State v. Williams

• Citation: 179 N.E.3d 228
• Decision Date: 05 October 2021
• Docket Number: No. 2021CA0003,2021CA0003
• Parties: STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Tamarkis WILLIAMS, Defendant - Appellant
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

179 N.E.3d 228

STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Tamarkis WILLIAMS, Defendant - Appellant

No. 2021CA0003

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Fifth District, Coshocton County.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: October 5, 2021

WILLIAM C. HAYES, Licking County Prosecutor, Special Prosecutor for Coshocton, County Prosecutor's Office, By: PAULA SAWYERS, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, 20 S. Second Street, Fourth Floor, Newark, Ohio 43055, For Plaintiff-Appellee.

JAMES ANZELMO, 446 Howland Drive, Gahanna, Ohio 43230, For Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGES: Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, P.J., Hon. W. Scott Gwin, J., Hon. Earle E. Wise, J.

OPINION

Baldwin, J.

{¶1} Tamarkis Williams appeals the sentence imposed by the Coshocton County Court of Common Pleas after receiving his plea of guilty to kidnapping, a First degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2905.01 ; and aggravated robbery, a First degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2911.01 with a firearm specification. Appellee is the State of Ohio.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND THE CASE

{¶2} On July 1, 2020, Appellant, Tamarkis Williams and four others planned and executed a robbery of a juvenile, C.H.

{¶3} C.H. called Hunter Markley to buy marijuana and Markley said he didn't have any to sell, but could help him find a seller. Williams took the phone and arranged to meet with C.H. suggesting that he had marijuana to sell. Prior to meeting with C.H., Williams and the others discussed the plan to rob C.H.

{¶4} Williams and Elijah Byrd were driven to an agreed location and the driver, Kacia R.A. Eckelberry, drove to meet C.H. with Markley and Kire E. Page hiding in the back of the vehicle. Eckelberry picked up C.H. and drove back to where Byrd and Williams were waiting. Byrd and Williams got in the back seat with C.H., held him at gun point and demanded his belongings. They took C.H. to a different location, forced him out of the vehicle at gun point and told him to get on his knees. They took $60.00 in cash, his shoes, sweatshirt, pocket knife and a chain necklace. Williams and his cohorts drove off and divided C.H.’s property.

{¶5} Williams was charged with kidnapping, a First degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(2) and one count of aggravated robbery, a First degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1), (C) with a firearm specification. He entered a plea of guilty on December 14, 2020 and appeared for sentencing on January 19, 2021. The court reviewed the facts and determined that the offenses did not merge. The trial court imposed a sentence of a minimum term of eight years and a maximum term of twelve years for the offense of aggravated robbery with an additional three years for the gun specification. For the offense of kidnapping, the trial court sentenced Williams to a minimum of four years and a maximum of six years.

{¶6} The trial court decided that the sentences should be served consecutively finding that "the consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime punish the defendant and are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the defendant's conduct and the danger that the defendant poses to the public. The

179 N.E.3d 232

court finds that the defendant committed the instant offense while under a community control sanction from Clark County for trespass in a habitation. ( O. R. C.2929.14(C)(4)(a) )." (Judgment Entry on Sentencing, Jan. 26, 2021). Williams was advised of a rebuttable presumption that he would be released from service of the sentence on the expiration of the minimum prison term imposed as part of the sentence or on the defendant's presumptive early earned early release date, whichever is earlier, pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Act. He was also advised of his obligation to register as a violent offender under R.C.2903.42 and the weapon he carried during the offense was forfeited to the state.

{¶7} Williams did not raise the issue of the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Act in the court below.

{¶8} Williams filed a notice of appeal and submitted five assignments of error:

{¶9} "I. AS AMENDED BY THE REAGAN TOKES ACT, THE REVISED CODE'S SENTENCES FOR FIRST AND SECOND DEGREE QUALIFYING FELONIES VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE STATE OF OHIO."

{¶10} "II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO MERGE WILLIAMS'S KIDNAPPING AND AGGRAVATED ROBBERY OFFENSES, IN VIOLATION OF THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION."

{¶11} "III. THE TRIAL COURT UNLAWFULLY ORDERED WILLIAMS TO SERVE CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES FOR HIS OFFENSES, IN VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS, GUARANTEED BY SECTION 10, ARTICLE I OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION AND THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION."

{¶12} "IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ORDERING WILLIAMS TO BE PLACED ON THE VIOLENT OFFENDER REGISTRY."

{¶13} "V. TAMARKIS WILLIAMS RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, IN VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND SECTION 10, ARTICLE I OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION."

ANALYSIS

I.

{¶14} Williams's first assignment of error challenges the constitutionality of the Regan Tokes Act which codified hybrid indefinite prison terms for first and second degree felonies. Williams challenges the presumptive release feature of the act, R.C. 2967.271, advancing several arguments including it violates his constitutional rights to trial by jury and due process of law, and further violates the constitutional requirement of separation of powers and equal protection.

{¶15} R.C. 2967.271 provides in relevant part:

(B) When an offender is sentenced to a non-life felony indefinite prison term, there shall be a presumption that the person shall be released from service of the sentence on the expiration of the offender's minimum prison term or on the offender's presumptive earned early release date, whichever is earlier.

(C) The presumption established under division (B) of this section is a rebuttable presumption that the department of rehabilitation and correction may rebut as provided in this division. Unless the

179 N.E.3d 233

department rebuts the presumption, the offender shall be released from service of the sentence on the expiration of the offender's minimum prison term or on the offender's presumptive earned early release date, whichever is earlier. The department may rebut the presumption only if the department determines, at a hearing, that one or more of the following applies:

(1) Regardless of the security level in which the offender is classified at the time of the hearing, both of the following apply:

(a) During the offender's incarceration, the offender committed institutional rule infractions that involved compromising the security of a state correctional institution, compromising the safety of the staff of a state correctional institution or its inmates, or physical harm or the threat of physical harm to the staff of a state correctional institution or its inmates, or committed a violation of law that was not prosecuted, and the infractions or violations demonstrate that the offender has not been rehabilitated.

(a) The offender's behavior while incarcerated, including, but not limited to the infractions and violations specified in division (C)(1)(a) of this section, demonstrate that the offender continues to pose a threat to society.

(2) Regardless of the security level in which the offender is classified at the time of the hearing, the offender has been placed by the department in extended restrictive housing at any time within the year preceding the date of the hearing.

(3) At the time of the hearing, the offender is classified by the department as a security level three, four, or five, or at a higher security level.

(D)(1) If the department of rehabilitation and correction, pursuant to division (C) of this section, rebuts the presumption established under division (B) of this section, the department may maintain the offender's incarceration in a state correctional institution under the sentence after the expiration of the offender's minimum prison term or, for offenders who have a presumptive earned early release date, after the offender's presumptive earned early release date. The department may maintain the offender's incarceration under this division for an additional period of incarceration determined by the department. The additional period of incarceration shall be a reasonable period determined by the department, shall be specified by the department, and shall not exceed the offender's maximum prison term.

(2) If the department maintains an offender's incarceration for an additional period under division (D)(1) of this section, there shall be a presumption that the offender shall be released on the expiration of the offender's minimum prison term plus the additional period of incarceration specified by the department as provided under that division or, for offenders who have a presumptive earned early release date, on the expiration of the additional period of incarceration to be served after the offender's presumptive earned early release date that is specified by the department as provided under that division. The presumption is a rebuttable presumption that the department may rebut, but

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