State v. Williams

Decision Date29 April 2014
Docket NumberSC 19103
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut
PartiesSTATE OF CONNECTICUT v. CHUMELL WILLIAMS

The "officially released" date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the "officially released" date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the "officially released" date.

All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative.

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald, Espinosa and

Vertefeuille, Js.

Neal Cone, senior assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Timothy J. Sugrue, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Maureen Platt, state's attorney, Jayne Kennedy, senior assistant state's attorney, and Jennifer F. Miller, special deputy assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Opinion

ESPINOSA, J. The sole issue in this appeal is whether we should overrule our precedent holding that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement under the state constitution applies to a closed container located in the trunk of a vehicle. The defendant, Chumell Williams, appeals1 from the judgment of conviction, rendered following his conditional plea of nolo contendere; see General Statutes § 54-94a; of one count of possession of narcotics with intent to sell by a person who is not drug-dependent in violation of General Statutes § 21a-278 (b), one count of possession of narcotics with intent to sell within 1500 feet of a school in violation of General Statutes § 21a-279 (d), and one count of possession of a weapon in a motor vehicle in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 29-38. On appeal, the defendant challenges the denial of his motion to suppress with respect to the narcotics and handgun that were found in a plastic bag inside the trunk of his vehicle. In doing so, the defendant asks this court to decide whether article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution2 prohibits the warrantless search of a closed container located in the trunk of a vehicle conducted during an otherwise constitutional warrantless search of an automobile. We answer the question in the negative and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In its oral decision on the defendant's motion to suppress, the trial court made the following factual findings. "On March 25, 2010, three Waterbury police officers were patrolling Waterbury streets in an unmarked police vehicle and in plainclothes. At approximately 9 p.m., the officers stopped their vehicle at a red light at the intersection of East Farm [Street] and North Main Street. This intersection is part of a high crime area where the police have made numerous arrests for narcotic and firearm offenses. The area is well lit and the visibility was good that evening.

"While stopped at the intersection they observed the defendant's vehicle, a black Maxima, parked along the curb on West Farm [Street], very close to the intersection of West Farm [Street] and North Main Street. East Farm [Street] becomes West Farm [Street] after it crosses North Main Street. An individual was standing at the driver's window of the defendant's vehicle. The police then observed the driver hand a small item to the individual standing outside the window. The driver of the defendant's vehicle subsequently turned out to be the defendant.

"Based on the officers' training and experience, they reasonably suspected that they may have just witnessed a drug sale and decided that they should investigate further. Accordingly, the officers drove [their] vehicle through the intersection and parked further down alongthe curb on West Farm [Street]. They exited the vehicle and proceeded on foot toward the defendant's vehicle with their police badges displayed around their necks. As the officers neared the man, later identified as Shawn Warner, standing outside of the vehicle, they demanded that he show the officers his hands. Warner then proceeded to drop on the ground a small plastic bag containing a white rock like substance, which the officers, based upon their training and experience, reasonably concluded was cocaine. Having witnessed Warner drop this item, the officers more than confirmed their reasonable and articulable suspicion that Warner and the defendant had been engaged in a narcotics transaction.

"One of the officers placed Warner under arrest while another began to direct his attention to the black Maxima and the driver of the vehicle. A strong odor of unburnt marijuana was coming from the car. There were four occupants in the car: two in the front seats and two in the rear seats. The officer immediately demanded that the defendant show him his hands. The defendant did not immediately comply, but instead appeared to place his hands in the center console of the vehicle. It reasonably appeared to the officer that the defendant was either trying to conceal an item or to reach for a weapon. The officer again demanded that the defendant show him his hands, and the defendant subsequently complied. The defendant was removed from the vehicle and placed in handcuffs. The officers then called for backup assistance on their radio. Once backup arrived, the other individuals were removed from the car.

"At this point, one of the officers opened the center console and discovered what reasonably appeared to be crack and powder cocaine. While doing so, he also observed what reasonably appeared to be four bags of marijuana on the front passenger side floor. After these items were removed from the vehicle, the officers continued to smell a strong odor of marijuana in the car, which reasonably led them to believe that . . . additional quantities of marijuana [were] still in the car. The smell was strongest in the backseat area and appeared to be emanating from behind one of the seats.

"While searching the backseat area, the officers pushed a button on one of the rear seats which then permitted the seat to be flipped down. This mechanism thereby allowed anyone sitting in the rear seat to easily access a portion of the trunk of the vehicle. Behind the seat, the officers immediately observed a dark plastic bag that smelled strongly of marijuana. The officers opened the bag and saw what reasonably appeared to be powder cocaine, marijuana, and a second opaque black plastic bag. The second bag was heavy and conformed around an object that appeared to be a handgun. [An] officer opened the bag and confirmed that it, in fact, did contain a firearm. All of the evidence wasseized, [and] the defendant [was] arrested and charged with narcotics and firearm offenses." On the basis of these findings, the trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress. The defendant subsequently entered a conditional plea of nolo contendere and the court rendered judgment of guilty in accordance with the defendant's plea. This appeal followed.

On appeal, the defendant does not challenge the search of the passenger compartment of his vehicle or the seizure of the narcotics found in the center console and on the passenger side floor. Nor does he argue that the police did not have probable cause to search the trunk. The defendant's sole claim is that the search of the bags inside the trunk, which revealed powder cocaine, marijuana and a handgun, could not be conducted within the automobile exception to the warrant requirement under the state constitution. The defendant contends that when the police have probable cause to believe that an item contains contraband or evidence of a crime, after a proper seizure, they must obtain a warrant to search any such item unless exigent circumstances exist.

In support of his argument, which requires us to reconsider our prior holdings that our state constitution allows the police to conduct a warrantless search of a closed container located in an automobile pursuant to the automobile exception, the defendant claims that a Geisler3 analysis demonstrates that our state constitution affords greater protections than the federal constitution. He first details the sociological and policy considerations that weigh in favor of excluding the search of closed containers located in vehicles from the ambit of the automobile exception under the state constitution. He identifies several instances in which this court has diverged from search and seizure jurisprudence as it has been applied under the federal constitution, and highlights a number of sister states that also have taken such an approach. Acknowledging that the fourth amendment to the federal constitution permits the search of a closed container located in a vehicle that properly is being searched pursuant to the automobile exception, the defendant urges this court to recognize an additional exigency requirement to the search of a closed container under the state constitution.4 Applying the Geisler factors, we reject his claim and conclude that the state consti...

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