State v. Wilson

• Decision Date: 26 September 1990
• Docket Number: No. 23545,23545
• Citation: 413 S.E.2d 19,306 S.C. 498
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: , 60 USLW 2483, 72 Ed. Law Rep. 430 The STATE, Respondent, v. James William WILSON, Appellant. . Heard

Page 19

413 S.E.2d 19

306 S.C. 498, 60 USLW 2483, 72 Ed.

Law Rep. 430

The STATE, Respondent, v. James William WILSON, Appellant.

No. 23545.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard Sept. 26, 1990.

Decided Jan. 6, 1992.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 4, 1992.

David I. Bruck, of S.C. Office of Appellate Defense, Columbia, and David G. Belser, Asheville, N.C., for appellant.

Atty. Gen. T. Travis Medlock, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen. Donald J. Zelenka, Columbia, and Sol. W. Townes Jones, IV, Greenwood, for respondent.

TOAL, Justice:

The primary issue which we address in this appeal is whether a sentence of death for a defendant who pleads or is found "guilty but mentally ill", as that verdict is defined by South Carolina statute, violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Stated in a different fashion, the question we answer here is whether a person, acting under what amounts to an "irresistible impulse" to commit an offense, may constitutionally be sentenced to death for the commission of that offense. We hold that the Eighth Amendment does not bar such a sentence, and we therefore affirm.

FACTS

On the morning of September 26, 1988, Jamie Wilson drove to his maternal grandmother's house and stole her .22 caliber, nine-shot revolver. Wilson then drove to an Abbeville discount store and purchased some .22 hollow-point long rifle ammunition. Wilson discarded the bullets already loaded in the gun, and reloaded the weapon with the more destructive hollow-point bullets. Wilson next proceeded to the Oakland Elementary School in Greenwood, where he parked his 1974 Maverick. He entered the school, finding his way to the cafeteria, where he stood quietly for a moment. It was right at lunch time for many of the children. Next, Wilson pulled out the pistol and began shooting, picking his victims, both children and adults, at random. Witnesses observed a look of hatred and rage masking Wilson's face.

Wilson fired until his gun was empty. He then went into a restroom and reloaded the weapon, after which he entered a classroom and opened fire again. After emptying his gun a second time, Wilson threw the gun down and stepped outside through a window. A teacher spotted him and told him to remain still with his hands up, which Wilson did. The police then arrived and took Wilson into custody.

The terror created and damage inflicted by Wilson on September 26 was considerable and an entire nation was shocked, as the unthinkable had occurred. One female first grade teacher was shot once in the shoulder and once in the left hand, with the bullet traveling through her hand and into her throat. A young boy slumped forward onto a cafeteria table after Wilson aimed his pistol at the boy's temple and fired, hitting the boy in the head. Two little girls, both age eight, were shot dead. Children screamed; children fled; children hid under their desks; other children were shot.

Altogether, Wilson was indicted for two counts of murder, nine counts of assault and battery with intent to kill, and one count of illegally carrying a firearm. Wilson pled "guilty but mentally ill" (GBMI) to substantially all of the charges, and his plea was accepted. He was sentenced to twenty years, each sentence to be served consecutively, for each of eight counts of assault and battery with intent to kill; ten years, consecutive, for assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature; and five years, consecutive, for illegally carrying a firearm. Wilson elected to have the penalty phase of his capital murder charges tried by the trial judge without a jury. The trial judge affirmatively found the existence of two statutory aggravating circumstances: (1) murder wherein two or more persons are murdered pursuant to one act or scheme; and (2) murder of a child eleven years of age or under. The trial judge also found the existence of four statutory mitigating circumstances: (1) defendant has no significant history of prior violent crime conviction; (2) the murder was committed under the influence of mental or emotional disturbance; (3) capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired; and (4) the age or mentality of the defendant at the time of the crime. Wilson was then sentenced to death for each of the two murders. Wilson now appeals his death sentence.

LAW/ANALYSIS

Wilson makes several arguments for reversal of his sentence: (1) the state legislature did not intend, and therefore does not permit, execution as punishment for a defendant found "guilty but mentally ill" pursuant to S.C.Code Ann. § 17-24-20(A) (1989 Cum.Supp.); (2) the execution of a GBMI defendant, as that verdict is defined by South Carolina statute, violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment prohibition of the Eighth Amendment; (3) Wilson's sentence is excessive and disproportionate under S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-25(C)(3) (1989 Cum.Supp.); and (4) the lower court judge failed to take into account all mitigating circumstances in reaching his decision on sentencing. We shall address these contentions in order.

I. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

Wilson contends that, in creating the verdict entitled "guilty but mentally ill", the South Carolina legislature did not intend that death be a potential punishment. Wilson makes reference primarily to the language of S.C.Code Ann. § 17-24-70 (1989 Cum.Supp.) to support his argument. This statutory section deals with sentencing of a GBMI defendant. It provides:

If a verdict is returned of "guilty but mentally ill" the defendant must be sentenced by the trial judge as provided by law for a defendant found guilty, however:

(A) If the sentence imposed upon the defendant includes the incarceration of the defendant, the defendant must first be taken to a facility designated by the Department of Corrections for treatment and retained there until in the opinion of the staff at that facility the defendant may safely be moved to the general population of the Department of Corrections to serve the remainder of his sentence.

(B) If the sentence includes a probationary sentence, the judge may impose those conditions and restrictions on the release of the defendant as the judge considers necessary for the safety of the defendant and of the community.

It is Wilson's position that since there is no provision which gives specific guidance to a lower court which sentences a GBMI defendant to death, such a sentence was not contemplated by the legislature. We reject this contention. Wilson refuses to read with any force that portion of the statute which is phrased in mandatory and crystal-clear terms, viz., "[i]f a verdict is returned of 'guilty but mentally ill' the defendant must be sentenced ... as provided by law for a defendant found guilty ..." (emphasis added). The punishment for one found guilty of murder is set forth in S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-20 (1976) as follows: "[a] person who is convicted of or pleads guilty to murder must be punished by death or by imprisonment for life...." (emphasis added). Hence, we hold that the plain language of the GBMI statute clearly allows for a death sentence in an appropriate case. The fact that the legislature does not provide for special guidance or a specific procedure to be used in cases where a GBMI defendant is sentenced to death does not mean from a logical standpoint that no death sentence may be handed down, as Wilson urges. Instead, it simply means, we hold, that the legislature did not see fit to provide lower courts with any special guidance or procedure in such an instance. We decline to ignore the clear language of the statute in favor of Wilson's strained reading.

Beyond the plain language of § 17-24-70, however, there exist other reasons why we are convinced that the legislature intended that a sentence of death be possible for certain GBMI defendants. First, we are persuaded that § 17-24-20(C) (1989 Cum.Supp.), ¹ which provides "[t]he verdict of 'guilty but mentally ill' may be rendered only during the phase of a trial which determines guilt or innocence and is not a form of verdict which may be rendered in the penalty phase," (emphasis added) is indicative of a legislative intent that a bifurcated capital case may be necessary for some GBMI defendants. We interpret this language to prohibit juries or judges from treating the defendant as anything other than an ordinary "guilty" defendant for purposes of rendering their sentencing verdict.

Secondly, it is well established that the purposes for the enactment of GBMI statutes nationwide are: (1) to reduce the number of persons being completely relieved of criminal responsibility due to their mental condition; and (2) to insure that mentally ill defendants receive treatment while incarcerated for their benefit as well as society's. See generally, Annotation, "Guilty But Mentally Ill" Statutes: Validity and Construction,71 A.L.R.4th 702, 777-780 (1989); People v. Smith, 124 Ill.App.3d 805, 80 Ill.Dec. 310, 465 N.E.2d 101 (1984); People v. Ramsey, 422 Mich. 500, 375 N.W.2d 297 (1985); Commonwealth v. Trill, 374 Pa.Super. 549, 543 A.2d 1106 (1988). Hence, as a general proposition, GBMI statutes were created in part to narrow the field of defendants who could successfully claim a lack of culpability via the insanity defense. Wilson seeks here to use the verdict as a shield to protect him from punishment, which is contrary in a fundamental way to its creation as a mechanism to enable the state to punish and treat a larger group of defendants.

Lastly, very similar arguments concerning legislative intent have been rejected by courts in other jurisdictions, and we find those holdings persuasive. See, e.g., People v. Crews, 122 Ill.2d 266, 119 Ill.Dec. 308, 522 N.E.2d 1167 (1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 925, 109 S.Ct. 3260, 106 L.Ed.2d 605 (1989). Accordingly, for all of the above reasons, we hold that the legislature...