State v. Wing
| Decision Date | 20 December 2021 |
| Docket Number | A-1-CA-38763 |
| Citation | 505 P.3d 905 |
| Parties | STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Donald WING a/k/a Donald Wing III, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, Walter Hart, Assistant Attorney General, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender, Mary Barket, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant
{1} Defendant Donald Wing III appeals his conviction and sentence for possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 30-31-23(A) (2011, amended 2021), following entry of a guilty plea conditioned on his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. Because we conclude Defendant's proximity to the scene of a recent crime, in conjunction with all the surrounding circumstances, gave rise to reasonable suspicion in this case, we affirm the district court's denial of Defendant's suppression motion. In this appeal, Defendant also contends that we must remand for resentencing because the district court did not afford him the opportunity to allocute prior to sentencing. The State counters that, by entering into a plea and disposition agreement, Defendant waived his right to raise the allocution violation on appeal. We do not agree with the State on this point. We hold that the entry of a valid guilty plea and appellate waiver does not operate to waive the right to appeal an allocution violation that occurred at sentencing. Because the district court did not afford Defendant the right of allocution, we reverse Defendant's sentence and remand for resentencing.
{2} As for the district court's suppression ruling, Defendant argues the court erred in concluding that his encounter with law enforcement was consensual and in alternatively concluding that the encounter, if nonconsensual, was supported by reasonable suspicion. Assuming for purposes of this opinion that Defendant indeed was seized at the inception of the encounter, we conclude that reasonable suspicion supported the stop of Defendant, and we affirm the district court's denial of his suppression motion on this basis. Cf. State v. Ortiz , 2009-NMCA-092, ¶¶ 21, 49, 146 N.M. 873, 215 P.3d 811 ().
{3} While on patrol in his marked vehicle, at around 1:15 a.m. on a cold January day, Farmington Police Officer Matthew Burns observed at least two individuals in an empty lot appearing to dump a large piece of trash from the back of a truck. Officer Burns testified that there were numerous issues with this lot, including unwanted subjects and people dumping trash there. Upon seeing the truck in the lot, Officer Burns turned his vehicle around and drove in the direction of the street where he believed he saw the truck traveling. By the time Officer Burns got to the street, the truck was gone, but Defendant was there walking a bicycle. Without activating his patrol lights or telling Defendant to stop, Officer Burns approached Defendant and asked him about the activity in the lot. Defendant immediately admitted to dumping trash there.
{4} Officer Burns estimated that between when he saw the truck on the lot and when he came in contact with Defendant, only a minute or two had passed; he also estimated that the distance between Defendant and the lot was "pretty close," roughly 100 yards. Defendant was the only person around at that time, and Officer Burns testified that it was unusual for anyone to be out, given it was a cold, January morning. When asked if he specifically saw Defendant or his bicycle, which had distinctive lights through the spokes, on the lot, Officer Burns answered that it was dark and he could see a couple subjects but he did not provide any description of the subjects and could not say whether Defendant was one of them. Officer Burns further stated that he did not recall seeing the bicycle on the lot because he was focused on the truck at the time.
{5} After obtaining Defendant's name and date of birth, Officer Burns learned of an outstanding warrant for Defendant's arrest, and he placed Defendant under arrest. Prior to being booked at the local detention center, Defendant was searched and methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia were found on Defendant's person; this discovery led to the charges in this case. Defendant moved to suppress both the evidence found on his person and a statement he made when officers discovered the methamphetamine. Defendant's motion alleged that he "was seized ... when Officer ... Burns saw [Defendant] walking his bicycle and began to question him about what he was doing in the dirt lot" and that this seizure was unconstitutional because Officer Burns lacked reasonable suspicion. The State's written response to the motion, as well as the parties’ presentations to the district court at the suppression hearing, focused on whether reasonable suspicion existed to link Defendant to the trash dumping.
{6} After taking the matter under advisement, the district court entered a written order denying Defendant's motion on alternative grounds. The court first ruled that Defendant's constitutional rights were not implicated because Officer Burns had not seized Defendant prior to his admission that he dumped trash in the lot. Alternatively, acknowledging the State effectively conceded that a seizure occurred, the district court ruled that the seizure of Defendant, prior to his admission, was supported by reasonable suspicion. Defendant appeals the district court's denial of his suppression motion, pursuant to his conditional plea.
{7} Defendant makes numerous contentions directed at explaining why the district court erred in concluding that Defendant's initial encounter with Officer Burns was consensual and therefore not a seizure. Because we agree with the district court's alternative ruling—i.e., that the stop of Defendant was supported by reasonable suspicion—we need not and do not address Defendant's arguments about the encounter being nonconsensual.
{8} Defendant argues that under both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution, his seizure was unreasonable.1 See Yazzie , 2016-NMSC-026, ¶ 17, 376 P.3d 858 . It is well established that "a police officer may detain an individual in investigating potential criminal activity where the officer has formed a reasonable suspicion the individual is breaking, or has broken, the law"—such detention is not constitutionally unreasonable. State v. Salazar , 2019-NMCA-021, ¶ 12, 458 P.3d 546 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
{9} "A reasonable suspicion is a particularized suspicion, based on all the circumstances that a particular individual, the one detained, is breaking, or has broken, the law." State v. Hubble , 2009-NMSC-014, ¶ 8, 146 N.M. 70, 206 P.3d 579 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "We will find reasonable suspicion if the officer is aware of specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that, when judged objectively, would lead a reasonable person to believe criminal activity occurred or was occurring." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "The level of suspicion required for an investigatory stop is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence." State v. Urioste , 2002-NMSC-023, ¶ 10, 132 N.M. 592, 52 P.3d 964 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
{10} Because Defendant does not challenge the district court's factual findings, whether reasonable suspicion supported the stop is a legal question we review de novo. See Yazzie , 2016-NMSC-026, ¶ 15, 376 P.3d 858. "On appeal, we must review the totality of the circumstances and must avoid reweighing individual factors in isolation." State v. Martinez , 2018-NMSC-007, ¶ 12, 410 P.3d 186. In doing this, we view the facts "in a manner most favorable to the prevailing party," indulge "all reasonable inferences in support of the court's decision," and disregard "all inferences or evidence to the contrary[.]" State v. Werner , 1994-NMSC-025, ¶ 10, 117 N.M. 315, 871 P.2d 971 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
{11} Defendant does not contend Officer Burns lacked reasonable suspicion that trash had been illegally dumped in the lot. Instead, Defendant contends the officer lacked reasonable suspicion that Defendant, in particular, was involved in this offense. Thus, our inquiry is limited to whether, based on the totality of the circumstances, Officer Burns’ suspicion that Defendant was involved in the illegal dumping was reasonable. The district court ruled that it was. Defendant on appeal makes several arguments why this was error, chief among them that Officer Burns relied exclusively on Defendant's proximity to the scene of the crime, which Defendant contends was insufficient to form a reasonable suspicion.
{12} In advancing this argument, Defendant does not contend proximity to the scene of a recent crime is irrelevant when assessing the reasonableness of a stop. Any such contention would be contrary to precedent. When viewed in conjunction with all the circumstances known to an officer, proximity to the scene of a recent crime may prove significant in determining the reasonableness of...
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State v. Matteson
...an invalid sentence "mandates reversal and resentencing without any inquiry into harm or the like." State v. Wing, 2022-NMCA-016, ¶ 28, 505 P.3d 905, cert. denied (S-1-SC-39182). the sentencing hearing in this case, the district court neither informed Defendant of his right to address the c......