State v. Wilson
| Decision Date | 28 December 1982 |
| Citation | 188 Conn. 715,453 A.2d 765 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Terrance WILSON. |
Gerard A. Smyth, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant (defendant).
Carl Schuman, Asst. State's Atty., with whom were Richard A. Schatz, Asst. State's Atty., and, on the brief, John M. Bailey State's Atty., and Jorge A. Simon, Sp. Deputy Asst. State's Atty. for appellee (state).
Before SPEZIALE, C.J., and PETERS, ARTHUR H. HEALEY, PARSKEY and GRILLO, JJ.
In a trial to the jury the defendant was found guilty of the crimes of burglary in the second degree, and larceny in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-102 and 53a-122(a)(2) respectively. In his appeal the defendant claims he was denied his constitutional right to cross-examine a key witness in certain respects. He also claims that the court erred in permitting a jeweler to give his opinion with respect to the value of several items of the stolen property.
The evidence presented at trial showed that during the period of time commencing on March 5, 1979, between the hours of 3 and 4 p.m., and ending on March 6, 1979, between the hours of 2 and 3 p.m., the home of Mr. and Mrs. Peter Bossi, located at 1246 Burlington Avenue, Bristol, was forcibly entered and jewelry was stolen. At the time, Mr. and Mrs. Bossi were on vacation in Florida. Upon returning to their home, they were informed of the break-in and discovered their loss. Subsequently, Mr. Bossi and his wife prepared an inventory of those items which had been stolen. The items which belonged to Mr. Bossi were a gold Hamilton watch, a tiger eye ring with small diamond chips, a gold chain with horn, and an inexpensive watch. The other items on the list belonged to Mrs. Bossi. Mr. Bossi testified that he was not familiar with all of the items which belonged to his wife.
Mrs. Bossi testified that she was missing her mother's engagement ring and wedding band, a gold chain, a gold-link bracelet, a pearl stone ring, a silver dollar on a chain, a half dozen bracelets, four or five rings, four or five gold chains, coins, and an award watch from the New Departure Company, all of which were listed on the inventory. A pillowcase from one of the pillows in the bedroom was also missing.
Joseph J. Gerulis, a coaccused, testified that on an evening in early March, 1979, he was with the defendant in Bristol in the vicinity of Burlington Avenue shortly after 7 p.m. and had dropped him off to "do a couple of house jobs." He next saw the defendant around 10 p.m. that same evening at the defendant's father's house, where the defendant showed him a pillowcase full of assorted jewelry. The defendant said he had gotten the jewelry in the Burlington Avenue area.
Reva Paris testified that in March, 1979, the defendant came to her house and gave her a pillowcase containing some jewelry. She subsequently turned these items over to the Bristol police department. Mrs. Bossi identified these items as items which had been stolen from her house.
Diane Bromley testified that the defendant had given her a bracelet in March, 1979, which she likewise turned over to the Bristol police department. Mrs. Bossi identified this bracelet as another one of the items stolen from her house.
The defendant admitted that he had given these items to Reva Paris and Diane Bromley, but testified that he himself had received them from Joseph Gerulis. Officer Barbara Kenney of the Bristol police department testified that some of the other items which had been stolen from the Bossi residence were recovered in the home of Joseph Gerulis on March 29, 1979.
Joseph Gerulis testified as a witness for the state. Upon cross-examination the following occurred:
Although the defendant took no exception to the court's ruling, because the court's action might reasonably have been understood to preclude further comment by counsel and because it implicates the defendant's sixth amendment right of confrontation we consider the issue under State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 70, 327 A.2d 576 (1973).
Cross-examination to elicit facts tending to show motive, interest, bias and prejudice is a matter of right and may not be unduly restricted. State v. Corley, 177 Conn. 243, 246, 413 A.2d 826 (1979); State v. Luzzi, 147 Conn. 40, 46, 156 A.2d 505 (1959). The sixth amendment to the constitution guarantees the right of an accused in a criminal prosecution "to be confronted with the witnesses against him." This right is secured to defendants in both state and federal prosecutions. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 1067, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965). The primary interest secured by confrontation is the right to cross-examination. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 1076, 13 L.Ed.2d 934 (1965). An important function of cross-examination is the exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496, 79 S.Ct. 1400, 1413, 3 L.Ed.2d 1377 (1959). To comport with the constitutional standards embodied in the confrontation clause the defendant in exercising his right of cross-examination must be allowed to "expose to the jury the facts from which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness." Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1111, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). Cross-examination with regard to motive permits the exploration of felony charges even when the witness has not yet been convicted.
Although the court should have permitted the particular question, a review of the entire cross-examination demonstrates that the opportunity to impeach the witness sufficiently comported with the constitutional standards to satisfy the confrontation clause. United States v. Andrew, 666 F.2d 915, 925 (5th Cir.1982); United States v. Vasilios, 598 F.2d 387, 390-91 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 967, 100 S.Ct. 456, 62 L.Ed.2d 380 (1979), reh. denied, 444 U.S. 1049, 100 S.Ct. 742, 62 L.Ed.2d 737 (1980); see State v. Tropiano, 158 Conn. 412, 426-28, 262 A.2d 147 (1969). Additional cross-examination revealed that Gerulis had driven the defendant and another man to the area of the crime; that he returned every fifteen to twenty minutes over the period of an hour to pick up the others; that when they did not return, he went to the defendant's residence to see what they got; and that Gerulis expected and received gas money for his efforts. Cross-examination further indicated that some of the stolen property was found in Gerulis' apartment during the execution of a...
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