State v. Williamson
| Decision Date | 14 July 1992 |
| Docket Number | 59793,Nos. 58421,s. 58421 |
| Citation | 836 S.W.2d 490 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. John W. WILLIAMSON, Defendant-Appellant. John W. WILLIAMSON, Movant-Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent-Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Jeanene Moenckmeier, St. Louis, Stephen J. Harris, Columbia, for appellant.
William L. Webster, Atty. Gen., Breck K. Burgess, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.
John W. Williamson appeals his convictions, after a three-day jury trial, of one count of first degree robbery, § 569.020, RSMo 1986; one count of armed criminal action, § 571.015, RSMo 1986; and one count of first degree burglary, § 569.160, RSMo 1986. Additionally, Williamson appeals the denial of his Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief, without an evidentiary hearing. We have consolidated Williamson's two appeals, pursuant to Rule 29.15(l ). We affirm.
The evidence adduced at trial, in the light most favorable to the verdict, is as follows. In December 1987, Williamson was working for Mitch Murch's Maintenance Management Company ("MMMM"). Sometime that month, Williamson went to the company office and reported to the receptionist that he was shorted on his paycheck. The receptionist called the payroll administrator, Sandra Cummings. Cummings spoke with Williamson about the alleged shortage. She told Williamson that there was nothing that she could do; Williamson would have to speak to the operations manager, Stacy Williams. Williamson went into Williams' office and had a discussion with Williams. As Williamson left the office, Williamson appeared to be very agitated. Williamson stated: "I'll get my money from Mitch Murch one way or another."
On January 6, 1988, the victim, Ann Daniels, was babysitting her grandson, Conner, at her daughter's home in University City. Her daughter's husband, Tim Murch, was the vice-president of MMMM. At approximately 1:00 p.m., Daniels put Conner down for a nap. She, in turn, laid down on the living room sofa. A few minutes later, Daniels got up to answer a knock at the side door. She observed a tall, slender, black man, wearing what she thought was a dark blue uniform or working clothes. Daniels stated: "[y]es, what is it?". The man, Williamson, replied: "[i]s this the Tim Murch residence?". As Daniels responded "yes", Williamson motioned to Daniels as though he was "handing [her] or delivering or wanting to give [her] something." When Daniels opened the door to take whatever Williamson had in his hand, he pushed in on the door. Although Daniels attempted to close the door, she was overcome by Williamson's power, and he pushed his way into the kitchen.
Williamson told Daniels not to scream or yell. He put her in a choke hold and pressed something into her back. Daniels believed that it was a gun. Williamson led Daniels throughout the house, checking to see if anyone was at home. While doing so, Williamson stated: "Tim owes me."
Williamson then demanded Daniels' purse and the money therein. Daniels gave him two hundred dollars. Williamson, thereafter, grabbed a knife out of the knife block and ordered Daniels to open the refrigerator. Daniels complied. Williamson told Daniels to take out a package of hot dogs. He then told her to pick up a bottle of liquid detergent. Williamson, subsequently, ordered Daniels to go down in the "cellar" and sit on the steps. As Williamson backed up the "cellar" stairs, closed the door and prepared to leave, he told Daniels not to tell anybody, not to call the police, not to do anything but to give him time to get away or he would shoot at the house. Williamson opened the door twice to see if Daniels was doing as he instructed. He, then, left.
The phone, upstairs, began ringing. On the third ring, Daniels ran upstairs and grabbed the phone. The person on the other end of the line, had, however, hung up. Daniels looked to see if anyone was in the house. Seeing no one, she ran to Conner's room, picked him up and ran to a neighbor's house. Someone, it is unclear whom, called the police. A couple of minutes later, the University City police arrived. After giving the police a description of Williamson, the police took Daniels to the University City police station to make a composite of her assailant. Additionally, the police had Daniels look at photographs. Daniels was unable to identify any of the photographs as a picture of her assailant. The police, thereafter, distributed the composite to officers, as well as to MMMM. Cummings recognized the composite to be the likeness of Williamson.
The police, therefore, obtained a black and white photograph of Williamson and placed it in an array of other black and white photographs. The next day, Daniels returned to the police station, where the police had her look at the array. Daniels stated that she was unable to identify any of the pictures as the perpetrator of the crime, since all of the subjects appeared too young.
On January 9, 1988, Daniels returned to her home in South Carolina. While there, Tim sent her four identification badges of people that he believed had reason to commit the crimes. Daniels looked only at the photographs on the badges, and recognized Williamson as being the individual who committed the crimes. She called Tim and identified her assailant. Daniels, subsequently, returned to St. Louis. The police, thereafter, arrested Williamson, and placed him in a physical lineup, which Daniels observed. Daniels positively identified Williamson as her assailant.
Williamson testified in his own defense. Additionally, he called three witnesses to testify on his behalf. However, at the close of the evidence, instructions and arguments of counsel, the jury found Williamson guilty of first degree robbery, armed criminal action and first degree burglary. On April 11, 1990, defense counsel filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, or, in the alternative, a motion for a new trial. On April 23, 1990, the trial court denied these motions. On May 11, 1990, the trial court sentenced Williamson to ten years imprisonment for first degree robbery, three years imprisonment for armed criminal action and five years imprisonment for first degree burglary. The court specified that the sentences for robbery and armed criminal action are to be served consecutively, while the sentence for burglary is to be served concurrent to the robbery sentence. On May 15, 1990, defense counsel filed Williamson's Notice of Appeal. On August 30, 1990, Williamson filed a pro se motion to vacate, set aside or correct the trial court's judgment or sentence, pursuant to Rule 29.15. On September 12, 1990, the trial court appointed the Special Public Defender's office to represent Williamson. On September 21, 1990, defense counsel filed Williamson's request for a change of judge, which the trial court later granted. After one extension of time, post-conviction counsel filed an amended Rule 29.15 motion on November 6, 1990. On January 9, 1991, the court issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order, Judgment and Decree, denying Williamson's motion. On February 15, 1991, Williamson filed his second Notice of Appeal. We have consolidated these appeals, pursuant to Rule 29.15(l ).
Williamson's first point is that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for judgment of acquittal: (1) at the close of the State's case; (2) at the close of all evidence; and (3) notwithstanding the verdict. At the outset, we note that the State rested its case, and defense counsel made her opening statement and presented the testimony of three witnesses before she moved for a directed verdict at the close of the State's case. Thus, whether the evidence at the close of the State's case-in-chief was sufficient to support the conviction need not be determined because Williamson did not move for a judgment of acquittal at that stage of trial but proceeded to introduce evidence on his own behalf. State v. Wood, 553 S.W.2d 333, 334 (Mo.App.1977).
At the close of all the evidence, Williamson did, by motion, attack the sufficiency of the evidence. In addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence at trial, an appellate court accepts as true all evidence, whether circumstantial or direct, tending to prove the defendant guilty, together with all reasonable inferences supportive of the verdict. State v. Vitale, 801 S.W.2d 451, 456 (Mo.App.1990). We ignore all contrary evidence and inferences. State v. Davis, 797 S.W.2d 560, 563 (Mo.App.1990). Our review is limited to whether there is sufficient evidence from which reasonable persons could have found the defendant guilty. State v. Moseley, 705 S.W.2d 613, 616 (Mo.App.1986).
To sustain a conviction for first degree robbery, the State must prove that the defendant forcibly stole property, and in the course thereof he, or another participant in the crime,: (1) caused serious physical injury to any person; or (2) was armed with a deadly weapon; or (3) used or threatened the immediate use of a dangerous instrument against any person; or (4) displayed or threatened the use of what appeared to be a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument. § 569.020, RSMo 1986. The evidence, considered in the light most favorable to the verdict, indicates that on January 6, 1988, Williamson took $200.00 from Daniels. In the course of so doing, Williamson threatened the immediate use of physical force by stating that he would shoot at the house if Daniels did not give him time to get away. Additionally, Williamson displayed a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument when he grabbed a knife out of the knife block. Thus, there was sufficient evidence both to submit the first degree robbery count to the jury and upon which the jury could reasonably find Williamson guilty.
To sustain a conviction for armed criminal action, the State must prove that the defendant...
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