State v. Wilton R. Co.
| Decision Date | 01 June 1937 |
| Citation | 192 A. 623 |
| Parties | STATE v. WILTON R. CO. et al. |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
Transferred from Superior Court, Merrimack County; Johnston, Judge.
Petition for mandamus by the State against the Wilton Railroad Company and another, wherein defendants filed a demurrer, and the case was transferred without a ruling.
Case discharged.
Petition for mandamus, seeking "to compel the resumption, to the extent of one round trip daily, of speedier rail passenger service" than is now furnished over the Wilton road. The Boston & Maine Railroad is a party defendant, having assumed the charter obligations of the Wilton Railroad as a term of the lease under which it operates the road. The charter duty is "to keep said road * * * in good repair, and provide suitable engines and cars for the conveyance of passengers and property over the road, and cause * * * [them] to be run each way at least once a day, Sundays excepted, to accommodate the public travel and transportation," subject to unavoidable interruptions.
The railroad runs from Nashua to East Wilton, a distance of about 151/2 miles. The only present passenger service is a mixed train, running week days, and by schedule leaving Nashua at 8 a. m., stopping at Milford 45 minutes, arriving at Wilton at 9:45 a. m., leaving Wilton on its return at 11:30 a. m., stopping at Milford 30 minutes, and arriving at Nashua at 1 p. m. The Public Service Commission in another proceeding has found that complete "cessation of passenger service * * * is not unreasonable," and the State accepts the finding.
The defendants demurred to the petition and moved for its dismissal. The questions of law thereby raised were transferred without ruling by Johnston, J.
Thomas P. Cheney, Atty. Gen., and Dudley W. Orr, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State. Demond, Woodworth, Sulloway, Piper & Jones and Fred C. Demond, all of Concord, for defendants.
It was held in Thompson v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 86 N.H. 204, 166 A. 249, that if a railroad's cessation or curtailment of service is unreasonable, the Public Service Commission has power to order restoration to the extent necessary to establish reasonable service. Since here complete discontinuance of passenger service is reasonable, the questions are limited to the defendants' obligation to furnish any passenger service, and, if the obligation exists, whether the service now furnished is a compliance with it.
The defendants would have the Wilton charter construed as not requiring any service unless there is a reasonable demand for it. They say that legislation should be construed sensibly and not to produce unreasonable results. But this principle is applied only to language whose meaning is doubtful. The requirement of a daily train each way is clear and explicit. Service to meet the public demand was to be provided, and the charter prescribes a minimum test of the demand. To accommodate the public travel "at least" one daily train each way was to be run. A liquidated measure of reasonable service to be in any event maintained is set forth as a term of the charter. It is a legislative determination of minimum requirement, accepted by the grantees of the charter. It is not for the courts to amend the test because it has become too high. The provision is not to be regarded as one productive of unreasonable results, but is a standard fixed as a measure of the nadir of reasonableness. A formula has been prescribed. That it is not adapted to existing conditions may be good reason for its disuse, but while the order for its use remains in force, it must be employed. And disuse of it may not be permitted judicially. Its "wisdom and expediency" is not a legal issue.
The sought construction would result in the requirement of minimum service becoming meaningless surplusage, or at most creating a burden of proof by making the requirement a prima facie test of such service. The charter is not phrased to ascribe any such meaning to its language. The exception of "unavoidable accidents and contingencies" indicates the extent of the allowance of noncompliance. If daily service of which there is no public need were also intended to be excepted, it would hardly be left to be implied. Specified exceptions usually exclude others. Howe v. Howe, 87 N.H. 338, 341, 179 A. 362. "It is clear that significant words in a statute are not to be rejected or rendered ineffectual by construction, but the statute is to be so read as to give to every part its due weight." Jewell v. Warner, 35 N.H. 176, 186. "Every statute should be so construed that it may have a reasonable effect, agreeably to the intent of the legislature, and, if possible, so that no clause, sentence or word, shall be superfluous, void or insignificant." Tilton v. Tilton, 35 N.H. 430, 432.
Argument is also advanced that the charter provision was repealed by the act (Laws 1911, c. 164) creating the Public Service Commission. It is said that the act evidences a broad change of policy in the public control of railroads, and that a section of the act (section 11 (b) with its amendment (Laws 1913, c. 145, § 11) vests full control of railroad service in the commission. The conclusion is urged that all special regulations of service were repealed, by force of an apparent intent in the legislation that the commission should have a free and unrestricted field in the exercise of its functions in respect to service. Overadequate as well as inadequate service were placed under its authority to correct, it as said, and to give it the scope of control intended for it to have, special enactments prescribing particular service were impliedly repealed.
The authority of Opinion of the Justices, 66 N.H. 629, 33 A. 1076, is invoked, the rule of repeal by implication having been therein thought to be applicable to the legislation to which the opinion related. The occasion for employment of the rule must be evidence of convincing force. Admitting the validity of the rule, "the law does not favor" it. Currier v. Concord Railroad Corporation, 48 N.H. 321, 329. Purinton v. Ladd, 58 N.H. 596, 597. If this may be too strict a statement of the rule for all cases, a repeal is not to be found if any other reasonable construction may avoid it. 25 R.C.L. 918, and cases cited. ...
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