State v. Windsor

Citation110 Idaho 410,716 P.2d 1182
Decision Date19 December 1985
Docket NumberNo. 15486,15486
PartiesSTATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Karla Yvonne WINDSOR, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Idaho

Renae Hoff, of Gunn & Hoff, Caldwell, for defendant-appellant.

Jim Jones, Atty. Gen., Lynn E. Thomas, Sol. Gen., Boise, for plaintiff-respondent.

DONALDSON, Chief Justice.

Appellant Karla Windsor appeals from her conviction for first degree murder and from the imposition of the death penalty therefor.

On September 7, 1983, Sterling Grammer was stabbed to death in his Caldwell home. On September 10, 1983, Karla Windsor and Donald Fetterly were observed driving a vehicle registered to Grammer. They were subsequently arrested and charged with first degree murder, burglary, grand theft and the use of a deadly weapon in connection with Grammer's death.

The record reveals that Windsor and Fetterly had become acquainted with Grammer several weeks prior to his death. Grammer was dating Fetterly's ex-mother-in-law, Viola Hogan, and Windsor and Fetterly met Grammer through her.

The scenario that culminated in Grammer's death on Wednesday, September 7 began unfolding on Monday, September 5 when Windsor and Fetterly showed up at Grammer's home around dinner time. The pair had been living together for approximately six months at the time of Grammer's death. They were unemployed and had sold most of their possessions to raise money in order to travel to adjacent states in search of work. When they arrived at Grammer's doorstep on September 5, they were without money, a vehicle or a place to stay. Grammer invited them to stay for dinner and allowed them to spend the night in his extra room. Grammer woke them about 5:30 the next morning and they all left the house together.

Windsor and Fetterly had been told that there were several warrants out for their arrest and they spent the day of September 6 walking around and trying to devise a plan to get themselves safely out of the state. During their visit with Grammer, they had observed that he owned two vehicles, a large television, and a diamond ring. Windsor testified that they decided to ask Grammer to loan them a vehicle. She further testified that, if he refused, they had decided to tie him up and rob him. She stated that they never intended to hurt Grammer, only to rob him.

The pair returned to Grammer's house that afternoon and waited for him to come home from work. When he did not arrive, they entered the house through a window and waited for him. Grammer did not come home until about 6:30 the following morning. Viola Hogan testified that he had spent the night at her home.

Windsor testified that when Grammer arrived at home on Wednesday morning, she and Fetterly explained their situation and asked him to give them a vehicle and some money. When he refused, they decided to go ahead with the robbery. They had Grammer's face was also covered with duct tape. The state's expert testified, over objection, that the placement of the tape would have completely cut-off Grammer's air supply. Windsor testified that she taped Grammer's face and that his breathing was not affected.

[110 Idaho 413] found some duct tape in Grammer's bedroom which they used to bind his hands and feet. Windsor stated that Grammer agreed to let them tie him up and did not struggle. The autopsy, however, revealed an unexplained bruise to the back of Grammer's head. The state's medical expert testified that in his opinion a blow sufficient to have raised such a bruise would have rendered Grammer unconscious. From this, the state postulated that Windsor and Fetterly struck Grammer and that he was unconscious when they taped him.

Windsor's version of the stabbing is substantially as follows: Grammer was taped up and left lying on his bed while Windsor and Fetterly determined which of his possessions to take. Grammer began to make a lot of noise. Afraid that he would alert the neighbors, Windsor and Fetterly ran into the bedroom and attempted to quiet him. Grammer began to thrash around on the bed. Fetterly grabbed him and tried to hold him still. Grammer then began kicking his legs and Windsor laid across them. At that point, Fetterly reached across the headboard and grabbed the knife they had used to cut the duct tape. He held the knife to Grammer's chest. When Grammer continued to struggle, Fetterly stabbed him several times in the chest. Windsor stated that the stabbing occurred so quickly that it was impossible for her to do anything to prevent it.

Grammer's body was dumped in the Snake River where it was discovered by a pair of fishermen on September 9. The following day, a police officer observed Windsor and Fetterly driving around Caldwell in Grammer's pickup. They were stopped and taken to the Canyon County Sheriff's Office for questioning.

Windsor was placed in an interrogation room and questioned by Detective Jim Hensen as to the whereabouts of the deceased's other vehicle. She was not given Miranda warnings prior to this questioning. Windsor's answers enabled the police to locate the vehicle.

After Hensen had obtained the information about the vehicle, his supervisor, Richard Appleton, suggested Hensen leave the room as Windsor was becoming upset by what Appleton termed Hensen's "firm attitude." Appleton then talked to Windsor in an attempt to calm her. He told her that if she was involved in anything it would be best if she told the truth. Windsor responded that she was not going to make any statement without Fetterly being present. Appleton had Fetterly brought into the room and, after talking together, Fetterly and Windsor agreed to make a joint statement. At that point, Appleton read them their Miranda rights. Both Windsor and Fetterly signed forms waiving those rights and proceeded to give a detailed confession. On the basis of that confession, they were indicted on charges of first degree murder, burglary, grand theft and the use of a deadly weapon in the commission of a felony.

Trial was set for December 12, 1983. On November 21, 1983, the defense filed a motion for change of venue or, in the alternative, for selection of a jury from a county other than Canyon alleging that widespread pretrial publicity mandated such procedures. Both motions were denied without prejudice.

Several other pretrial motions were made, including a motion to sever the trial of the two defendants and a motion to suppress the joint confession. Additionally, the public defender moved to sever Windsor's defense due to a conflict of interest. The court granted the motion to sever the trial, rescheduling Windsor's trial for February 13, 1984, and allowed withdrawal of counsel from Windsor's defense. The motion for suppression of the joint confession was denied.

The trial of co-defendant Donald Fetterly began on December 12, 1983 and concluded on December 15, 1983. The jury returned On February 16, 1984, the jury returned a verdict of guilty to the charges of grand theft, second degree burglary and first degree murder in the perpetration of a burglary. The verdict form for premeditated murder was returned unsigned. Windsor's motion to have an acquittal entered on that charge was denied.

[110 Idaho 414] a guilty verdict not only to first degree premeditated and deliberate murder, but to felony murder as well. Publicity regarding Fetterly's trial and conviction was extensive. As a result, Windsor renewed her motion for a change of venue. The trial court took the motion under advisement indicating that the matter of venue would not be decided until trial. Jury selection in Windsor's trial was commenced on February 13, 1984. Once the jury had been impanelled, the court denied Windsor's motion for change of venue without comment.

Notice of intent to seek the death penalty was filed on March 20, 1984. The court scheduled the matter for sentencing and ordered a presentence investigation. Alleging that the pre-sentence investigator interrogated Windsor regarding facts of the crimes charged in violation of her constitutional rights, the defense filed a motion to strike portions of the presentence report. The motion was denied. Prior to sentencing, Windsor moved for a formal sentencing hearing and for sentencing by jury. These motions were also denied and the hearing on aggravation and mitigation commenced on March 28, 1984. Following testimony and argument, the court determined that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances and the death penalty was imposed. The court also imposed a concurrent indeterminate five-year sentence for burglary and a concurrent indeterminate fourteen-year sentence for grand theft. A death warrant and findings were filed pursuant to I.C. § 19-2515.

Thereafter, Windsor filed a motion for reduction and correction of sentence. A hearing on that motion was held on November 14, 1984. At the hearing, Windsor objected to the fact that the prosecutor had filed a document with the court entitled "Memorandum Regarding Aggravation/Mitigation Hearing of Karla Windsor" without serving the defense with a copy. She also argued that the death penalty was disproportionate in her case. Windsor's motion was denied without any discussion of her objection to the prosecutor's memorandum. Windsor appeals from the judgment of conviction for first degree murder and from the imposition of the death penalty.

I.

Windsor alleges that the totality of the circumstances surrounding the taking of the joint confession rendered it involuntary and therefore inadmissible. Although conceding that she was read her Miranda rights and that she signed a waiver of those rights prior to giving the confession, she nevertheless asserts that she was coerced into making a statement in violation of Miranda. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). She contends that Officers Hensen and Appleton used a "good cop/bad cop" technique to psychologically pressure...

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    ...he can be criminally liable for any death occurring during the commission of that felony. This Court also stated in State v. Windsor, 110 Idaho 410, 716 P.2d 1182 (1985) that, under I.C. § 18-4003(d), "a defendant who participates in a felony can be held liable for the death of any person k......
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