State v. Wilson

Decision Date26 October 2020
Docket NumberNo. 64, Sept. Term, 2019,64, Sept. Term, 2019
Citation240 A.3d 1140,471 Md. 136
Parties STATE of Maryland v. Darrayl John WILSON
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland

Argued by Brenda Gruss, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Brian E. Frosh, Attorney General of Maryland, Baltimore, MD), on brief for Petitioner/Cross-Respondent.

Argued by Joseph B. Tetrault, Assigned Public Defender (Law Office of Joseph B. Tetrault, LLC, Baltimore, MD), on brief for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner.

Barbera, C.J., McDonald, Watts, Hotten, Getty, Booth, Biran, JJ.

Watts, J.

This case requires us to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to support a defendant's convictions for witness tampering and obstruction of justice where the evidence indicated that the defendant married a potential witness for the State to have the witness invoke the spousal testimonial privilege at his murder trial. We are also asked to decide whether the defendant's convictions for witness tampering and obstruction of justice merge for sentencing purposes.

The witness tampering and obstruction of justice statutes preclude the use of "corrupt means" to impede, among others, a witness in the performance of the witness's duties or to impede the administration of justice. Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol., 2019 Supp.) ("CR") §§ 9-305(a), 9-306(a). In Maryland, the spouse of a person on trial for a crime may invoke the spousal testimonial privilege codified at Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. (1974, 2013 Repl. Vol., 2019 Supp.) ("CJ") § 9-106(a), and, unless certain exceptions specified in the statute are satisfied, may not be compelled to testify as an adverse witness.

In this case, Kearra Bannister informed a law enforcement officer that her boyfriend, Darrayl John Wilson, Respondent/Cross-Petitioner, told her that he and Raymond Posey were involved in the murder of Crystal Anderson. In the Circuit Court for Charles County, the State, Petitioner/Cross-Respondent, separately charged Wilson and Posey with first-degree murder of Anderson and other crimes, initiating the cases of State v. Darrayl John Wilson, No. 08-K-15-000551 (Cir. Ct. Charles Cty.) ("Wilson I") and State v. Raymond Daniel Posey III, No. 08-K-15-000121 (Cir. Ct. Charles Cty.) ("Posey").

While incarcerated and awaiting the trial in Wilson I, Wilson engaged in multiple telephone and video conversations with Bannister and others in which he indicated that he wanted to marry Bannister so that she could refuse to testify at his and Posey's trials. One day before the State was scheduled to call Bannister as a witness in Posey's trial, and eighteen days before the trial in Wilson I was scheduled to begin, Wilson and Bannister married via a telephone conversation with a pastor. While testifying at Posey's trial, Bannister attempted to invoke the spousal testimonial privilege. The circuit court ruled that she could not do so and required her to answer the prosecutor's questions. In Wilson I, before trial, the State filed a motion to preclude Bannister from invoking the spousal testimonial privilege, which the circuit court granted. Wilson later pled guilty to offenses in the case.

Subsequently, the State charged Wilson with witness tampering and obstruction of justice as to Wilson I and Posey on the ground that Wilson married Bannister to try to have her invoke the spousal privilege and thus preclude her from testifying in both cases. A jury found Wilson guilty of witness tampering and obstruction of justice as to Wilson I, but not guilty of witness tampering and obstruction of justice as to Posey. Wilson appealed. The Court of Special Appeals reversed the convictions for insufficient evidence, reasoning that the State failed to prove the "corrupt means" element of witness tampering and obstruction of justice. The State filed a petition for a writ of certiorari , and Wilson filed a conditional cross-petition for a writ of certiorari . This Court granted the petition and granted the conditional cross-petition as to one issue.

Before us, the State contends that the evidence was sufficient to support Wilson's convictions because, although marrying someone is a lawful act, Wilson married Bannister with the corrupt intent of trying to make it possible for her to invoke the spousal testimonial privilege at trial in Wilson I. The State also argues that, because of an "anti-merger" provision in CR § 9-305, a conviction for witness tampering does not merge for sentencing purposes with a conviction for obstruction of justice. Wilson responds that he did not commit a crime by marrying Bannister and therefore his conduct does not satisfy the corrupt means element of the statutes. Wilson also contends that, if the evidence is sufficient to sustain his convictions, his conviction for witness tampering should merge for sentencing with his conviction for obstruction of justice under the required evidence test, the rule of lenity, and the principle of fundamental fairness.

Below, in Part I, we conclude that, where a person marries a potential witness for the State with the intent to enable the witness to invoke the spousal testimonial privilege at a criminal proceeding, the evidence is sufficient to support convictions for witness tampering and obstruction of justice. Consistent with our holding in Romans v. State, 178 Md. 588, 16 A.2d 642 (1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 695, 61 S.Ct. 732, 85 L.Ed. 1131 (1941), and in accord with the determinations of federal appellate courts, we conclude that conduct constituting corrupt means under the witness tampering and obstruction of justice statutes may include conduct that is in and of itself legal. We conclude that use of corrupt means involves acting with corrupt intent, i.e. , a person uses corrupt means by marrying with the intent to preclude another person from testifying at a criminal proceeding, even though the conduct involved—entering into a marriage—is otherwise lawful. Applying the holding to the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support Wilson's convictions for witness tampering and obstruction of justice given the ample evidence that Wilson married Bannister with the corrupt intent of having her invoke the spousal testimonial privilege at his upcoming murder trial to prevent the State from compelling her testimony.

In Part II, we conclude that Wilson's conviction for witness tampering does not merge for sentencing purposes with his conviction for obstruction of justice in light of the anti-merger provision, CR § 9-305(d), which states: "A sentence imposed under this section may be separate from and consecutive to or concurrent with a sentence for any crime based on the act establishing the violation of this section." Given the plain language of CR § 9-305(d), it is not necessary to determine whether the required evidence test mandates merger of Wilson's convictions for witness tampering and obstruction of justice, and neither the rule of lenity nor the principle of fundamental fairness requires merger.

BACKGROUND
Trial and Sentencing

At trial, as a witness for the State, Detective John Elliott of the Charles County Sheriff's Office testified that, in August 2011, Anderson's mother reported her missing. Detective Elliott and another detective determined that Anderson was last seen alive at a party in Nanjemoy, Maryland, which occurred on July 26, 2011. In January 2012, the remains of a human body were found in a creek bed in Nanjemoy. In February 2012, a medical examiner identified the remains as Anderson's. The investigation of Anderson's murder went on for years. In August 2014, as part of the investigation, Detective Brian Buchanan of the Charles County Sheriff's Office interviewed Wilson's girlfriend, Bannister.

As a witness for the State, Detective Buchanan testified that, in August 2014, his supervisor informed him that an officer had responded to a domestic call in Nanjemoy, and that Bannister, who had been at the scene of the call, told the officer that she had information regarding Anderson's murder. Detective Buchanan's supervisor asked him to interview Bannister. He did so, and made a recording of the interview, which was admitted into evidence and played for the jury. During the interview, Bannister stated that, on July 25, 2011, Wilson told her that he and Raymond Posey intended to rob Anderson and take drugs and cash from her. Bannister indicated that, on July 26, 2011 (the date of Anderson's death, according to the indictments), on multiple occasions, she telephoned Wilson, who did not answer. Bannister stated that, days later, Wilson and Posey had drugs and cash, and were burning clothes and selling guns and other items. According to Bannister, Wilson told her that he and Posey were involved in Anderson's murder.

The circuit court admitted into evidence indictments showing that grand juries separately indicted Posey and Wilson for first-degree murder and other crimes. Specifically, on June 19, 2015, in the circuit court, the State filed an indictment against Wilson, initiating Wilson I. Detective Elliott testified that, from July 2015 through at least February 2017, Wilson was incarcerated at the Charles County Detention Center, awaiting the trial.

The circuit court admitted into evidence notices of when the circuit court scheduled the trials in Posey and Wilson I to begin. On October 6, 2016, the circuit court scheduled the trial in Posey to begin on February 6, 2017. On October 27, 2016, the circuit court scheduled the trial in Wilson I to begin on February 27, 2017.

The circuit court admitted into evidence recordings of multiple telephone conversations and video visits in which Wilson participated with Bannister and others while he was incarcerated and awaiting trial. The recordings were played for the jury. On December 5, 2016, Wilson telephoned his cousin, Takiya Washington, who said that she had "asked the big question" of Wilson's "baby mama." Wilson responded: "What?" Washington responded: "Uuuuuh, jump the broom."1 Shortly afterward,...

To continue reading

Request your trial
22 cases
  • Williams v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • March 25, 2022
    ...where all of the elements of Crime A are included in Crime B, so that only Crime B contains a distinct element." State v. Wilson, 471 Md. 136, 178, 240 A.3d 1140, 1164 (2020) (citation omitted). The offenses of first-degree assault (involving the use of a firearm) and use of a firearm in th......
  • Koushall v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • February 26, 2021
    ...Manion , 442 Md. at 431, 112 A.3d 506. We review "without deference the question of whether a sentence is legal." State v. Wilson , 471 Md. 136, 178, 240 A.3d 1140 (2020).I. THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT MR. KOUSHALL OF BOTH SECOND-DEGREE ASSAULT AND MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE .Mr. Koush......
  • White v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • May 26, 2021
    ...of fundamental fairness. It is not fundamentally unfair to impose a sentence authorized by the legislature. See State v. Wilson , 471 Md. 136, 186, 240 A.3d 1140 (2020) (Witness tampering and obstruction of justice offenses did not merge under principle of fundamental fairness where merger ......
  • Koushall v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • February 3, 2022
    ...included in Crime B, so that only Crime B contains a distinct element." Id. at 734, 246 A.3d at 774 (quoting State v. Wilson , 471 Md. 136, 178–79, 240 A.3d 1140, [1164] (2020) ) (other citation omitted). According to the Court, misconduct in office requires an act by a public official, whi......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT