State v. Wilson

Decision Date17 July 1931
Docket Number31285
Citation173 La. 347,137 So. 57
CourtLouisiana Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE v. WILSON

Rehearing Denied October 6, 1931

Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; T. F Bell, Judge.

Clarence Wilson was convicted of shooting another with intent to commit murder, and he appeals.

Affirmed.

Thomas W. Robertson and L. C. Blanchard, both of Shreveport, for appellant.

Percy Saint, Atty. Gen., E. R. Schowalter, Asst. Atty. Gen., and James U. Galloway, Dist. Atty., of Shreveport, for the State.

OPINION

OVERTON, J.

Defendant was convicted under an information charging, to quote the charge, that he "did shoot J. C. Glenn with a dangerous weapon, to wit: a pistol and a rifle, with the intent to commit murder," and was sentenced to the penitentiary for not less than eight nor more than twelve years. He relies on three bills of exception for a reversal.

Bills numbered 1 and 3 were taken to the overruling of a motion to quash and of a motion in arrest of judgment. As both bills present the same question, namely, whether the information charges an offense known to the law, they may be considered together.

Defendant's position is that the information charges no offense known to the law, because it does not charge that the shooting was done "wilfully and unlawfully," and because it does not charge that it was done "feloniously," nor that it was done with malice aforethought.

The charge is preferred under section 791 of the Revised Statutes, as amended and re-enacted by Act 43 of 1890, which, in so far as pertinent, reads as follows:

"Whoever shall shoot, stab, cut, strike or thrust any person with a dangerous weapon with intent to commit murder, under any other circumstances than those mentioned in the preceding section [referring to a higher grade of the offense], shall, on conviction, suffer imprisonment at hard labor or otherwise for not less than one nor more than twenty one years."

The position that the information must allege that the shooting was done with malice aforethought is not supported by the law. This very point was at issue in State v. Menard, 150 La. 324, 90 So. 665, and, after a consideration of the authorities for and against the position, it was held that the allegation was unnecessary, the ruling being based largely on the well-established doctrine that, in an indictment for a statutory crime, of which the offense, here charged is one, it suffices to follow substantially the language of the statute, creating the offense. We adhere to the ruling. It finds support to-day in article 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, where the same rule is reflected.

The position that the information must expressly charge that the shooting was done unlawfully or feloniously is likewise not supported by law. Since the adoption of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in the year 1928, no indictment may be held insufficient for the omission of the word "unlawfully" or of the word "feloniously." Article 234, Code of Crim. Proc. The propriety of their omission is also supported by the fact that neither word is found in the statute, denouncing the offense.

The position that the information must charge expressly that the shooting was done willfully ought not to be sustained. If the word "unlawfully" or the word "feloniously" may be omitted from the indictment it would seem that, with equal propriety andreason, the word "wilfully" may be omitted. That word does not appear in the statute creating the offense charged, and it suffices that the offense be charged in the language of the statute creating the offense, or in words unequivocally conveying the meaning of the statute. State v. Menard, supra; Code Crim. Proc. Art. 227. It may be observed also that in the short forms of indictment, given in article 235 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the word "wilfully" is omitted in all forms given, without reference to the necessity of using the word, as the law stood, prior to the adoption of the Code. It was the manifest intention of the framers of...

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