State v. Wilson

• Citation: 714 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 9,350 P.3d 800,237 Ariz. 296
• Decision Date: 03 June 2015
• Docket Number: No. CR–14–0308–PR.,CR–14–0308–PR.
• Parties: STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Bradley Harold WILSON, Appellant.
• Court: Supreme Court of Arizona

237 Ariz. 296

350 P.3d 800

714 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 9

STATE of Arizona, Appellee

v.Bradley Harold WILSON, Appellant.

No. CR–14–0308–PR.

Supreme Court of Arizona.

June 3, 2015.

Brett R. Rigg, Shane J. Shumway (argued), The Rigg Law Firm, P.L.L.C., Pinetop, Attorneys for Bradley Harold Wilson.

Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General, John R. Lopez IV, Solicitor General, Joseph T. Maziarz, Chief Counsel, Criminal Appeals Section, Myles A. Braccio (argued), Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix, Attorneys for State of Arizona.

Chief Justice BALES authored the opinion of the Court, in which Vice Chief Justice PELANDER and Justices BERCH, BRUTINEL, and TIMMER joined.

Opinion

Chief Justice BALES, opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 The Fourth Amendment generally requires police to obtain a warrant to search a home. Courts have recognized exceptions to this requirement, such as the exigent circumstances and emergency aid exceptions. The State here urges us to extend the community caretaking exception, which applies to certain vehicle searches, to justify the warrantless search of a home. We decline to do so.

I.

¶ 2 Police officers and paramedics went to Bradley Wilson's residence after neighbors complained about his erratic behavior. Wilson said that he had “up to seven pounds of mercury” in his house in a glass jar and that he and his family had been handling the mercury over several years. Concerned about possible contamination, a paramedic contacted the fire department, which ordered Wilson to be “rinsed off.” Wilson complied and was taken to a hospital to be examined.

¶ 3 The fire department sent a volunteer firefighter who had experience dealing with mercury spills to assess the situation at Wilson's home. Believing they should gather information for Wilson's medical treatment and noting that the outside temperature was approaching mercury's vaporization point, the firefighter and a police officer entered the home “to see if there was mercury, to see where it was at and how much there was, and get an idea of what [they] were actually dealing with.”

¶ 4 Once inside, the officer smelled marijuana. He traced the smell to a laundry room, where several marijuana plants were hidden by a hanging blanket. The officer left and obtained a search warrant. He then re-entered the home and seized the marijuana. No mercury was found, though the officer saw an “indication of mercury” in the hallway and the firefighter saw traces on the floor. The firefighter concluded that all he could do was to tell Wilson to clean it up.

¶ 5 Wilson was charged with production of marijuana and three counts of possession of drug paraphernalia. Denying Wilson's motion to suppress, the trial court concluded that exigent circumstances permitted the warrantless search and admitted evidence of the marijuana. Wilson was tried and found guilty on all charges.

¶ 6 The court of appeals reversed the denial of the motion to suppress, finding that the search was not justified by the exigent circumstances, emergency aid, or community caretaking exceptions to the warrant requirement. State v. Wilson, 235 Ariz. 447, 452 ¶ 21, 333 P.3d 774, 779 (App.2014). The State petitioned for review only as to the court of appeals' holding that the community caretaking exception did not apply.

II.

¶ 7 We review the denial of a motion to suppress evidence for an abuse of discretion, considering only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing and viewing the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the trial court's ruling. State v. Manuel, 229 Ariz. 1, 4 ¶ 11, 270 P.3d 828, 831 (2011). Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 2, Section 8 of the Arizona Constitution protect against unlawful searches and seizures. The search of a home without a warrant is presumptively unreasonable, and the fruits of the search must be suppressed at trial unless some exception applies. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978) ; State v. Bolt, 142 Ariz. 260, 265, 689 P.2d 519, 523 (1984).

A.

¶ 8 A warrantless search of a home may be justified when “the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Mincey, 437 U.S. at 394, 98 S.Ct. 2408. Warrantless entry into a home may be justified, for example, when police are in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect, United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42–43, 96 S.Ct. 2406, 49 L.Ed.2d 300 (1976), or reasonably believe that the destruction of evidence is imminent, Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 1856, 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011). Officers also may make a warrantless entry onto private property to fight a fire and investigate its cause. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978).

¶ 9 “Any warrantless entry based on exigent circumstances must, of course, be supported by a genuine exigency.” King, 131 S.Ct. at 1862. That is, an objectively reasonable basis must exist for officers to believe that the circumstances justify a warrantless entry. See id. at 1856. Exigent circumstances exist when “a substantial risk of harm to the persons involved or to the law enforcement process would arise if the police were to delay a search until a warrant could be obtained.” State v. Greene, 162 Ariz. 431, 433, 784 P.2d 257, 259 (1989) (citation omitted).

¶ 10 To lawfully make a warrantless entry to arrest a fleeing suspect or to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence, police must also have probable cause. See State v. Decker, 119 Ariz. 195, 197, 580 P.2d 333, 335 (1978). Exigency alone does not allow police to enter for these purposes; they must also have facts—that is, probable cause—that would support issuance of a warrant if time allowed. Cf. Florida v. Harris, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1050, 1055, 185 L.Ed.2d 61 (2013) (noting that a “police officer has probable cause to conduct a search when the facts available to [him] would warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime is present”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

¶ 11 Incident to a lawful arrest, police may make a limited warrantless search of a residence as part of a “protective sweep.” State v. Fisher, 226 Ariz. 563, 565 ¶ 8, 250 P.3d 1192, 1194 (2011). Such searches do not require probable cause. Id. Wilson was not arrested by the officers at his residence, and the State has not argued that the entry was justified by the “protective sweep” doctrine. Cf. id. at 566 ¶ 10, 250 P.3d at 1195 (assuming, but not deciding, that protective sweeps may be permitted when a suspect is detained and questioned but not yet arrested outside of a residence).

¶ 12 Officers also “may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.” Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006). This “emergency aid exception” does not depend on the officers' subjective intent or the seriousness of any crime they are investigating when the emergency arises. Id. at 404–05, 126 S.Ct. 1943. Instead, it requires only “an objectively reasonable basis for believing,” that “a person within [the house] is in need of immediate aid.” Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 47, 130 S.Ct. 546, 175 L.Ed.2d 410 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Supreme Court's decision in Brigham City supersedes our case law holding that the emergency aid exception turns on the officers' “primary motive” in entering the home. See, e.g., State v. Fisher, 141 Ariz. 227, 237, 686 P.2d 750, 760 (1984).

¶ 13 Here, the court of appeals held that the exigent circumstances and emergency aid exceptions did not apply. Wilson, 235 Ariz. at 450–51 ¶¶ 14, 17, 333 P.3d at 777–778. Although the officers had reason to believe that a substantial amount of mercury might be present in Wilson's home, possession of mercury is not itself unlawful. The police did not believe that anyone was inside the house, and the State did not offer evidence suggesting that mercury spilled inside threatened the immediate safety of any person.Id. at 450 ¶ 14, 333 P.3d at 777. “Because there was neither evidence of a crime nor evidence of an imminent threat to the health of any person or the public generally,” the court of appeals concluded that exigent circumstances did not justify the entry. Id. Moreover, the emergency aid exception did not apply because the State offered no evidence that locating the mercury was necessary for Wilson's safety. Id. at 451 ¶ 17, 333 P.3d at 778. Wilson, after all, was not in the house: he was responsive and he had gone to the hospital. Id.

¶ 14 Because the State did not seek review on these issues, we assume for purposes of our analysis that the exigent circumstances and emergency aid exceptions did not apply.

B.

¶ 15 The State here urges another exception to the warrant requirement: community caretaking. In Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973), the Supreme Court upheld the warrantless search of an impounded vehicle for a firearm. Reasoning that local police frequently investigate events “in which there is no claim of criminal liability and engage in what, for want of a better term, may be described as community caretaking functions, totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute,” id. at 441, 93 S.Ct. 2523, the Court concluded that the search was justified by “concern for the safety of the general public who might be endangered if an intruder removed a revolver from the trunk of the vehicle,” id. at 447, 93 S.Ct. 2523.

¶ 16 Police officers perform many tasks outside of criminal investigation that might properly be called community caretaking functions. “Any police officer at any given time may perform the responsibilities of the office by acting as a domestic-relations counselor ... or as...