State v. Williford, 1

• Decision Date: 16 October 1969
• Docket Number: No. 1,1
• Citation: State v. Williford, 169 S.E.2d 851, 275 N.C. 575 (N.C. 1969)
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Alvis Thomas WILLIFORD and Boyd Baxter Squires.

Page 851

169 S.E.2d 851

275 N.C. 575

STATE of North Carolina v. Alvis Thomas WILLIFORD and Boyd Baxter Squires.

No. 1.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Oct. 16, 1969.

Atty. Gen. Robert Morgan, and Staff Atty. Dale Shepherd, for the State.

Tharrington & Smith, Raleigh, for defendant Williford.

BRANCH, Justice.

Defendant's first assignment of error challenges the admission of the confession alleged to have been made by defendant to Officer J. L. Denning.

The test of admissibility is whether the statements made by defendant were in fact voluntarily and understandingly made. State v. Gray, 268 N.C. 69, 150 S.E.2d 1, cert. denied 386 U.S. 911, 87 S.Ct. 860, 17 L.Ed.2d 784; State v. Rogers, 233 N.C. 390, 64 S.E.2d 572, 28 A.L.R.2d 1104; State v. Roberts, 12 N.C. 259.

Defendant contends, Inter alia, that the purported confession was not voluntarily and understandingly made because of his physical and mental condition at that time. He relies upon the case of Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35, 88 S.Ct. 189, 19 L.Ed.2d 35, where the defendant was shot in the leg while fleeing from the police. Immediately after the defendant was shot by the police officers, an oral confession was obtained by threats on his life accompanied by the firing of a rifle near his ear while he lay wounded on the ground. Later, he was questioned by two investigators after a morphine injection and while he was feverish and in pain. The medical assistant in charge told him to cooperate, and in the defendant's presence told the investigators to let him know if defendant 'did not tell them what they wanted to know.' The defendant was left alone with the investigators, and after a 90-minute 'conversation' signed a written confession prepared by the officers similar to the one first signed at gunpoint. In holding the confession inadmissible, the U.S. Supreme Court said:

'The petitioner, already wounded by the police, was ordered at gunpoint to speak his guilt or be killed. From that time until he was directed five days later to tell Alabama investigators 'what they wanted to know,' there was 'no break in the stream of events,' Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 710, 87 S.Ct. 1338, 18 L.Ed.2d 423. For he was then still in pain, under the influence of drugs, and at the complete mercy of the prison hospital authorities. Compare Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 81 S.Ct. 1541, 6 L.Ed.2d 948.

'* * * A realistic appraisal of the circumstances of This case compels the conclusion that this petitioner's confessions were the product of gross coercion. Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, no conviction tainted by a confession so obtained can stand.'

The distinctions between Beecher v. Alabama and the facts of the instant case are obvious. In Beecher v. Alabama, there is an unbroken stream of events that reek of intimidation, threat and coercion calculated to frighten and obviate the free will of the defendant. The only apparent similarity between the two cases is the fact that defendant was wounded and gave the statement to police officers while in custody.

The weight of authority appears to be that the admissibility of a confession is not, Ipso facto, rendered involuntary because defendant was suffering from physical injuries and resulting pain at the time he made the confession. These are circumstances to be taken into consideration by the jury in weighing the evidence. State v. Horner, 139 N.C. 603, 52 S.E. 136; State v. Hamson, 104 N.H. 526, 191 A.2d 89; State v. Dolan, 86 N.J.L. 192, 90 A. 1034; State v. Wise, 19 N.J. 59, 115 A.2d 62.

It is further well settled in this jurisdiction that a confession is not rendered involuntary and incompetent by the mere fact that at the time of making it defendant was in prison or under arrest. State v. Crawford, 260 N.C. 548, 133 S.E.2d 232; State v. Thomas, 241 N.C. 337, 85 S.E.2d 300. It is the mental condition and compulsions that control when a confession is given. The confessor's physical condition is of little consequence unless it so affects his mental condition as to destroy voluntariness or understanding. Thus, we hold that the confession did not become inadmissible solely upon the showing that defendant was wounded, in pain, and confessed while in police custody.

In connection with the admission of the purported confession, the defendant assigns as error the court's failure to strike the confession, in light of testimony given by police officer R. L. Johnson before the jury and after the voir dire hearing, and the court's ruling on the admissibility of the confession. Pertinent to this contention is the testimony of Officer Johnson that defendant told him, before he allegedly made the confession, 'I am not going to tell you you a damn thing.' Defendant contends that the officers were then precluded from further questioning by that portion of the opinion in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, which states: 'Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him.'

It has long been the rule in this state that the admissibility of a confession is to be determined by the facts appearing in evidence when it is received or rejected, and not by facts appearing in evidence at a later stage of the trial. State v. Rogers, 233 N.C. 390, 64 S.E.2d 572, 28 A.L.R.2d 1104; State v. Richardson, 216 N.C. 304, 4 S.E.2d 852. Doubt has been cast upon this position by cases which hold that when the involuntariness of a confession is conclusively demonstrated, a defendant is deprived of due process by admission of a confession even though important evidence regarding involuntariness was introduced after admission of the confession. Black-burn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 80 S.Ct. 274, 4 L.Ed.2d 242; Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 58 S.Ct. 443, 82 L.Ed. 685.

The facts of the instant case do not require that we resolve this doubt since it does not appear that the testimony of Officer Johnson conclusively demonstrated that defendant's confession was involuntary or that defendant was deprived of due process. The record indicates that this statement was addressed solely to Officer Johnson, who immediately terminated his conversation with defendant. The ensuing events seem to imply that, for some unknown reason, defendant did not desire to tell Officer Johnson anything. Apparently, the defendant, without coercion or intimidation of any kind, talked with the other police officers.

However, a more serious question is presented by defendant's assignment of error and contention that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact to support his conclusions of law. In State v. Barnes, 264 N.C. 517, 142 S.E.2d 344, Higgins, J., speaking for the Court, stated: 'Under present procedures it is essential not only that a full investigation be made and the evidence recorded, but the facts must be found which disclose the circumstances and conditions surrounding the making of the incriminating admissions.'

In the instant case the trial judge properly excused the jury and heard evidence from both the State and defendant on the question of whether the alleged confession was voluntarily and understandingly made. State v. Gray, supra; State v. Rogers, supra.

At the conclusion of the voir dire hearing the trial judge found the following facts:

'* * * The Court finds that Officer Jimmy A. Mohiser and Officer J. L. Denning were present together on December 6, 1966 in the bus on Fayetteville Street with the defendant Williford; that on the bus on Fayetteville Street Officer Mohiser advised the defendant Williford prior to asking him any questions and prior to any admission or statement having been made by the defendant Williford, that anything that the defendant Williford--strike that--that the defendant...