State v. Wilson
| Decision Date | 14 February 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 18204,18204 |
| Citation | 1990 NMSC 19,109 N.M. 541,787 P.2d 821 |
| Parties | STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Samuel Edward WILSON, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
Defendant-appellant, Samuel Edward Wilson (Wilson), was convicted pursuant to a jury verdict of first degree murder contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-2-1(A) (Repl.Pamp.1984) and conspiracy to commit murder contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-28-2(A) (Repl.Pamp.1984). The jury also found the aggravating circumstance of murder for hire. Wilson was sentenced to life imprisonment for first degree murder, and nine years with two years mandatory parole for conspiracy to commit murder, with the sentences set to run concurrently.
The State presented evidence that Wilson hired James Smith and Maurice Lee Smith, brothers, to kill the victim, the husband of a woman whom Wilson wanted to marry. Testimony at trial showed that Wilson provided a weapon, told the Smith brothers on which night to kill the victim and the method and manner of killing him, and to take money from the scene of the crime. Wilson points to various inconsistencies in this testimony and to the prosecutor's admission that the State's case contained such inconsistencies. After he was arrested, James Smith told police that Wilson had not been involved in the killing. The guns used in the murder were found on property owned by the Smith family. Later, however, James Smith told investigators that Wilson promised to pay him and his brother to kill the victim.
During voir dire of the prospective jury, one juror stated in open court that an upcoming religious holiday, Yom Kippur, might prevent him from being able to attend to his jury duties every day of the trial. Prior to the parties' counsel asserting challenges to the venire, and after the prospective juror had spoken with the trial judge in chambers about his possible conflict, the following exchange took place:
The prospective juror at issue was chosen. On the fourteenth day of trial, he sent another note (his third note) to the trial judge restating his anxiety about serving the following day, Yom Kippur. The trial judge met with the juror in chambers, out of the presence of counsel for either party, came back into court and announced that she was excusing the juror, and appointed an alternate juror to sit in the excused juror's place for the remainder of the trial.
After the judge's first in-chambers discussion with the juror, she stated to the parties and counsel what had been discussed. Prior to the second meeting in chambers, the juror had sent the judge a second note, to which the judge did not respond. Following his third note, the day before Yom Kippur, the judge met with the juror the second time and asked him if he could serve at least half a day, but he answered that it would be impossible. In his affidavit submitted after trial, the juror also testified, "During my two meetings with Judge Maes, neither the prosecution nor the defense attorneys were present." He also testified, "[I]t is unthinkable for me to devote myself to any other pursuits on Yom Kippur than fasting, prayer and contemplation."
Prior to the judge's second in-chambers discussion with the juror, the following exchange took place in open court:
* * * * * *
I think that * * * we could easily finish testimony within * * * an hour, or two hours, I guess * * *. But we could do jury instructions tomorrow, and, I don't know, whatever the court feels is the proper thing to do.
No objection was raised to the juror's dismissal until Wilson's counsel filed a motion for new trial following the verdict, nor was any objection raised to the judge's consulting with the juror outside of the presence of the attorneys for the parties.
Prior to trial, Wilson filed a "Motion in Limine About Aliases" in which he asked the court to "[r]efer to defendant during proceedings before the jury only as Ed Wilson[,]" and to "[r]equire that the prosecution, through its argument and witnesses, so refer to defendant." The court granted this motion. Wilson also filed a "Motion to Exclude All References to Defendant's Prior Convictions," which read, in pertinent part, as follows:
1. On two occasions more than ten years ago, defendant was convicted by military courts-martial of absenses [sic] without leave.
2. These convictions equate to misdemeanor offenses.
* * * * * *
Therefore defendant requests that the court prohibit the prosecutor from making any reference to this past conviction, and to direct witnesses to follow this ruling.
The court granted this motion also.
On cross-examination of a State witness, the following exchange took place:
[Defense Counsel]: Now officer, that manslaughter charge that you brought up, you had an opportunity to check that, didn't you?
[Witness]: Yes, sir. I did.
[Witness]: That is true, sir.
[Defense Counsel]: As a matter of fact, there are no felonies for Mr. Wilson--felony convictions for Mr. Wilson?
[Witness]: Can we have--clarification?
[Defense Counsel]: A conviction is when you get convicted for a felony?
[Witness]: The conflict that I have is there was a special court martial and a special court martial through the military judicial system would be the same as a felony through the civilian system.
The subject of manslaughter had been elicited on direct examination. The Smith brothers had told the witness they felt threatened by Wilson to kill the victim because of Wilson's reputation for having committed manslaughter in Texas. The court allowed questioning about this matter. Following the witness' response equating a court martial conviction with a "felony through the civilian system," Wilson's counsel asked the court to take judicial notice that Wilson's court martial conviction of "AWOL" was a misdemeanor. The court did so. Defense counsel did not ask the court to admonish the jury on this point. After a recess, the prosecutor asked the court for permission to inquire on re-direct examination into Wilson's military convictions. Wilson's counsel then moved for a mistrial, or in the alternative, an admonition to the jury not to consider the military conviction as a felony conviction. The court ruled that the prosecutor could not inquire on re-direct into Wilson's military conviction. It denied the motion for mistrial, and did not admonish the jury as requested.
Concerning the court's order disallowing testimony on any aliases Wilson may have used, the following exchange occurred on cross-examination of Wilson by the prosecutor:
[Prosecutor]: Now, you testified that the reason you put Ed Wilson to Samuel E. Wilson was just something you decided to do?
[Wilson]: No, sir.
[Prosecutor]: What was the purpose of it then?
[Wilson]: Like I said, at one time [officials at the department of motor vehicles] may ask you for your driver's license for I.D. and the next time they won't. "Ed" is just natural for me. I've gone by Ed all my life, since I was a little feller.
[Prosecutor]: You've never gone by any other name?
[Wilson]: Yes sir.
[Prosecutor]: What was that?
[Wilson]: John Edward Goodloe.
[Prosecutor]: Why did you go under that name?
[Wilson]: Because I didn't want to go back to Vietnam.
[Prosecutor]: You were finally discharged as a deserter?
At this point Wilson's counsel objected. The objection was overruled. The court previously had allowed the prosecutor to inquire into several different names Wilson had used on his vehicle registration forms.
The court instructed the jury on first degree murder, in pertinent part, as follows:
For you to find the defendant guilty of first degree murder * * * the state must prove * * * each of the following elements of the crime:
1. The defendant had [the victim] killed;
2. The killing was with the deliberate intention to take away the life of [the victim] * * *.
This instruction was the same as that found in the relevant uniform jury instruction, SCRA 1986, 14-201, except that in the latter, paragraph number one reads, "The defendant killed [the victim]." Wilson's counsel had asked the court to instruct the jury verbatim from SCRA 1986, 14-201, and then add an instruction on aiding and abetting, to the effect that:
1. The defendant intended that the crime be committed;
2. The crime was committed;
3. The defendant helped, encouraged or caused the crime to be committed.
This second tendered instruction is the same as uniform instruction, SCRA 1986, 14-2822. The court refused both tendered instructions and read its own as quoted above.
On appeal, Wilson asserts the following errors:
I. The trial judge's in-chambers communications with...
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