State v. Winters
Decision Date | 04 April 1997 |
Docket Number | No. 49A02-9604-PC-248,49A02-9604-PC-248 |
Citation | 678 N.E.2d 405 |
Parties | STATE of Indiana, Appellant-Respondent, v. Arnold WINTERS, Appellee-Petitioner. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
The State of Indiana appeals the granting of post-conviction relief to Arnold Winters. We restate the sole issue for review as whether the post-conviction court erroneously vacated Winters' convictions because of its determination that the trial court committed fundamental error by ex parte communications with the jury during deliberations and failing to comply with the provisions of IC 34-1-21-6 regarding jury requests for information.
We reverse and remand.
The facts underlying Winters' convictions were set forth by our supreme court in his direct appeal:
Winters v. State, 530 N.E.2d 291, 292 (Ind.1988).
During deliberations, the jury foreman sent a note to the trial court which read:
Record at 108. 1 Neither the judge nor the attorneys received notice of the note. Instead, the bailiff denied the jury's request by writing "no" on the bottom of the noted and initialing it. Record at 108.
The jury sent a second request which read:
"To: Judge Alsip 6/10/87
Can we the jury obtain a written definition of the aiding and abetting portion of the Law [sic ] as it applys [sic ] to this subject case.
James R. McKnight
Foreman"
Record at 109. Again, neither the judge nor the attorneys received notice of the jury's request. The Record does not indicate whether there was any response to the request. 2 The jury convicted Winters of murder, attempted murder, and robbery. Our supreme court affirmed those convictions on direct appeal. Winters, 530 N.E.2d at 291. Winters sought post-conviction relief on several grounds: (1) denial of his constitutional right to be present during all critical stages of his criminal proceeding; (2) the failure to instruct as to Winters' specific intent to kill in the attempted murder instruction; (3) the violation of his double jeopardy protections; and (4) ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The post-conviction court agreed with assertions (1)-(3), found them to be fundamental error, vacated all of Winters' convictions, and ordered new trials. The court disagreed with assertion (4) and found that Winters received effective assistance of trial counsel. The court made no finding, however, with respect to the performance of his appellate counsel. The State appeals solely on the basis of the jury communication. Because the State does not challenge the post-conviction relief granted for the attempted murder and robbery convictions, this opinion addresses only the post-conviction relief granted for the murder conviction.
When the State appeals the granting of post-conviction relief, the standard of review applicable to negative judgments does not apply. State v. Lime, 619 N.E.2d 601, 603 (Ind.Ct.App.1993), trans. denied (1994). We review under the standard noted in Ind.Trial Rule 52(A). Id. Under that standard, this court will not set aside the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous, with due regard given to the trial court's ability to judge witness credibility. T.R. 52(A).
The State asserts that the bailiff's communication with the jury did not amount to reversible error. We disagree.
When a court engages in ex parte communications with a jury, an inference of prejudice arises, creating a rebuttable presumption that error has been committed. Madden v. State, 656 N.E.2d 524, 526 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), trans. denied. This rebuttable presumption of error also exists in cases when a bailiff communicates with the jury outside of the defendant's presence. Driver v. State, 594 N.E.2d 488, 493 (Ind.Ct.App.1992), trans. denied. To be reversible error, the bailiff's conduct must prejudice a defendant's substantial rights. Bartruff v. State, 528 N.E.2d 110, 120 (Ind.Ct.App.1988), trans. denied (1989). Prejudicial conduct usually amounts to the bailiff answering a legal question or providing additional instructions to the jury. Wallace v. State, 266 Ind. 344, 346-47, 363 N.E.2d 956, 957 (1977); Harrison v. State, 575 N.E.2d 642, 649-50 (Ind.Ct.App.1991); Stader v. State, 453 N.E.2d 1032, 1035 (Ind.Ct.App.1983); Laine v. State, 154 Ind.App. 81, 85-86, 289 N.E.2d 141, 143-44 (1972).
With respect to ex parte communications between court officials and juries, reviewing courts have held that where the ex parte communication is only a refusal of a jury's request, the presumption of harm to the defendant was rebutted. See, e.g., Martin v. State, 535 N.E.2d 493, 497 (Ind.1989); Marsillett v. State, 495 N.E.2d 699, 709 (Ind.1986); Kiner v. State, 643 N.E.2d 950, 955 (Ind.Ct.App.1994). Here, the bailiff simply refused the jury's requests. Due to the nature of the jury's requests, however, we cannot say that the State rebutted the presumption of harm to Winters.
At issue here is the trial court's failure to follow the mandate of IC 34-1-21-6 which provides:
"After the jury have [sic ] retired for deliberation, if there is a disagreement between them as to any part of the testimony, or if they desire to be informed as to any point of law arising in the case, they may request the officer to conduct them into court, where the information required shall be given in the presence of, or after notice to, the parties or their attorneys."
This statute sets forth a mandatory procedure for the court to follow when the jury disagrees as to any part of the testimony and when the jury wishes to be informed as to any point of law arising in the case. If either situation arises, the trial court must notify the parties or their attorneys and provide the necessary information in open court.
With respect to the manifestation of jury disagreement, reviewing courts have interpreted this provision to apply usually when there is open and obvious disagreement among jury members. See, e.g., Survance v. State, 465 N.E.2d 1076, 1082-83 (Ind.1984) ( ); Grayson v. State, 593 N.E.2d 1200, 1205-06 (Ind.Ct.App.1992) ( ); Dowdy v. State, 672 N.E.2d 948, 953-54 (Ind.Ct.App.1996) ( ). We note, however, that juries may manifest disagreement about testimony by requesting to rehear it. Brownlee v. State, 555 N.E.2d 505, 508 (Ind.Ct.App.1990). Indeed, we question why a jury that was in agreement as to the testimony at issue would request to rehear it.
In Brownlee, the defendant was prosecuted for attempted murder and armed robbery. His alibi defense rested on...
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...error. Id. Fundamental error is error so prejudicial that it amounts to a denial of fundamental due process. State v. Winters, 678 N.E.2d 405, 410 (Ind.Ct.App.1997). Fundamental error must be of such magnitude to persuade the reviewing court that the defendant could not possibly have receiv......
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Riggs v. State, 49A02-9702-PC-120
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