State v. Wilson
Decision Date | 20 August 2020 |
Docket Number | Docket No. 47275 |
Parties | STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ANDREW REED WILSON, Defendant-Respondent. |
Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Bannock County. Hon. Robert C. Naftz, District Judge.
Order granting motion to suppress, reversed and case remanded.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for appellant. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.
Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Reed P. Anderson, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for respondent. Andrea W. Reynolds argued.
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The State appeals from the district court's order granting Andrew Reed Wilson's motion to suppress. Because we conclude reasonable suspicion existed based on the totality of circumstances, we reverse the court's order and remand the case.
The district court made the following factual findings in its ruling granting Wilson's motion to suppress:
(Footnotes omitted.) As a result of this encounter, the State charged Wilson with felony driving under the influence, Idaho Code § 18-8004.
Wilson filed a motion to suppress all the evidence obtained during the encounter arguing, among other things, that Officer Malone initially detained him in the drive-through lane and lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him at that time. The State did not respond to this motion before the parties proceeded to an evidentiary hearing, at which both the Jack in the Box employee and Officer Malone testified. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court took the motion under advisement and ordered post-hearing briefing.
In its post-hearing brief, the State relied on the community caretaking function to explain Officer Malone's initial encounter with Wilson in the drive-through lane. Specifically, the State argued that Officer Malone was performing his community caretaking function when he approached Wilson's car and that Officer Malone did not actually detain Wilson until after Wilson exited his car in the parking lot when Officer Malone saw Wilson's "glassy eyes" andsmelled the odor of alcohol coming from Wilson. At this point in time, the State argued, Officer Malone had reasonable suspicion to detain Wilson.
In a written decision, the district court rejected the State's argument that Officer Malone was performing a caretaking function when he approached Wilson's car in the drive-through lane, concluding "there was no evidence that Officer Malone had a genuine or warranted concern that any of the occupants of the vehicle were in need of any assistance." Rather, the court ruled Officer Malone detained Wilson in the drive-through lane when Officer Malone "instructed him to move his car from the drive through to the restaurant parking lot."
The district court further ruled that reasonable suspicion did not support this detention:
Viewing the totality of circumstances, Officer Malone did not have reasonable suspicion to detain [Wilson]. A review of the facts known to Officer Malone and the inferences that can be reasonably drawn from the totality of circumstances [show Wilson's] detention was not supported by reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity. First, a report to law enforcement that occupants in a vehicle located in a drive-through lane of a restaurant had alcohol in the car is not sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Further, the smell of alcohol coming from a vehicle with several occupants is not adequate to conclude that [Wilson] himself had consumed any alcohol. Likewise, the presence of empty beer cans in the car does not establish that [Wilson] had consumed any of the alcohol in the cans. Therefore, the detention of [Wilson] was impermissible.
The State timely appeals the district court's order granting Wilson's motion to suppress.
On appeal, the State no longer argues Officer Malone was performing a community caretaking function when he engaged Wilson in the drive-through lane. Rather, the State now directly challenges the district court's ruling by arguing Officer Malone had reasonable suspicion to detain Wilson in the drive-through lane. Wilson argues the State failed to preserve this argument. We disagree.
The Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Court will not address new issues on appeal. In State v. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95, 439 P.3d 1267 (2019), the Idaho Supreme Court clarified the rule governing when a party has preserved or failed to preserve an issue for appeal. Id. at 97, 439 P.3d at 1269. The Court distinguished between a case in which a party consistently maintains the same issue or position but "polishes" its argument with citation to previouslyuncited authority and a case in which a party raises a new substantive issue on which the trial court did not have the opportunity to rule. Id. at 98, 439 P.3d at 1270. The Court held that the former was a permissible "pragmatic evolution" of an appellate issue but that the latter was an issue unpreserved for appeal. Id. Further, the Court emphasized that it will not address on appeal "an issue or a party's position on an issue that [the trial court] did not have the opportunity to address." Id. at 99, 439 P.3d at 1271 (emphasis added).
As this language indicates, an exception to the preservation rule applies if a party argued the issue to the trial court or if the court actually decided the issue. See, e.g., State v. Duvalt, 131 Idaho 550, 553, 961 P.2d 641, 644 (1998) (); State v. Jeske, 164 Idaho 862, 868, 436 P.3d 683, 689 (2019) ( )(quotations and brackets omitted).
This exception applies in this case. We agree with the State that the district court had the opportunity to address the issue it raises on appeal--whether Officer Malone had reasonable suspicion to detain Wilson in the drive-through lane. Indeed, the court directly ruled that Officer Malone did not have reasonable suspicion to detain Wilson in the drive-through lane. On appeal, the State does not challenge any of the district court's factual findings but, rather, simply challenges the court's legal application of the reasonable suspicion standard to the facts as the court found them. Specifically, the State argues that--contrary to the court's ruling--the Jack in the Box employee's tip about alcohol in Wilson's car, the odor of alcohol emanating from the car, and the presence of empty beer cans in the car constituted reasonable suspicion to detain Wilson in the drive-through lane.
The facts on which the State relies on appeal to argue that reasonable suspicion existed are the exact same facts the court relied on to conclude the State failed to establish reasonable suspicion. Because the court directly addressed and ruled on the issue of reasonable suspicion based on the same facts the State relies on to argue the contrary, the State's argument is preserved for appeal.
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