State v. Wilson

Decision Date16 December 2008
Docket NumberNo. 28554.,28554.
CourtConnecticut Court of Appeals
PartiesSTATE of Connecticut v. Craig WILSON.

Norman A. Pattis, Bethany, with whom, on the brief, was Kim Coleman, for the appellant (defendant).

Denise B. Smoker, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Jonathan C. Benedict, state's attorney, and Brian F. Kennedy, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellant (state).

DiPENTIMA, LAVINE and DUPONT, Js.

DUPONT, J.

The defendant, Craig Wilson, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of six crimes, namely, sale of narcotics by a person who is not drug-dependent in violation of General Statutes § 21a-278(b), possession of narcotics with intent to sell by a person who is not drug-dependent in violation of General Statutes § 21a-278(b), sale of narcotics within 1500 feet of a school in violation of General Statutes § 21a-278a(b), possession of narcotics with intent to sell within 1500 feet of a school in violation of General Statutes § 21a-278a(b), possession of narcotics in violation of General Statutes § 21a-279(a) and possession of marijuana in violation of § 21a-279(c).1 On appeal, the defendant has raised three claims: (1) the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress the evidence seized during a search of his vehicle; (2) certain comments made by the prosecutor in closing argument constituted prosecutorial impropriety;2 and (3) the court's jury instructions regarding reasonable doubt were constitutionally infirm. We disagree. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On the night of February 24, 2004, six members3 of the Bridgeport police department's tactical narcotics team were conducting an undercover operation at the corner of Connecticut and Union Avenues, an area known for drug trafficking. At approximately 11:30 p.m., Officer Clive Higgins, who was undercover, approached a male standing in front of a restaurant located on that corner and asked him if he had any "slabs."4 The male told him to wait a few minutes because his "man" would be arriving with some. Higgins joined a group of people who were also waiting for this man in front of the restaurant.

A few seconds later, a dark colored four door sedan was driven onto Union Avenue and parked near an unmarked police car occupied by Officer Sean Ronan. The defendant got out of the sedan and walked toward the restaurant. The male standing in front of the restaurant pointed toward the defendant and announced: "That's the dude right there." The defendant then walked into the restaurant, and the "customers" waiting outside, including Higgins, followed him.

Inside the restaurant, Higgins observed the defendant making hand-to-hand drug transactions with the other "customers." When it was his turn, Higgins gave the defendant a $20 bill he had previously marked and photocopied; in return, the defendant gave Higgins some crack cocaine. Higgins then left the restaurant and returned to his unmarked police car. He gave a description of the defendant to other officers through the use of a listening device.

Meanwhile, Ronan watched the defendant leave the restaurant and walk back toward the vehicle in which he had arrived. Before reaching the vehicle, however, the defendant turned and started to walk back down Union Avenue in the opposite direction. Ronan believed that the defendant had recognized him as a police officer. Ronan then radioed police officers William Reilly and John Andrews and directed them to move in and arrest the male standing on the west side of the road on Union Avenue, north of Connecticut Avenue.

Reilly and Andrews drove their cruiser onto Union Avenue and drove next to Ronan. As they approached, the defendant ran toward an alley to the left of the house located at 651 Union Avenue. Andrews and Reilly gave chase down the alley. The defendant threw two cellular telephones to the ground and jumped over a fence into the yard of an auto body shop. Andrews radioed the location of the defendant to police officers Chris Lamaine and Keith Ruffin and followed the defendant over the fence. Reilly stopped to pick up the two telephones. Inside one of the telephones, Reilly found eight small bags of a substance he suspected to be crack cocaine.

By the time Andrews got over the fence, Lamaine had apprehended the defendant. Ruffin searched the defendant and found a plant like substance he suspected to be marijuana and $120, which included the $20 bill Higgins had given the defendant in exchange for the crack cocaine. Andrews, Lamaine and Ruffin lifted the defendant, who was now handcuffed, back over the fence, with Reilly assisting from the other side. The defendant was placed in a patrol car and driven back to his vehicle on Union Avenue.

Reilly also patted down the defendant.5 He found the key to the defendant's vehicle in the defendant's right front pocket. Reilly used the key to unlock the defendant's vehicle to perform a search. Inside the vehicle, he found forty-five bags of suspected crack cocaine in the center console and $984 and another cellular telephone in the backseat. After the search, Reilly drove the vehicle to the narcotics unit on River Street. The car eventually was towed from that unit.

Rafal Mielgj, an analytical chemist with the department of public safety, tested the bag of suspected crack cocaine the defendant sold to Higgins, the eight bags of suspected crack cocaine found in the cellular telephone and the forty-five bags of suspected crack cocaine found in the defendant's vehicle. Each item was found to be freebase cocaine, or crack. Mielgj also tested the plant material located on the defendant's person and found it to be marijuana.

During the evidentiary portion of the defendant's trial, the court held a hearing outside the presence of the jury on the defendant's motion to suppress the narcotics, money and cellular telephone that were seized from the defendant's vehicle. At the hearing, the court heard testimony from Reilly. On the basis of that testimony and Ronan's testimony before the jury, the court denied the motion to suppress on the ground that an exception to the warrant requirement for a search and seizure applied. The court, however, did not specify which exception applied, and neither party requested an articulation.

I

The defendant first claims that the court improperly denied his motion to suppress the evidence seized from his automobile because the warrantless search of the vehicle did not fall within any of the exceptions to the warrant requirement, and, as such, his rights under the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution and article first, § 7, of the constitution of Connecticut were violated.6

"[O]ur standard of review of a trial court's findings and conclusions in connection with a motion to suppress is well defined. A finding of fact will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous in view of the evidence and pleadings in the whole record.... [When] the legal conclusions of the court are challenged, [our review is plenary, and] we must determine whether they are legally and logically correct and whether they find support in the facts set out in the court's memorandum of decision.... Because a trial court's determination of the validity of a ... search [or seizure] implicates a defendant's constitutional rights, however, we engage in a careful examination of the record to ensure that the court's decision was supported by substantial evidence.... However, [w]e [will] give great deference to the findings of the trial court because of its function to weigh and interpret the evidence before it and to pass upon the credibility of witnesses." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Foreman, 288 Conn. 684, 691-92, 954 A.2d 135 (2008); State v. Williams, 110 Conn.App. 329, 332-33, 954 A.2d 878 (2008).

In the present matter, the defendant asserts that he is challenging the court's legal conclusion that the motion to suppress should be denied, not the court's factual findings. Accordingly, it is this court's duty to determine whether the denial of the motion to suppress was legally and logically correct "in light of the [trial court's] findings of fact." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kaminski, 106 Conn.App. 114, 125, 940 A.2d 844, cert. denied, 287 Conn. 909, 950 A.2d 1286 (2008). The court, however, did not set forth the facts it found in support of its ruling. The parties indicate that this is of no importance because they agree that the facts are not in dispute. They fail, however, to cite any authority in support of this proposition.

Consequently, before reaching the question of the constitutionality of the search and seizure, we must first determine whether we may review that ultimate legal question without the benefit of any findings of fact by the court when the parties agree that the facts are not in dispute. Simply stated, the question is whether there are limited instances in which fact-finding by the trial court is not necessary to obtain appellate review of a constitutional issue. To find the answer, we have reviewed decisional and treatise authority.

"[A] judge must disclose the factual bases of his [or her] decision in [ruling on a motion to suppress]...." C. Tait & E. Prescott, Connecticut Appellate Practice and Procedure (3d Ed.2000) § 8.10, p. 308; see also Practice Book § 64-1. "Where a transcript of an oral decision of the trial court fails to set forth the factual basis of the trial court's decision, the [burden is on the defendant to] perfect the record on appeal either by filing a motion to compel the trial court to file a memorandum of decision ... or by filing a motion for articulation...." State v. Fontanez, 37 Conn.App. 205, 207, 655 A.2d 797 (1995). "Without any specific findings of fact ... we...

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  • State v. DeMarco, No. 30152.
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    ...must be suppressed [as] it is ... the fruit of prior police illegality." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wilson, 111 Conn.App. 614, 623, 960 A.2d 1056 (2008), cert. denied, 290 Conn. 917, 966 A.2d 234 (2009). "The requirement that a warrant be obtained before conducting a searc......
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