State v. Wilson
| Decision Date | 06 July 1965 |
| Citation | 212 A.2d 75,153 Conn. 39 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Joseph WILSON. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut |
Samuel N. Allen, Sp. Public Defender, for appellant (defendant).
Peter W. Gillies, Sp. Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (state).
Before KING, C. J., and MURPHY, ALCORN, SHANNON and HOUSE, JJ.
The defendant was tried on an information charging him with four counts of burglary in violation of § 53-68 of the General Statutes and one count of using a motor vehicle without the consent of the owner in violation of § 14-229 of the General Statutes. Two of the burglary counts were dismissed by the court, and all evidence concerning them was stricken from the record. The defendant was convicted, after a trial to a jury, of the remaining three counts after which he pleaded guilty to the second part of the information charging him with being a second offender pursuant to § 54-118 of the General Statutes on the basis of a prior conviction of the crimes of breaking and entering and larceny. The defendant was thereupon sentenced to concurrent terms in the state prison on two counts of burglary, and judgment was suspended on the count charging him with using a motor vehicle without the permission of the owner. He has appealed, assigning error in the court's refusal to strike out all of the evidence offered by the state. His assignment of error is based upon the claim that his arrest, made without a warrant, was illegal and the evidence offered to convict him was obtained as a result of, and was therefore tainted by, the illegal arrest. The decisive question is whether the defendant's arrest without a warrant was illegal.
The validity of the arrest is to be determined by the application of § 6-49 of the General Statutes, which permits members of the state police department or of an organized local police department to arrest, without previous complaint and warrant, any person who the officer has reasonable grounds to believe has committed a felony. Martyn v. Donlin, 151 Conn. 402, 409, 198 A.2d 700; State v. Traub, 150 Conn. 169, 173, 187 A.2d 230, cert. granted, judgment vacated and case remanded, 374 U.S. 493, 83 S.Ct. 1899, 10 L.Ed.2d 1048; see United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 589, 68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210. The defendant was arrested without a warrant by state and Hartford police officers, and there is no claim that he was arrested for a crime committed in the officers' presence. We examine the facts of this case, therefore, to determine whether reasonable grounds existed for the arresting officers to believe that the defendant had committed a felony. In this connection 'reasonable grounds to believe' is to be equated with 'probable cause'. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100, 102, 80 S.Ct. 168, 4 L.Ed.2d 134. As the latter term implies, we are dealing with probabilities, and our determination is to be reached by an application of the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men act. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879. While the proposition was stated many years ago, we reaffirm as sound doctrine today the words of Chief Justice Church: 'It is a false humanity which would protect offenders, either by stifling detection and prosecution, or by affording facilities to escape conviction, by unnecessary and artificial technicalities in the administration of the law.' Rawson v. State, 19 Conn. 292, 295. We also find ourselves in agreement with the declaration of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit that '[t]he whole complex of swift modern communication in a large police department would be a futility if the authority of an individual officer was to be circumscribed by the scope of his first hand knowledge of facts concerning a crime or alleged crime'. Williams v. United States, 113 U.S.A.pp.D.C. 371, 308 F.2d 326, 327.
In order to establish probable cause it is not necessary to produce a quantum of proof sufficient to establish guilt. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 311, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327. Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the officer and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in...
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State v. DeChamplain
...everyday life on which reasonable and prudent persons act. State v. Jackson, 162 Conn. 440, 445, 294 A.2d 517 (1972); State v. Wilson, 153 Conn. 39, 41, 212 A.2d 75 (1965), citing Brinegar v. United States, supra, 338 U.S. 175, 69 S.Ct. The test is best stated in Spinelli v. United States, ......
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...are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that a felony had been committed.' State v. Wilson, 153 Conn. 39, 42, 212 A.2d 75 [1965]"; State v. Wilson, 178 Conn. 427, 435-36, 423 A.2d 72 (1979); and that the person arrested committed it. State v. DeChampla......
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