State v. Wilson
| Decision Date | 23 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2020AP1014-CR |
| Citation | 404 Wis.2d 623,982 N.W.2d 67,2022 WI 77 |
| Parties | STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Christopher D. WILSON, Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs filed by David Malkus, assistant state public defender. There was an oral argument by David Malkus, assistant state public defender.
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by Anne C. Murphy, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral argument by Anne C. Murphy, assistant attorney general.
¶1 The petitioner, Christopher Wilson, seeks review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals affirming both his judgment of conviction and the circuit court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence.1 Wilson argues that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when police officers entered his fenced-in backyard without a warrant.
¶2 Specifically, Wilson contends that the officers’ warrantless entry was not a valid "knock and talk" investigation because the officers lacked an implicit license to enter his fenced-in backyard and therefore the entry violated the Fourth Amendment. He further contends that the officers’ warrantless entry was not justified by the exigent circumstance of hot pursuit. The State argues to the contrary, advancing that it had an implicit license to enter and that it was in hot pursuit of Wilson.
¶3 We conclude that the police officers did not conduct a valid "knock and talk" investigation because the officers did not have an implicit license to enter Wilson's backyard. Additionally, we conclude that the officers’ entry into Wilson's backyard was not permissible under the exigency of hot pursuit because the officers did not immediately or continuously pursue Wilson from the scene of a crime and therefore violated the Fourth Amendment.
¶4 Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand to the circuit court with directions to vacate Wilson's judgment of conviction and grant the motion to suppress evidence.
¶5 On January 16, 2017, South Milwaukee police received a call from a citizen witness describing a grey BMW driving erratically and traveling "all over the road." The caller provided an address at which the car had stopped and described the driver of the vehicle as wearing a black hat and bright orange shoes. Further, the caller reported that the driver exited the vehicle, climbed onto a fence, reached over the fence to open it, and then entered the yard.
¶6 Officer Nathan Siefert of the South Milwaukee Police Department responded and arrived at the address the caller had given. He testified that upon his arrival he observed a "silver BMW, just as the caller had described, which was parked in the back parking slab partially on a snowbank." The car was running and the back tailgate was open. Officer Siefert ran the car's license plate and discovered that it was not registered to the address at which it was located.
¶7 Next, Officer Siefert telephoned the caller to confirm the information given. They discussed the details of the complaint, including that the car was changing speeds and driving erratically over the course of about three and a half miles and the fact that the caller observed the car pull into the location where Office Siefert eventually found it. Officer Siefert confirmed with the caller that the caller saw a white male wearing bright orange shoes climb onto a fence, reach over the fence, open it, and enter the yard.
¶8 At this point, Officer Siefert testified that he treated the situation as "possibly an OWI and possibly a burglary." Specifically, he
¶9 The backyard area of the property was surrounded by a high, solid wooden fence that obstructed any view of the yard. When Officer Siefert and his partner arrived, the gate was open, but a large garbage can blocked the entry way. The officers removed the garbage can from their path, walked through the open gate into the backyard, and proceeded to knock on the side door of the unattached garage. At no point prior to entering the property did the officers obtain a warrant.
¶10 Wilson, who was wearing a black cap and bright orange shoes as the caller had described, opened the garage side door. As they conversed, Officer Siefert observed that Wilson had slurred speech and stumbled on the dry, level, concrete garage floor. Wilson also stated that he had taken his prescribed Methadone that day.
¶11 Officer Siefert accompanied Wilson back to the car so Wilson could retrieve his identification. Upon arriving at the vehicle, Officer Siefert observed in plain view a handgun inside the vehicle. Wilson was subsequently found to have a revoked driver's license, and Officer Siefert placed him under arrest. In the course of a pat-down search, Officer Siefert found a prescription pill bottle in Wilson's pocket which was in a name other than Wilson's.
¶12 Wilson ultimately was charged with one count of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI) as a second offense,2 one count of endangering safety by use of a dangerous weapon under the influence of an intoxicant,3 and one count of possession of a prescription drug without a valid prescription.4 He subsequently moved to suppress "all statements, physical evidence, blood samples, and any observations obtained by police that were derived from" the police's warrantless entry to the property.
¶13 Specifically, Wilson contended that the officers impermissibly entered the curtilage of his home without a warrant, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Consequently, he argued that all evidence gathered as a result of the officers’ unlawful actions must be suppressed. The evidence included his statements, the suspected prescription drugs, the gun, and the results of a subsequent chemical test of Wilson's blood.
¶14 After a hearing, the circuit court denied Wilson's motion. It concluded that the "warrantless entry into the backyard near Mr. Wilson's garage and the subsequent arrest of Mr. Wilson on the parking slab outside of the garage were justified by exigent circumstances of a hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect who had committed jailable offenses." The circuit court cited criminal trespass and burglary as the potential jailable offenses justifying the entry.
¶15 Subsequently, Wilson pleaded guilty to the OWI and endangering safety counts, and the prescription drug count was dismissed and read in, enabling it to be considered at sentencing.5 He was sentenced to a total of four months in jail.
¶16 Wilson appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's judgment of conviction and denial of the motion to suppress. State v. Wilson, No. 2020AP1014-CR, unpublished slip op., 2021 WL 1883942 . However, rather than echoing the circuit court's hot pursuit rationale, it determined that the officers’ conduct constituted a permissible "knock and talk" investigation, which if lawfully conducted does not implicate the Fourth Amendment. Wilson petitioned for this court's review.
¶17 We are called upon to review the court of appeals’ decision affirming the circuit court's denial of a motion to suppress. Whether evidence should be suppressed is a question of constitutional fact subject to a two-step inquiry. State v. Reed, 2018 WI 109, ¶51, 384 Wis. 2d 469, 920 N.W.2d 56.
¶18 First, we will uphold a circuit court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Anderson, 2019 WI 97, ¶20, 389 Wis. 2d 106, 935 N.W.2d 285. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. Id. Second, the application of constitutional principles to those facts presents a question of law that we review independently of the decisions rendered by the circuit court and court of appeals. Id.
¶19 We begin our analysis by setting forth principles of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. This case implicates one of the core constitutional guarantees found in the United States Constitution.6 The Fourth Amendment guarantees that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." "It is axiomatic that the ‘physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.’ " Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (citing United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for E. Dist. of Mich., S. Div., 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972) ). Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 185 L.Ed.2d 495 (2013) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961) ).
¶20 Fourth Amendment protections also extend to the curtilage of one's home, the area "immediately surrounding and associated with the home." Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) ; State v. Martwick, 2000 WI 5, ¶26, 231 Wis. 2d 801, 604 N.W.2d 552. The extent and scope of a home's curtilage is determined by four factors:
[T]he proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which...
To continue reading
Request your trial