealing the stereos. The quality of the tape was very poor, however, and she could not identify the thieves. She also observed Mr. Williams and recognized him as a patron of the store. She noticed bits of insulation on his clothing.

Mr. Williams was questioned by Officer Amelia Hull later that afternoon at the police station after receiving the Miranda warning and waiving his rights. He denied any involvement in the burglary. He told Officer Hull that he was walking past the store when he saw two men throwing boxes over a fence located nearby. He recognized one of the men as "Eddie." He heard the alarm sounding, saw the rear door of the store open, and could not resist entering the store and stealing something because he needed the money. Mr. Williams stated that he entered the store, removed two boxes of cookies, and was arrested before he could return to the store. He was adamant that he did not plan the burglary and that he was not acting in concert with "Eddie." He also denied having insulation on his clothing at the time of his arrest.

Mr. Williams was subsequently charged by amended information with one count of second degree burglary and one count of felony stealing. Prior to trial, he filed a motion to suppress any oral or written statements made by him to any police officer on the day of his arrest. He asserted the statements were coerced and were made prior to his receiving the appropriate warnings. The statements Mr. Williams made to Officer Cox were suppressed. The statements Mr. Williams made to Officer Hull were not suppressed.

Following jury trial, Mr. Williams was convicted of second degree burglary and sentenced to twelve years imprisonment. This appeal followed.

I. SHOE PRINT EVIDENCE

In his first point on appeal, Mr. Williams claims that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Officer Cox regarding the shoe print he observed in the tar on the roof and its similarity to the soles of Mr. Williams's sandals. He argues that the State violated Rule 25.03 by not disclosing that Officer Cox would testify about the shoe print. He contends that as a result of this nondisclosure, he was unable to prepare for effective cross-examination of Officer Cox.

Prior to trial, Mr. Williams requested the names and addresses of the State's witnesses, their written or recorded statements or existing memoranda reporting or summarizing their oral statements, and any reports or statements of experts. In response, the State notified Mr. Williams of its intent to call Officer Cox to testify and provided Mr. Williams's attorney with the officer's police report. The police report did not contain a reference to the shoe print discovered on the roof of the store or to the similarities detected by the officer between the shoe print and the soles of Mr. Williams's sandals.

Rule 25.03 provides, in pertinent part:

(A) Except as otherwise provided in these Rules as to protective orders, the state shall, upon written request of defendant's counsel, disclose to defendant's counsel such part or all of the following material and information within its possession or control designated in said request:

(1) The names and last known addresses of persons whom the state intends to call as witnesses at any hearing or at the trial, together with their written or recorded statements, and existing memoranda, reporting or summarizing part or all of their oral statements;

* * * * * *

(5) Any reports or statements of experts, made in connection with the particular case, including results of physical or mental examinations and of scientific tests, experiments, or comparisons.

This Rule and Rule 25.12, which allows the defense to depose potential witnesses, are designed to prevent surprises at trial. State v. Enke, 891 S.W.2d 134, 137 (Mo.App.1994). While Rule 25.03 requires the State to disclose the names and addresses of its witnesses, it does not require the State to categorize anticipated witnesses and their testimony into a particular classification or to summarize the witnesses' proposed testimony. Id. at 137-138; State v. Wolfe, 793 S.W.2d 580, 587 (Mo.App.1990).

The State disclosed to Mr. Williams its intent to call Officer Cox to testify and provided him with a copy of the officer's police report, including any and all memoranda and written or recorded statements made by Officer Cox. Rule 25.03 did not require the State to prepare and provide a summary of Officer Cox's anticipated trial testimony to defense counsel. Mr. Williams was aware that the police had discovered a shoe print in tar on the roof of the burglarized premises and that the print matched the soles of the sandals he was wearing when arrested. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Officer Cox's testimony concerning the shoe print and its similarity to the soles of Mr. Williams's sandals. Point one is denied.

II. BATSON CHALLENGE

In his second point on appeal, Mr. Williams claims that the trial court erred in overruling his Batson challenge to the State's use of peremptory strikes to remove a venireperson from the jury. Specifically, he argues that the State's explanation for its striking an African-American venireperson was pretextual because a similarly situated white venireperson was not struck and the explanation was not supported by the record.

The Equal Protection Clause prohibits the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on the basis of race or gender. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). Under the procedural guidelines established by the Missouri Supreme Court in State v. Parker, 836 S.W.2d 930, 939-940 (Mo. banc 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1014, 113 S.Ct. 636, 121 L.Ed.2d 566 (1992), when a prosecutor's use of a peremptory strike is challenged in a timely fashion on the ground that in exercising the strike the prosecutor engaged in race discrimination, the prosecutor is obligated to give a valid race-neutral explanation for the strike regardless of whether a prima facie case of such discrimination is presented. State v. Jackson, 925 S.W.2d 856, 863 (Mo.App.1996). The explanation need not be plausible or persuasive, and it is presumed to be race-neutral unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the explanation. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995).

If the prosecutor articulates a race-neutral reason for a challenged peremptory strike, the burden shifts back to the defendant to show that the State's proffered reason for striking the venireperson was merely pretextual and, in fact, was racially motivated. Jackson, 925 S.W.2d at 864. If the defendant makes such a showing, the trial court must decide if purposeful racial discrimination has been proven. Id.

The trial court is vested with considerable discretion in determining the plausibility of the prosecutor's reason and whether the prosecutor purposefully discriminated in exercising a peremptory strike. State v. Gray, 887 S.W.2d 369, 384 (Mo. banc 1994). An appellate court will not overturn a trial court's finding unless it is clearly erroneous. Id.

The decisive question in a typical Batson challenge inquiry is whether the prosecutor's race-neutral explanation for the strike will be believed. State v. Davis, ...