State v. Windmiller
Decision Date | 06 March 1979 |
Docket Number | No. 39193,39193 |
Citation | 579 S.W.2d 730 |
Parties | STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Ray G. WINDMILLER, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Paul E. Williams, Bowling Green, for defendant-appellant.
James Millan, Pros. Atty., Bowling Green, John D. Ashcroft, Atty. Gen., Weldon W. Perry, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for plaintiff-respondent.
Appellant was found guilty of murder in the second degree by a jury in the Circuit Court of Pike County and sentenced to serve ten years in the custody of the Department of Corrections. He appeals.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred: (1) in denying him the right to call character and behavior witnesses; (2) in admitting into evidence certain photographs of the victim; and (3) in permitting an unqualified expert witness to testify.
It is unnecessary to recite the facts in detail. Appellant admitted that he killed his wife and based his defense on mental disease or defect excluding responsibility. § 552.030, RSMo 1969.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial because of the error of the trial court in denying appellant the right to call character and behavior witnesses.
During the pretrial proceedings the state on May 18, 1976 filed a "Motion for Disclosure" under Rule 25.34 requesting the defendant to disclose, among other things, the names and last known addresses of persons he intended to call as witnesses.
Rule 25.34 was adopted October 9, 1973, effective July 1, 1974, and required the defendant to disclose to the state, among other things, "the names and last known addresses of persons, other than defendant, who defendant intends to call as witnesses . . . ." The heading of the rule at that time was "Disclosure by Defendant to State Upon Court Order Without Exercise of Discretion by Court." This version of the rule was in effect at the time of the state's motion.
Rule 25.34 was amended on May 6, 1976, effective January 1, 1977, by changing the heading to read "Disclosure by Defendant to State Without Court Order" and by prescribing the method to be used in making the requests provided for by the rule.
Appellant on October 8, 1976 answered the state's motion for disclosure in part as follows:
2. Counsel for Defendant states that the only witnesses, other than the technical witness above described and witnesses endorsed by the State, that Defendant intends to testify are family, friends, and co-workers, all in the local area, the exact name and number of which is yet unknown.
On March 10, 1977, five days before trial, appellant sent a letter to the deputy court clerk listing names and addresses of witnesses whom he intended to call and sent a copy of the letter to the state which was received on March 14, 1977, one day prior to trial.
The question is whether, in view of its heading, the rule in effect at the time the request for disclosure was made required a court order to make it mandatory that appellant reveal the names and addresses of the witnesses he proposed to call. There was neither a court order to the appellant requiring a disclosure nor a request for a court order by the state.
The rules of construction are the same for supreme court rules and legislative enactments. Gooch v. Spradling, 523 S.W.2d 861, 866(4-6) (Mo.App.1975). The official title to a statute is a portion thereof and must be considered in construing the meaning and purpose of the statute. Bullington v. State, 459 S.W.2d 334, 341(3) (Mo.1970). The heading of a supreme court rule is not similar to a chapter or paragraph heading in a statute which is supplied by a clerk or the reviser of statutes, but instead is comparable to the official title of a statute. It is an integral part of the rule itself as it is adopted by the supreme court and promulgated in the Southwestern Reporter and the Annotated Statutes. Just as the title to a statute is adopted by the legislature so also the heading of a supreme court rule is adopted and promulgated by the supreme court and should be considered in ascertaining the purpose and intent of the rule.
No Missouri cases have been cited, and none found, which speak to this point, but it is only rational, giving weight to the rule of statutory interpretation, that rule headings, as adopted by the supreme court along with the body of the rule, be taken into consideration in interpreting the rule.
The change in the heading from "Disclosure Upon Court Order" to "Disclosure Without Court Order" meant something. At best, the rule as it read at the time of the state's request for disclosure was ambiguous. Any ambiguity should be resolved in favor of an appellant whose right to a fair trial may depend upon the interpretation placed upon the rule. Counsel for appellant was entitled to rely upon the rule as it was written and effective in 1976 when the request for disclosure was filed.
Was the denial by the trial court of appellant's request to call the witnesses in question prejudicial to appellant's defense? Counsel for appellant repeatedly moved to permit the calling of the character witnesses "in support of the psychiatric evidence that will be introduced in this case." In his offer of proof counsel stated the evidence would support the testimony of Dr. Thomas D. Manglesdorf, a psychiatrist, and that it would be directed to the character and behavior of appellant preceding the incident and would show a marked change in the attitude, demeanor and personality of appellant during the last few months before the offense for which he was charged. The testimony was intended to lend support to the formal plea of not...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State ex rel. Westfall v. Campbell
...considered in construing the meaning and purpose of the statute. Bullington v. State, 459 S.W.2d 334, 341 (Mo.1970); State v. Windmiller, 579 S.W.2d 730, 732 (Mo.App.1979). We think the legislative intent in § 570.080 was to create the single crime of receiving stolen property which may be ......
-
State v. Holtkamp
...the trial court has wide discretion in admitting such evidence and abuse of that discretion is required for reversal. State v. Windmiller, 579 S.W.2d 730, 733 (Mo.App.1979). While it is true that the photographs in this case are gruesome it must be observed that the crime itself had gruesom......
-
State v. Ryan
...courts in construing legislative enactments. State ex rel. DeGeere v. Appelquist, 748 S.W.2d 855, 857 (Mo.App.1988); State v. Windmiller, 579 S.W.2d 730, 732 (Mo.App.1979). Where repugnance or inconsistency exists between two statutes, courts will attempt to reconcile them and apply both, b......
-
Adams v. Boring, 17648
...v. Ryan, 813 S.W.2d 898, 901 (Mo.App.1991); State ex rel. DeGeere v. Appelquist, 748 S.W.2d 855, 857 (Mo.App.1988); State v. Windmiller, 579 S.W.2d 730, 732 (Mo.App.1979). In construing a statute, courts presume the General Assembly was aware of the state of the law when the statute was ena......