State v. Wilson
| Decision Date | 05 March 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 21165,21165 |
| Citation | 274 S.C. 352,264 S.E.2d 414 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. Jacob David WILSON, Appellant. |
Cleveland Stevens, Conway, for appellant.
Atty. Gen. Daniel R. McLeod and Asst. Attys. Gen. Brian P. Gibbes and Sally G. Young, Columbia, and Sol. Jim Dunn, Conway, for respondent.
The issue to be decided in this appeal involves the validity of a condition of probation which requires a defendant convicted of a crime of violence to make reparation to the injured victim of the crime.
Appellant discharged a firearm into a dwelling severely injuring one Carl Foster, and subsequently entered a plea of guilty to the offense of discharging a firearm into a dwelling in violation of Section 16-23-440 of the 1976 Code of Laws. The offense is a misdemeanor, and the punishment is governed by Code Section 17-25-30 which, construed in connection with Code Section 17-25-20, limits the maximum imprisonment for the present offense to a period of ten (10) years. State v. Hill, 254 S.C. 321, 175 S.E.2d 227.
Upon his plea, appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for five (5) years, suspended upon the service of ninety (90) days, and placed on probation for a period of five (5) years. A special condition of the probationary sentence required the defendant to pay twenty-five ($25.00) dollars per week for five (5) years as restitution to the victim of the crime. Although the sentence refers to the weekly payments as restitution, it is apparent that the court meant reparations, in the sense of payment for damages sustained by the victim from the commission of the crime.
Appellant challenges the jurisdiction of the court to include, as a condition of his probation, the requirement that he pay damages to the victim of the crime.
Although Section 17-25-100 of the 1976 Code of Laws authorizes circuit judges in this State to suspend sentences imposed by them in misdemeanor cases "upon such conditions as in their judgment may be fit and proper," we think the issues here are also controlled by the statutes authorizing probationary sentences.
The authority of the court to suspend the sentence and place appellant on probation is settled by the terms of Section 24-21-410 of the 1976 Code of Laws, which states:
After conviction or plea for any offense, except a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment, the judge of any court of record with criminal jurisdiction at the time of sentence may suspend the imposition or the execution of a sentence and place the defendant on probation or may impose a fine and also place the defendant on probation. (Emphasis added).
Section 24-21-430 is supplementary to Section 24-21-410 and deals with the conditions of probation, where the sentence of a defendant is suspended. Section 24-21-430 states:
The court shall determine and may impose by order duly entered and may at any time modify the conditions of probation and may include among them any of the following or any other.
The probationer shall:
(1) Refrain from the violation of any State or Federal penal laws;
(2) Avoid injurious or vicious habits;
(3) Avoid persons or places of disreputable or harmful character;
(4) Permit the probation officer to visit at his home or elsewhere;
(5) Work faithfully at suitable employment as far as possible;
(6) Pay a fine in one or several sums as directed by the court;
(7) Support his dependents; and
(8) Follow the probation officer's instructions and advice regarding recreational and social activities.
The portion of the sentence herein, requiring payment of reparations to the victim, was imposed as a condition of probation. The authority to require payment of reparations is not specifically included in the listed conditions of probation; therefore, the basis for such authority must be found, if at all, within the broad grant of power to impose the listed conditions "or any other."
Section 24-21-430 states that "the court shall determine . . . the conditions of probation and may include among them any of the following or any other." The phrase "any other" refers to any other conditions of probation and is broad enough to include a condition requiring payment of reparations to the victim of the crime, unless the use of the term "any other", following the enumeration of conditions of probation which may be included, must be construed to only include other...
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Fox v. State, 16872
...State v. Morgan, 198 Mont. 391, 646 P.2d 1177 (1982); Commonwealth v. Erb, 286 Pa.Super. 65, 428 A.2d 574 (1980); State v. Wilson, 274 S.C. 352, 264 S.E.2d 414 (1980); State v. Benoit, 131 Vt. 631, 313 A.2d 387 (1973). See also A. Campbell, Law of Sentencing § 23 (1978); American Bar Associ......
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Sloan v. United States, 85-892.
...as there is a factual basis in the record to support the court's determination of the amount of restitution. State v. Wilson, 274 S.C. 352, 355-56, 264 S.E.2d 414, 416 (1980); State v. Harris, supra, 70 N.J. at 598-599, 362 A.2d at 38. See also State v. Lack, supra, 98 N.M. at 507, 650 P.2d......
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Kennedy v. the Sc. Retirement Sys., 25133
...or discretionary unless it appears to require that it be given any other meaning in the present statute. See State v. Wilson, 274 S.C. 352, 356, 264 S.E.2d 414, 416 (1980). In this section, since it is very common for employees to retire without any accrued annual leave, the use of the word......
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Kennedy v. SC Retirement System, 25133.
...or discretionary unless it appears to require that it be given any other meaning in the present statute. See State v. Wilson, 274 S.C. 352, 356, 264 S.E.2d 414, 416 (1980). In this section, since it is very common for employees to retire without any accrued annual leave, the use of the word......