State v. Wilson
| Decision Date | 26 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 64,64 |
| Parties | STATE OF MARYLAND v. DARRAYL JOHN WILSON |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
WITNESS TAMPERING - OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE - SPOUSAL TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE - MERGER - Court of Appeals held that, where person married potential witness for State with intent to have witness invoke spousal testimonial privilege to prevent witness from testifying at criminal proceeding, evidence was sufficient to support convictions for witness tampering and obstruction of justice. Consistent with holding in Romans v. State, 178 Md. 588, 16 A.2d 642 (1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 695 (1941), and in accord with determinations of federal appellate courts, Court of Appeals concluded that conduct constituting corrupt means under obstruction of justice and witness tampering statutes may include conduct that is in and of itself legal. Court of Appeals determined that use of corrupt means involves acting with corrupt intent, i.e., person uses corrupt means by marrying with intent to preclude another person from testifying at criminal proceeding, even though conduct involved (entering into marriage) is otherwise lawful. Applying holding to circumstances of case, Court of Appeals concluded that evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for witness tampering and obstruction of justice given ample evidence that defendant married witness for State with corrupt intent of having her invoke spousal testimonial privilege at defendant's upcoming murder trial and therefore not be able to testify at trial.
Court of Appeals held that defendant's conviction for witness tampering did not merge for sentencing purposes with conviction for obstruction of justice due to anti-merger provision in witness tampering statute, Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol., 2019 Supp.) ("CR") § 9-305. In light of plain language of CR § 9-305(d), it was not necessary to determine whether required evidence test mandated merger of defendant's convictions for witness tampering and obstruction of justice, and neither rule of lenity nor principle of fundamental fairness required merger.
Circuit Court for Charles County
Barbera, C.J. McDonald Watts Hotten Getty Booth Biran, JJ.
Opinion by Watts, J.
This case requires us to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to support a defendant's convictions for witness tampering and obstruction of justice where the evidence indicated that the defendant married a potential witness for the State to have the witness invoke the spousal testimonial privilege at his murder trial. We are also asked to decide whether the defendant's convictions for witness tampering and obstruction of justice merge for sentencing purposes.
The witness tampering and obstruction of justice statutes preclude the use of "corrupt means" to impede, among others, a witness in the performance of the witness's duties or to impede the administration of justice. Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol., 2019 Supp.) ("CR") §§ 9-305(a), 9-306(a). In Maryland, the spouse of a person on trial for a crime may invoke the spousal testimonial privilege codified at Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. (1974, 2013 Repl. Vol., 2019 Supp.) ("CJ") § 9-106(a), and, unless certain exceptions specified in the statute are satisfied, may not be compelled to testify as an adverse witness.
In this case, Kearra Bannister informed a law enforcement officer that her boyfriend, Darrayl John Wilson, Respondent/Cross-Petitioner, told her that he and Raymond Posey were involved in the murder of Crystal Anderson. In the Circuit Court for Charles County, the State, Petitioner/Cross-Respondent, separately charged Wilson and Posey with first-degree murder of Anderson and other crimes, initiating the cases of State v. Darrayl John Wilson, No. 08-K-15-000551 (Cir. Ct. Charles Cty.) ("Wilson I") and State v. Raymond Daniel Posey III, No. 08-K-15-000121 (Cir. Ct. Charles Cty.) ("Posey").
While incarcerated and awaiting the trial in Wilson I, Wilson engaged in multipletelephone and video conversations with Bannister and others in which he indicated that he wanted to marry Bannister so that she could refuse to testify at his and Posey's trials. One day before the State was scheduled to call Bannister as a witness in Posey's trial, and eighteen days before the trial in Wilson I was scheduled to begin, Wilson and Bannister married via a telephone conversation with a pastor. While testifying at Posey's trial, Bannister attempted to invoke the spousal testimonial privilege. The circuit court ruled that she could not do so and required her to answer the prosecutor's questions. In Wilson I, before trial, the State filed a motion to preclude Bannister from invoking the spousal testimonial privilege, which the circuit court granted. Wilson later pled guilty to offenses in the case.
Subsequently, the State charged Wilson with witness tampering and obstruction of justice as to Wilson I and Posey on the ground that Wilson married Bannister to try to have her invoke the spousal privilege and thus preclude her from testifying in both cases. A jury found Wilson guilty of witness tampering and obstruction of justice as to Wilson I, but not guilty of witness tampering and obstruction of justice as to Posey. Wilson appealed. The Court of Special Appeals reversed the convictions for insufficient evidence, reasoning that the State failed to prove the "corrupt means" element of witness tampering and obstruction of justice. The State filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, and Wilson filed a conditional cross-petition for a writ of certiorari. This Court granted the petition and granted the conditional cross-petition as to one issue.
Before us, the State contends that the evidence was sufficient to support Wilson's convictions because, although marrying someone is a lawful act, Wilson married Bannisterwith the corrupt intent of trying to make it possible for her to invoke the spousal testimonial privilege at trial in Wilson I. The State also argues that, because of an "anti-merger" provision in CR § 9-305, a conviction for witness tampering does not merge for sentencing purposes with a conviction for obstruction of justice. Wilson responds that he did not commit a crime by marrying Bannister and therefore his conduct does not satisfy the corrupt means element of the statutes. Wilson also contends that, if the evidence is sufficient to sustain his convictions, his conviction for witness tampering should merge for sentencing with his conviction for obstruction of justice under the required evidence test, the rule of lenity, and the principle of fundamental fairness.
Below, in Part I, we conclude that, where a person marries a potential witness for the State with the intent to enable the witness to invoke the spousal testimonial privilege at a criminal proceeding, the evidence is sufficient to support convictions for witness tampering and obstruction of justice. Consistent with our holding in Romans v. State, 178 Md. 588, 16 A.2d 642 (1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 695 (1941), and in accord with the determinations of federal appellate courts, we conclude that conduct constituting corrupt means under the witness tampering and obstruction of justice statutes may include conduct that is in and of itself legal. We conclude that use of corrupt means involves acting with corrupt intent, i.e., a person uses corrupt means by marrying with the intent to preclude another person from testifying at a criminal proceeding, even though the conduct involved—entering into a marriage—is otherwise lawful. Applying the holding to the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support Wilson's convictions for witness tampering and obstruction of justice given the ample evidence thatWilson married Bannister with the corrupt intent of having her invoke the spousal testimonial privilege at his upcoming murder trial to prevent the State from compelling her testimony.
In Part II, we conclude that Wilson's conviction for witness tampering does not merge for sentencing purposes with his conviction for obstruction of justice in light of the anti-merger provision, CR § 9-305(d), which states: "A sentence imposed under this section may be separate from and consecutive to or concurrent with a sentence for any crime based on the act establishing the violation of this section." Given the plain language of CR § 9-305(d), it is not necessary to determine whether the required evidence test mandates merger of Wilson's convictions for witness tampering and obstruction of justice, and neither the rule of lenity nor the principle of fundamental fairness requires merger.
At trial, as a witness for the State, Detective John Elliott of the Charles County Sheriff's Office testified that, in August 2011, Anderson's mother reported her missing. Detective Elliott and another detective determined that Anderson was last seen alive at a party in Nanjemoy, Maryland, which occurred on July 26, 2011. In January 2012, the remains of a human body were found in a creek bed in Nanjemoy. In February 2012, a medical examiner identified the remains as Anderson's. The investigation of Anderson's murder went on for years. In August 2014, as part of the investigation, Detective Brian Buchanan of the Charles County Sheriff's Office interviewed Wilson's girlfriend, Bannister.
As a witness for the State, Detective Buchanan testified that, in August 2014, his supervisor informed him that an officer had responded to a domestic call in Nanjemoy, and that Bannister, who had been at the scene of the call, told the officer that she had information regarding Anderson's murder. Detective Buchanan's supervisor asked him to interview Bannister. He did so, and made a recording of the interview, which was admitted into evidence and played for the jury. During the interview, Bannister stated that, on July 25, 2011, Wilson told...
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