State v. Winterstein, 80755-8.

CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Washington
Citation167 Wash.2d 620,220 P.3d 1226
Docket NumberNo. 80755-8.,80755-8.
PartiesSTATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Terry Lee WINTERSTEIN, Petitioner.
Decision Date03 December 2009

Anne Mowry Cruser, Law Office of Anne Cruser, Kalama, WA, for Petitioner.

James Smith, Cowlitz County Prosecutor's Office, Kelso, WA, for Respondent.

STEPHENS, J.

¶ 1 Petitioner Terry Lee Winterstein was convicted of unlawful manufacture of methamphetamine with evidence discovered through a warrantless search of his residence by his probation officer. During a routine examination of the trial exhibits to be given to the jury, Winterstein's counsel discovered evidence that Winterstein changed his address with the Department of Corrections at least three weeks prior to the search. After he was convicted, Winterstein filed a motion for relief from judgment, arguing that the evidence gathered as a result of the warrantless search should be suppressed because his probation officer did not have the authority of law to search a house that was not Winterstein's documented residence. After holding a posttrial suppression hearing, the trial court denied the motion.

¶ 2 The Court of Appeals affirmed. State v. Winterstein, 140 Wash.App. 676, 166 P.3d 1242 (2007). It held that the probation officer had authority to search the residence because he had reasonable suspicion under the Terry1 "specific and articulable facts" standard to believe it was Winterstein's residence. In the alternative, the Court of Appeals held that notwithstanding the illegal search, the evidence was admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine. This case requires us to consider what standard a probation officer will be held to in determining a probationer's residence in order to justify a warrantless search of that residence. We hold that a probation officer must have probable cause to believe that a probationer resides at a particular residence before searching that residence. Additionally, we hold that the inevitable discovery doctrine is incompatible with article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 3 Winterstein received community supervision after pleading guilty to a gross misdemeanor in September 2002 and was assigned to Community Corrections Officer (CCO) Kristopher Rongen. As a condition of supervision, Winterstein signed a Department of Corrections (DOC) document acknowledging that he was subject to a search of his residence or other personal effects if the DOC had reasonable cause to suspect a violation of those terms. Winterstein initially reported his address as 646 Englert Road, Woodlawn, Washington.

¶ 4 Rongen required Winterstein to report twice per month. Even though the terms of his supervision required only notice to the DOC of a change of address, Rongen testified that he additionally required his supervisees to seek his permission before moving. In spite of this requirement Rongen testified that offenders are allowed to use the computer kiosks in the DOC offices to give notice of a change of address. All CCOs can access the information entered at the kiosks from a database on their computers, as well as information from the offender based tracking system (OBTS).

The Warrantless Search

¶ 5 Due to Winterstein's failure to report on January 15, 2003 and previous failed drug tests, Rongen planned to do a home visit. On February 5, 2003, Rongen received a tip from the Clark-Skamania Drug Task Force (Task Force) that there was a possible methamphetamine lab at 646 Englert Road. The next day, Rongen went to 646 Englert Road, along with two other DOC officers and five to six officers from two area joint drug task forces. Rongen did not check the kiosk database to confirm Winterstein's address prior to the visit, though he did check OBTS.

¶ 6 Upon arriving at the house, Rongen knocked on the front door and announced himself. An unidentified voice told him to come in. Rongen and the other officers entered and immediately walked through the house, directing all the occupants into the living room. Rongen testified that while searching the house for people, he looked into two bedrooms, neither of which was Winterstein's, and observed methamphetamine paraphernalia.

¶ 7 After directing people to the living room, Rongen asked Sunshine O'Connor, a former resident of 646 Englert Road and also Winterstein's girlfriend, where Winterstein was and if he still lived at the house. O'Connor replied that Winterstein still lived at the house, but he was not there at the time.

¶ 8 Once everyone was gathered in the living room, one of the other officers explained their purpose and the officers conducted a search of the premises. There is no evidence that Rongen or any of the officers ever asked for or received permission from any of the occupants to search the house. During the search, Rongen did not see anything incriminating in the bedroom he believed was Winterstein's.

¶ 9 Following the search, Rongen notified the Task Force officers of the methamphetamine paraphernalia he observed in two of the bedrooms, and an officer from the Task Force obtained a warrant. Task Force officers subsequently searched 646 Englert Road and confiscated the methamphetamine paraphernalia. They also searched an adjacent motor home marked with "646 1/2" on the side of the door. An officer testified that the motor home was filled with boxes and that it did not appear that anyone lived there. The officer did concede that it was possible for someone to live in the motor home. No contraband was found in it.

Trial and Postconviction Motions

¶ 10 Based on the evidence obtained from the search, Winterstein was charged with unlawful manufacture of methamphetamine. At some point during trial proceedings, it came to light that Winterstein had changed his address to 646 1/2 Englert Road using the kiosk in the DOC office, though there was a dispute about when the address change occurred. During discovery, the defense received a report from Rongen stating DOC records indicated that Winterstein did not change his address until the day of the search. Based on this information, Winterstein's counsel did not pursue a motion to suppress the evidence gathered as a result of Rongen's search.

¶ 11 After the close of evidence at trial and during a routine examination of the trial exhibits to be submitted to the jury, Winterstein's counsel discovered a DOC billing statement addressed to Winterstein at 646 1/2 Englert Road. The statement was dated January 13, 2003, three weeks before the search. This document had not been turned over to the defense during discovery.

¶ 12 Winterstein was convicted on December 23, 2004. Winterstein moved for relief from judgment under CrR 7.8 based on newly discovered evidence, the misrepresentation of an adverse party, and a violation of his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Winterstein also moved for a new trial under CrR 7.5 based on trial errors not at issue on appeal. Because the newly discovered evidence related to a suppression issue, all parties agreed that a suppression hearing was appropriate. Further, the State conceded that if Winterstein prevailed at the suppression hearing, then the court should grant him a new trial.

¶ 13 Following a suppression hearing that began at 4:15 p.m. and ran until 8:30 p.m., the trial court refused to suppress the evidence seized as a result of Rongen's warrantless search. The court found that Winterstein had properly effected his address change and that the DOC had notice of the change at least by January 13, 2003. However the court also found that the address change to 646 1/2 Englert Road was a ruse and that Winterstein actually lived at 646 Englert Road. Concluding that Rongen acted in good faith in performing the search at the defendant's actual address, the court upheld the validity of the search.

Appeal

¶ 14 Winterstein appealed, arguing that Rongen lacked legal authority to search 646 Englert Road in light of the address change. At oral argument, the Court of Appeals sua sponte brought up the issue of inevitable discovery. Affirming Winterstein's conviction in a partially published opinion, the court explained that under the Terry standard, the search of 646 Englert Road was lawful because CCO Rongen had a reasonable belief that Winterstein resided there. Winterstein, 140 Wash.App. at 692, 166 P.3d 1242. The court further held that even if the search was not lawful, the evidence was admissible under the doctrine of inevitable discovery, citing State v. Warner, 125 Wash.2d 876, 889, 889 P.2d 479 (1995). Winterstein, 140 Wash.App. at 693, 166 P.3d 1242. Winterstein petitioned this court for review, which we granted. State v. Winterstein, 163 Wash.2d 1033, 187 P.3d 269 (2008).

ANALYSIS

¶ 15 We review conclusions of law relating to the suppression of evidence de novo. State v. Duncan, 146 Wash.2d 166, 171, 43 P.3d 513 (2002). We review findings of fact for substantial evidence. State v. Hill, 123 Wash.2d 641, 647, 870 P.2d 313 (1994).

Search of the Residence under Article I, Section 7

¶ 16 Winterstein argues that the Court of Appeals erred in applying the Terry analysis to decide whether Rongen had the authority to search 646 Englert Road. Implicitly, Winterstein argues that authority of law requires something more than the Terry reasonable or well-founded suspicion standard, necessarily probable cause.

¶ 17 Article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution provides: "No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law." Under article I, section 7, the requisite "authority of law" is generally a search warrant. State v. Morse, 156 Wash.2d 1, 7, 123 P.3d 832 (2005) (citing State v. Ladson, 138 Wash.2d 343, 350, 979 P.2d 833 (1999)). Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless justified by a recognized exception. State v. Hendrickson, 129...

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