State v. Wilson

• Decision Date: 03 November 2003
• Citation: 178 N.J. 7,833 A.2d 1087
• Parties: STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Larry D. WILSON, a/k/a Robert Smith, IWA, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

833 A.2d 1087

178 N.J. 7

STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Larry D. WILSON, a/k/a Robert Smith, IWA, Defendant-Respondent.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued October 8, 2003.

Decided November 3, 2003.

Jafer Aftab, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant (Peter C. Harvey, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; Bennett A. Barlyn, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief).

Mark H. Friedman, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent (Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney).

Justice VERNIERO delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is a search-and-seizure case. We granted certification to determine whether the State has satisfied its burden of demonstrating the validity of a warrantless automobile search. The State advances some legitimate arguments to justify its conduct. However, our review of the trial court's suppression hearing leads us to conclude that the State submitted insufficient factual proofs at that hearing to support its current position. Under those circumstances, we hold that the Appellate Division properly suppressed the fruits of the search.

I.

On February 20, 1999, at approximately 12:26 a.m., two municipal police officers in a marked police car were patrolling the area of Union Avenue and Jasper Street in the City of Paterson. One of the officers observed a vehicle coming from his left on Union Avenue. The vehicle approached the intersection of the two streets to turn left. The officer's position allowed him to see into the interior of the vehicle's passenger side. The officer recognized the passenger, whom he knew as Robert Smith, and who later was identified as defendant Larry Wilson. The officer believed that there were outstanding arrest warrants for contempt against defendant.

The vehicle turned onto Jasper Street, proceeding approximately four car lengths before parking on the side of the street. The officers drove through the intersection and, as they pulled up behind the vehicle, they observed defendant exiting. There is no indication in the record that defendant was aware of the police presence. One of the officers was able to obtain a better view of defendant that confirmed the officer's belief that defendant was the person for whom the warrants had issued.

The officer called to defendant who responded by walking toward the officer. The officer arrested defendant based on the warrants. Defendant had his hands inside his jacket sleeves, impeding the officer's ability to handcuff him. Reacting to that circumstance, the officer directed defendant "to push his hands through [the jacket sleeves]." In compliance, defendant pushed his right hand through the sleeve and, in so doing, a small bag of what appeared to be marijuana dropped to the ground. Defendant "blurted" to the officer that the substance contained in the bag was, in fact, marijuana.

The officer then directed defendant to push his left hand through his jacket sleeve. In complying with that directive, defendant caused another bag to fall to the ground. That bag contained six smaller packages of what the officer believed was cocaine. The officer handcuffed defendant, placed him in the back of the patrol car, and retrieved the suspected drugs from the ground. The officer next turned his attention to the vehicle's driver whom he had never seen before that night. The driver had already exited the vehicle when the officer asked him for his driving credentials. In response, the driver furnished valid credentials.

While that officer questioned the driver, the other officer retraced defendant's path between the vehicle's passenger side and the police car to determine whether defendant had discarded any additional drugs on the ground. The officer found nothing. The officer then opened the unlocked passenger door "to look in the vehicle to see if there [were] any other drugs or [drug] paraphernalia in [defendant's] immediate area there." The officer observed suspected narcotics in an open map pocket on the lower portion of the passenger-side door. The officer later acknowledged that the narcotics found in the vehicle were not in plain view and that he had to open the car door to discover them. The retrieved drugs subsequently were determined to be fifty bags of crack cocaine. Following the search, the police arrested the driver, handcuffed him, and discovered $535 in cash but no drugs on his person.

A grand jury charged defendant with third-degree possession of cocaine, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a(1); third-degree possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(1) and b(3); and third-degree possession of cocaine with intent to distribute within 1000 feet of school property, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a and 2C:35-7. At a subsequent suppression hearing the trial court found that probable cause and exigent circumstances had existed to justify the warrantless search of the vehicle. Defendant thereafter pled guilty to all charges, subject to his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. The trial court sentenced defendant to an extended term of six years imprisonment, with a three-year period of parole ineligibility, and assessed the usual fines and penalties.

The Appellate Division reversed in a reported decision based on its view that the officers had lacked probable cause to conduct the warrantless search of the automobile. State v. Wilson, 354 N.J.Super. 548, 808 A.2d 552 (2002). We granted the State's petition for certification, 175 N.J. 431, 815 A.2d 477 (2003), and now affirm.

II.

The legal principles governing this dispute are straightforward. Consistent with the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution,

[a] warrantless search is presumed invalid unless it falls within one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. The requirement that a search warrant be obtained before evidence may be seized is not lightly to be dispensed with, and the burden is on the State, as the party seeking to validate a warrantless search, to bring it within one of those recognized exceptions.

[State v. Cooke, 163 N.J. 657, 664, 751 A.2d 92, 95 (2000) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).]

In satisfying that burden, the State must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that there was no constitutional violation. State v. Whittington, 142 N.J.Super. 45, 51-52, 359 A.2d 881, 884-85 (App.Div.1976). In certain areas of our search-and-seizure jurisprudence not applicable here, our case law imposes an elevated burden on the State. See, e.g., State v. Holland, 176 N.J. 344, 360-61, 823 A.2d 38, 47-48 (2003) (requiring clear-and-convincing proof to satisfy second and third prongs of three-prong test for admitting fruits of search under independent-source rule).

One exception to the warrant requirement is the automobile exception. Cooke, supra, 163 N.J. at 664, 751 A.2d at 95-96. Under our State's constitution, that exception "applies only in cases in which probable cause and exigent circumstances are evident, making it impracticable for the police to obtain a warrant." Id. at 671, 751 A.2d at 99. Because we agree with the Appellate Division that the State did not adequately demonstrate probable cause, we will not discuss exigency other than to confirm that, although not required under the Fourth Amendment, it is a necessary element of the automobile exception under Article I, paragraph 7. Id. at 666, 671, 751 A.2d at 96-97, 99.

Familiar in concept, probable cause "eludes precise definition[.]" State v. Sullivan, 169 N.J. 204, 210, 777 A.2d 60, 64 (2001) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "In general terms, it means less than legal evidence necessary to convict though more than mere naked suspicion. Probable cause exists if at the time of the police action there is a well grounded suspicion that a crime has been or is being committed." Id. at 210-11, 777 A.2d at 64 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). It reflects a determination that, in view of all the circumstances, "there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." State v. Demeter, 124 N.J. 374, 380-81, 590 A.2d 1179, 1183 (1991) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The definition of probable cause used to evaluate a warrantless search is the same as for a search warrant. Whiteley v. Warden, Wyo. State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 566, 91 S.Ct. 1031, 1035-36, 28 L.Ed.2d 306, 312 (1971).

In the case of a warrant, "the probable cause determination must be made based on the information contained within the four corners of the supporting affidavit, as supplemented by sworn testimony before the issuing judge that is recorded contemporaneously." Schneider v. Simonini, 163 N.J. 336, 363, 749 A.2d 336, 351 (2000). One commentator has explained that "[l]imiting consideration to the `four corners' of the evidence before the issuing magistrate assures that the magistrate was in a position to adequately perform the constitutional function of providing independent judicial review prior to executive intrusions on individual privacy." Kevin G. Byrnes, New Jersey Arrest, Search and Seizure, § 5:2-5, at 74 (2003).

Warrantless searches, of course, are not supported by an affidavit in advance of the search but rather are evaluated based on testimony and other evidence presented to the trial court (either a municipal or Law Division judge) at a subsequent suppression hearing. Nonetheless, the "four-corners" concept is reflected in such cases in that the suppression motion is "heard and decided by the court on the basis of everything each side has to offer, including testimony if material facts are disputed." State v. Gaudiosi, 97 N.J.Super. 565, 568, 235 A.2d 680, 682 (App.Div. 1967). In other words, the trial court decides whether the State has justified its warrantless conduct based on the "four corners"...