State v. Wilson

• Decision Date: 26 April 2017
• Docket Number: NO. 2015 KA 1794,2015 KA 1794
• Citation: 220 So.3d 35
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Jeremy WILSON
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

220 So.3d 35

STATE of Louisiana

v.Jeremy WILSON

NO. 2015 KA 1794

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

APRIL 26, 2017

Warren L. Montgomery, District Attorney, Matthew Caplan, Assistant District Attorney, Covington, Louisiana, Attorneys for Appellee, State of Louisiana

Katherine M. Franks, Abita Springs, Louisiana, Attorney for Appellant, Jeremy Wilson

Jeremy Wilson, Angola, Louisiana, Appellant, In Proper Person

BEFORE: WELCH, CRAIN, AND HOLDRIDGE, JJ.

CRAIN, J.

The defendant, Jeremy Wilson, was convicted of two counts of second degree murder and sentenced to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 8, 2008, the Washington Parish Sheriff's Office responded to a residential fire in Franklinton and discovered two bodies, burned beyond recognition. The victims were later identified as Donald Wayne Demille Williams and Kimberly Sims (or Simms), who both lived at the residence. During an autopsy, bullet fragments were recovered from the victims' bodies and it was determined they both died of gunshot wounds

to the head before their bodies were burned. The police recovered bullet and casing fragments at the crime scene, but found no evidence of traceable fire accelerant.

Initially, police identified as suspects, interviewed, and arrested Ricky Magee, Monica Simmons, and Andrew James; however, the murder investigation remained open. Then, in October 2008, Britney Farrell contacted police and said the defendant confessed to her that he and Erick Townsend shot the victims during a robbery, then burned the house to destroy any evidence. She later recanted her statement. At trial she denied any memory of any statements, but identified her voice after reviewing the recordings.

After Farrell gave statements to police, Townsend was arrested on unrelated charges and provided information that led police to recover three guns from Jamieson Creek and to conduct further investigation. Townsend was then indicted with the defendant for two counts of first degree murder. The cases were severed and Townsend pled guilty to two counts of manslaughter in exchange for his agreement to testify at the defendant's trial. However, when the state called Townsend to testify, he refused to answer questions despite the trial court finding he had no Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination to invoke and threatening him with its contempt power.

Information from Townsend led police to interview the defendant's wife, Felicia Brewer. Brewer implicated the defendant in the crimes, stating on the night of the murders she drove the defendant and Townsend to what she thought was a drug deal. She said she waited in the car and when the two men returned they were wearing masks, bloody gloves, and had changed clothes. She also described driving to Jamieson Creek where Townsend disposed of three guns. Like Farrell, Brewer later recanted her statement; however, at trial, Brewer testified her original statement to police implicating the defendant in the crimes was truthful.

The defendant maintained his innocence and accused Ricky Magee and Monica Simmons of the murders. However, Monica Simmons invoked her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and refused to testify at trial, as did Paul Robinson, who gave a statement saying Ricky Magee confessed to him. Over the defendant's objection that he was being denied his right to present a defense, the trial court refused to allow the defendant to admit the out-of-court statements to police into evidence and ruled other witnesses would not be allowed to testify about hearsay statements.

The jury convicted the defendant of two counts of second degree murder, responsive verdicts to his indictment on two counts of first degree murder.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

On appeal, the defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, arguing there was no physical evidence against him and the testimony of witnesses who implicated him was not credible.

A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand, as it violates due process. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV ; La. Const. art. I, § 2. In reviewing claims challenging sufficiency of evidence, an appellate court must determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt based on the entirety of the evidence, both admissible and inadmissible, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution. SeeJackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ; State v. Oliphant , 13-2973 (La. 2/21/14), 133 So.3d 1255, 1258-59 ; see also La. Code Crim. Pro. art. 821B; State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1308-09 (La. 1988). When circumstantial evidence forms the basis for conviction, the evidence, "assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove ... must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence." La. R.S. 15:438 ; Oliphant , 133 So.3d at 1258. The due process standard does not require the reviewing court to determine whether it believes the witnesses or whether it believes the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Mire , 14-2295 (La. 1/27/16), ––– So.3d ––––, –––– (2016 WL 314814). Rather, appellate review is limited to determining whether facts established by direct evidence and inferred from the circumstances established by that evidence are sufficient for any rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime. State v. Alexander , 14-1619 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/18/15), 182 So.3d 126, 129-30, writ denied , 15-1912 (La. 1/25/16), 185 So.3d 748. The weight given evidence is not subject to appellate review; therefore, evidence will not be reweighed by an appellate court to overturn a fact finder's determination of guilt. State v. Cobb, 13-1593 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/27/14), 144 So.3d 17, 24.

When the defendant's identity as the perpetrator of a crime is the key issue, the state is required to negate any reasonable probability of misidentification. State v. Neal , 00-0674 (La. 6/29/01), 796 So.2d 649, 658, cert. denied, 535 U.S. 940, 122 S.Ct. 1323, 152 L.Ed.2d 231 ; State v. Carter , 14-0742 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/25/15), 167 So.3d 970, 976. Positive identification by only one witness is sufficient to support a conviction. Neal , 796 So.2d at 658 ; Carter , 167 So.3d at 976.

As it relates to this case, second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. See La. R.S. 14:30.1A(1). Specific criminal intent is "that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act." La. R.S. 14:10(1). Specific intent may be formed in an instant. State v. Mickelson, 12-2539 (La. 9/3/14), 149 So.3d 178, 182. Because it is a state of mind, specific intent need not be proven as a fact, but may be inferred from circumstances surrounding the defendant's actions. Mickelson, 149 So.3d at 182.

Felicia Brewer was granted immunity from prosecution and, at trial, testified she was with the defendant and Erick Townsend on the night of the murders. She explained that the two men wanted pills, so late that night she drove them to a wooded location in a car that belonged to the defendant's sister, which she could only describe as green. The defendant and Townsend exited the car and told her to wait down the street. Brewer recalled Townsend carrying an opaque drawstring bag. She claimed she became worried when they did not quickly return and tried reaching them by cell phone, and Townsend called her back and said they were returning to the vehicle. She testified the defendant and Townsend came running out of the woods dressed in different clothes, wearing Jason and Scream costume masks and bloody latex gloves. They got back into the car and the defendant screamed at her to drive away.

Brewer testified she was scared and drove away with the defendant in the front passenger seat and Townsend in the back passenger seat. She recalled the two men arguing because Townsend wanted to tell her what went on in the house.

She stated she turned and saw Townsend had guns on his lap, which he was wiping with what she guessed was a black shirt. She also noticed a scratch on the left side of the defendant's neck. She said Townsend's bloody gloves were falling apart and "[t]here was blood everywhere" and all over Townsend.

Brewer explained the defendant said to stop at "the creek," where Townsend threw three guns out of the car. She stated while they were in the car the two men removed the outer clothes they were wearing over their original attire. When asked what happened to the outer clothes, Brewer said she had no personal knowledge, but knew what happened to the clothes because Townsend told her.¹ Brewer could not recall details about the clothes the men were originally wearing.

Brewer testified she did not know the victims, did not know where they lived, and did not go to their house on the night of the murders, explaining that she let the defendant and Townsend out of the car at a wooded area near the main road. She also denied seeing the victims' house burning or smelling smoke. However, she testified she knew about the fire. She also indicated she never experienced a more terrorizing, scary situation.

At trial, Brewer acknowledged she previously gave inconsistent and conflicting accounts of that night's events. She testified she was arrested twice and gave two statements to police consistent with her trial testimony. She testified after giving the statements to police, the defendant's parents drove her to defense counsel's office, where, in an attempt to get the defendant (her husband and the father of her child) out of jail, she said she lied to police, telling...