State v. Winot
Decision Date | 16 February 2010 |
Docket Number | No. 17696.,17696. |
Citation | 988 A.2d 188,294 Conn. 753 |
Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Gregory B. WINOT. |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Marjorie Allen Dauster, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state's attorney, James E. Thomas, former state's attorney, and Vicki Melchiorre and Donna Mambrino, senior assistant state's attorneys, for the appellant (state).
Jon L. Schoenhorn, Hartford, for the appellee (defendant).
ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE, ZARELLA and McLACHLAN, Js.*
In this certified appeal,1 the state appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court reversing the conviction of the defendant, Gregory B. Winot, following a jury trial, of kidnapping in the second degree2 in violation of General Statutes § 53a-94(a).3 See State v. Winot, 95 Conn.App. 332, 362, 897 A.2d 115 (2006). We agree with the state that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that § 53a-94(a) was unconstitutionally vague as applied to the defendant's conduct. Id., at 343, 897 A.2d 115. Moreover, we disagree with the defendant that we should affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court on the alternative ground that it improperly concluded that the trial court's exclusion of certain evidence was proper. Accordingly, we reverse in part the judgment of the Appellate Court.
The Appellate Court summarized the relevant facts, which the jury reasonably could have found, as follows:
State v. Winot, supra, 95 Conn.App. at 335-37, 897 A.2d 115.
The defendant's appeal from his conviction to the Appellate Court followed. There, he argued, inter alia, that § 53a-94(a), proscribing the offense of kidnapping in the second degree, was unconstitutionally vague as applied to his conduct on July 23, 2002. Specifically, he argued that, in light of the brevity of his encounter with the victim and the minimal amount of restraint he employed, the statute failed to give him fair notice that his conduct was prohibited.4 Id., at 338, 341, 897 A.2d 115. The Appellate Court agreed with the defendant, concluding that his movement or confinement of the victim was "`miniscule,'" and, therefore, that the resulting kidnapping conviction was "absurd and unconscionable. ..." Id., at 343, 897 A.2d 115. Moreover, according to the Appellate Court, to uphold the defendant's conviction "would risk the encouragement of arbitrary and discretionary enforcement of [§ 53a-94(a)] by overzealous prosecutors." Id. This certified appeal followed.
The state contends on appeal that the Appellate Court improperly reversed the defendant's conviction of kidnapping in the second degree because the statute proscribing that crime is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to his conduct on July 23, 2002. We agree.
We begin with the applicable standard of review and general governing principles.5 The determination of whether a statutory provision is unconstitutionally vague is a question of law over which we exercise de novo review. State v. Knybel, 281 Conn. 707, 713, 916 A.2d 816 (2007). In undertaking such review, we are mindful that (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rocque v. Farricielli, 269 Conn. 187, 204, 848 A.2d 1206 (2004).
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gonzalez v. Surgeon, 284 Conn. 573, 584, 937 A.2d 24 (2007).
Tempering the foregoing considerations is the acknowledgment that many statutes proscribing criminal offenses necessarily cannot be drafted with the utmost precision and still effectively reach the targeted behaviors. Consistent with that acknowledgment, the United States Supreme Court has explained: Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110, 92 S.Ct. 1953, 32 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972); see also Sweetman v. State Elections Enforcement Commission, 249 Conn. 296, 322, 732 A.2d 144 (1999) (...
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......25 We begin by setting forth the relevant legal principles. "The determination of whether a statutory provision is unconstitutionally vague is a question of law over which we exercise de novo review." State v. Winot , 294 Conn. 753, 758–59, 988 A.2d 188 (2010). "The void for vagueness doctrine is a procedural due process concept that originally was derived from the guarantees of due process contained in the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution.. The constitutional injunction ......
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State v. Osimanti, No. 18311.
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State v. Elmer G., (AC 37596).
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