State v. Willie Johnson
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
| Writing for the Court | TIMOTHY E. McMONAGLE, A.J.: |
| Citation | State v. Willie Johnson, 2002 Ohio 7057, 02-LW-6204, 80436 (Ohio App. Dec 19, 2002) |
| Decision Date | 19 December 2002 |
| Docket Number | 02-LW-6204,80436 |
| Parties | STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee v. WILLIE JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant |
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas Court, Case No. 410922.
For Plaintiff-Appellee William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecutor, Matthew King, Assistant, 8th Floor Justice Center, 1200 Ontario Street, Cleveland, OH 44113
For Defendant-Appellant Paul Mancino, Jr., 75 Public Square Suite 1016, Cleveland, OH 44113
TIMOTHY E. McMONAGLE, A.J.:
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Willie Johnson appeals the decision of the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court that convicted and sentenced him for rape, gross sexual imposition and intimidation following a jury trial for these offenses. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶2} The record reveals that a fifty-five count indictment was returned against appellant charging him with (1) 17 counts of rape of a victim under the age of 13 years, in violation of R.C. 2907.02; (2) 10 counts of rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02; (3) 26 counts of gross sexual imposition, in violation of R.C. 2907.05; and (4) two counts of intimidation, in violation of R.C. 2921.04. It was alleged in the indictment that these offenses were against two victims, each of whom were 13 and 11 years of age at the time of trial and will be referred to as Victim I and Victim II respectively. It was further alleged that these offenses occurred over a two-year time span, from June 1999 through June 2001. It appears from the record that appellant was the boyfriend of the victims' mother and had resided with the family for approximately thirteen years prior to the indictment.
{¶3} The case proceeded to trial and several counts were dismissed by the court upon appellant's motion for acquittal following the close of the state's case. What remained for consideration by the jury were (1) two counts of rape of a victim under the age of 13 years involving Victim I; (2) nine counts of rape involving Victim I; (3) eight counts of gross sexual imposition, two of which were against Victim I and six of which were against Victim II; and (4) one count of intimidation. The jury found appellant guilty on all of these remaining counts. The court ultimately sentenced appellant to consecutive prison terms of life without parole on the two counts of rape of a victim under the age of 13 years. Of those counts remaining, appellant was sentenced to (1) ten-year terms of imprisonment on nine counts of rape; (2) one-year terms on eight counts of gross sexual imposition; and (3) a one-year term on one count of intimidation. Each term was to run concurrent to the consecutive life terms already imposed.[1]
{¶4} Appellant is now before this court and assigns 17 errors for our review.
{¶5} In his first assignment of error, appellant contends that he was constructively denied the right to counsel when the trial court appointed counsel close to the date of trial.
{¶6} The record reveals that the trial court found appellant to be indigent at his arraignment on August 7, 2001 and appointed counsel to represent him. That counsel withdrew with the permission of the court on August 15, 2001 and the Public Defender's Office was contemporaneously appointed as appellant's legal representative. Trial commenced on August 30, 2001, at which time the court acknowledged that appellant's trial counsel had the case "no longer than seventeen days." The trial court judge specifically inquired of appellant if he wanted to go forward with trial on this date, stating:
{¶7}
{¶8} After answering affirmatively, the trial court judge again inquired of appellant if he wanted to go forward stating that "time is running the case," referring to the speedy trial time restriction. Appellant again answered affirmatively. The trial court judge then stated:
{¶9}
{¶10} Appellant again answered affirmatively, stating further that "because from what I see, you know, it still is going to be just me."
{¶11} Thereafter, the trial judge realized he misstated the current law on the amount of prison time appellant could receive for these charges. Correcting himself, the judge again inquired of appellant if he wanted to go forward with trial and appellant again answered affirmatively.
{¶12} As is demonstrated from the above colloquy, appellant was asked on several occasions if he wanted to go forward. Appellant repeatedly states in his brief before this court that his trial counsel did not "feel prepared" or was "admittedly ill prepared." This is untrue. Not only did appellant never voice any hesitancy with appointed counsel, appointed counsel did not indicate or otherwise demonstrate to the court that counsel was unprepared to go forward. On the contrary, when inquired by the court, counsel stated that he was prepared to go forward.
{¶13} While it is true that a court's decision to appoint counsel on the day of trial has been found to be prejudicial error, that is not the case here. Compare Hunt v. Mitchell (C.A.6, 2001), 261 F.3d 575. We see no error.
{¶14} Appellant's first assignment of error is not well taken and is overruled.
{¶15} In his second assignment of error, appellant contends that he was denied due process of law when the trial court failed to make an adequate inquiry regarding his request to replace his appointed counsel with counsel of his own choosing.
{¶16} We note at the outset that, contrary to appellant's representations, appellant's request was for a continuance, not a request for his counsel to withdraw. Notwithstanding, we note that if a criminal defendant has demonstrated "good cause, such as a conflict of interest, a complete breakdown of communication, or an irreconcilable conflict," then a trial court's failure to honor a timely request for new counsel would constitute a denial of effective assistance of counsel. State v. Blankenship (1995), 102 Ohio App.3d 534, 558; State v. Carter (1998), 128 Ohio App.3d 419, 423. In all other cases, a trial court's decision denying a motion for a continuance to retain new counsel is governed by an abuse of discretion standard. State v. McNeill (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 438, 452.
{¶17} Appellant relies on this court's decision in State v. Beranek (Dec. 14, 2000), Cuyahoga App. No. 76260, 2000 Ohio App. Lexis 5868, for the proposition that a trial court commits reversible error when it does not inquire of an indigent criminal defendant as to that defendant's reasons for requesting a change of counsel. In that case, the defendant had requested that his trial counsel withdraw and trial counsel thereafter made an oral motion prior to voir dire to be removed. Finding the motion not only untimely but not written, the court denied the motion.
{¶18} The Beranek court, relying on State v. Prater (1990), 71 Ohio App.3d 78, found that a trial court has a duty to investigate the reasons behind the defendant's request for a change of counsel, however brief or minimal, once that defendant asserts allegations specific enough to justify further investigation. Id. at 12. Notwithstanding that there were no specific allegations made by the defendant in Beranek, the court stated that it would "not penalize Beranek for failing to press the issue before the [court] when the [court] made it clear that [it] would not consider Beranek's complaints and did not inquire into their nature."
{¶19} In this case, the record reveals that the state's first witness, the victims' mother, had finished testifying when the state called Victim I as its second witness. After the court had inquired as to this victim's age and ability to testify truthfully and before the state began its direct examination, appellant's counsel interrupted, stating:
{¶24} During sentencing, appellant stated:
{¶25} "I still say that I'm innocent, and I want it on the record that I tried to dismiss my attorney, and he said that you disallowed it, even though there was no stenographer over there, he said that you disallowed it."
{¶26} Trial counsel thereafter explained to the court:
{¶27} "Just for clarification, Your Honor, with respect to the statement just made, he did ask me to approach the Court to try to get new counsel appointed on the case, and I explained to him that one of the problems was there was a time problem with respect to this case, and I asked would he be willing to sign a waiver to extend the time, and of course, he wasn't willing to do that, which is part of the reason why the Court decided that new counsel would not be appointed to the case."
{¶28}...
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