State v. Witt
| Decision Date | 24 September 2015 |
| Citation | 126 A.3d 850,223 N.J. 409 |
| Parties | STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. William L. WITT, Defendant–Respondent. |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
Ronald Susswein, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant (John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney).
Stephen W. Kirsch, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney).
Brooks H. Leonard argued the cause for amicus curiae Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (Coughlin Duffy, attorneys; Mr. Leonard and Michael J. Sullivan, Morristown, of counsel and on the brief).
Alexander R. Shalom argued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (Ronald K. Chen, Rutgers Constitutional Rights Clinic Center for Law & Justice and Edward L. Barocas, attorneys; Mr. Shalom, Mr. Chen, Mr. Barocas, and Jeanne M. LoCicero, of counsel and on the brief).
Jeffrey Evan Gold, Cherry Hill, argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey State Bar Association (Paris P. Eliades, President, Gold & Associates, and Yonta Law, attorneys; Mr. Gold and Mr. Eliades, of counsel; Mr. Gold, Kimberly A. Yonta, and Justin M. Moles, on the brief).
In this appeal, we are called on to determine whether the constitutional standard governing an automobile search in State v. Pena–Flores, 198 N.J. 6, 965 A. 2d 114 (2009) is unsound in principle and unworkable in practice.
In Pena–Flores, supra, 198 N.J. at 28, 965 A. 2d 114, a deeply divided Court reaffirmed its departure from the standard for automobile searches set forth in State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211, 233, 440 A. 2d 1311 (1981). In Alston, we determined that a warrantless search of an automobile was constitutionally permissible, provided that the police had probable cause to search the vehicle and that the police action was prompted by the "unforeseeability and spontaneity of the circumstances giving rise to probable cause." Id. at 233, 235, 440 A. 2d 1311. The Alston standard was seemingly consistent with the federal exception to the warrant requirement.
In State v. Cooke, 163 N.J. 657, 670, 751 A. 2d 92 (2000), invoking our State Constitution, the Court overthrew the Alston standard and added a pure exigent-circumstances requirement to justify an automobile search. Pena–Flores maintained the course charted by Cooke. Pena–Flores also set forth a multi-factor test to guide police officers in determining whether exigent circumstances excused the securing of a warrant and encouraged the use of telephonic warrants as a means of shortening roadway stops. The Court expected that its exigent-circumstances test would provide a reliable guide to law enforcement and that telephonic warrants would present an efficient and speedy way of curbing prolonged roadway stops. Those expectations have not come to pass.
Experience and common sense persuade us that the exigent-circumstances test in Pena–Flores does not provide greater liberty or security to New Jersey's citizens and has placed on law enforcement unrealistic and impracticable burdens. First, the multi-factor exigency formula is too complex and difficult for a reasonable police officer to apply to fast-moving and evolving events that require prompt action. Thus, we cannot expect predictableand uniform police or judicial decision-making. Second, the securing of telephonic warrants results in unacceptably prolonged roadway stops. During the warrant-application process, the occupants of a vehicle and police officers are stranded on the side of busy highways for an extended period, increasing the risk of serious injury and even death by passing traffic. If the car is impounded, then the occupants' detention will be extended for an even longer period as a warrant is procured. Third, one of the unintended consequences of Pena–Flores is the exponential increase in police-induced consent automobile searches. The resort to consent searches suggests that law enforcement does not consider time-consuming telephonic warrants or the amorphous exigent-circumstances standard to be a feasible answer to roadway automobile searches. The heavy reliance on consent searches is of great concern given the historical abuses associated with such searches and the potential for future abuses.
Adherence to stare decisis serves a number of salutary purposes, including promoting certainty and stability in our law. However, stare decisis is not a command to continue on a misguided course or to hold tight to a failed policy. We do not overturn precedent lightly, and certainly not without good cause or a special justification. Because we believe that good cause and special justification are present here, we return to the standard that governed automobile searches in Alston —a standard that is more in line with the jurisprudence of most other jurisdictions, yet still protective of the right of citizens to be free from unreasonable searches.
Defendant William L. Witt was charged in an indictment with second-degree unlawful possession of a firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39–5(b), and second-degree possession of a weapon by a convicted person, N.J.S.A. 2C:39–7(b). The police initiated a stop of defendant's car because he did not dim his high beams when necessary. A search of defendant's vehicle uncovered a handgun.
Defendant moved to suppress the gun on the ground that the police conducted an unreasonable search in violation of the New Jersey Constitution. Defendant's sole argument in support of his motion, presented both in a letter brief and oral argument to the trial court, was that the police did not have exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search of his car under Pena–Flores. Defendant did not challenge the validity of the motor-vehicle stop.
At the suppression hearing, only one witness testified-Officer Joseph Racite of the Carneys Point Township Police Department. According to Officer Racite, at approximately 2:00 a.m. on December 19, 2012, while providing backup for a motor-vehicle stop on Pennsville Auburn Road, he observed a car pass with its high beams on. Officer Racite explained that a car must dim its high beams "as vehicles approach." Officer Racite pursued and stopped the vehicle, and requested backup. Defendant, the driver, appeared intoxicated and was asked to exit his car. After defendant failed to properly perform field-sobriety and balance tests, Officer Racite arrested him for driving while intoxicated. Defendant was handcuffed and placed in the back of a patrol car. While Racite searched defendant's vehicle for "intoxicants," he found a handgun in the center console.
With Pena–Flores as its guide, the trial court made the following findings: the officer had a right to stop defendant's car based on an "unexpected" occurrence and had probable cause to search for an open container of alcohol, but did not have "sufficient exigent circumstances" to conduct a warrantless search. Accordingly, the court suppressed the handgun.
The Appellate Division granted the State's motion for leave to appeal.
The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's suppression of the gun "because of the utter absence of any exigency to support the warrantless vehicle search that occurred, and because there was no justification for this motor vehicle stop." State v. Witt, 435 N.J.Super. 608, 610–11, 90 A. 3d 664 (App.Div.2014). First, the panel declined to address the State's argument that the exigent-circumstances test in Pena–Flores "should be replaced because it has proved to be unworkable and has led to unintended negative consequences." Id. at 612, 90 A. 3d 664. The panel explained that, as an intermediate appellate court, it had "no authority to 'replace' Pena–Flores with some other legal principles." Ibid.
Second, in applying Pena–Flores, the panel determined that the evidence at the suppression hearing did not "suggest[ ] anything close to an exigency that would permit a motor vehicle search without a warrant." Id. at 613, 90 A. 3d 664. It emphasized that the stop occurred in the early morning when defendant was driving alone; during the search, defendant was "handcuffed" and "seated in the back of a police vehicle"; and the police had no reason to believe that the object of the search—"open containers of alcohol"—would not still be in the car "once a warrant was obtained." Ibid.
Third, the panel agreed with defendant's argument, raised for the first time on appeal, that Officer Racite did not have a "reasonable and articulable suspicion" to stop defendant for violating N.J.S.A. 39:3–60 because the statute requires drivers to dim their high beams only when " 'approach[ing] an oncoming vehicle' " within five hundred feet. Id. at 614–16, 90 A. 3d 664 (quoting N.J.S.A. 39:3–60 ). The panel reasoned that the officer's vehicle was not an "oncoming vehicle" because it was parked when defendant drove by with active high beams. Id. at 615–16, 90 A. 3d 664. Because the officer's vehicle was not "in operation and in the lane of traffic opposite to" defendant's car, in the panel's view, Officer Racite had no right to stop him. Ibid.
We granted the State's motion for leave to appeal. State v. Witt, 219 N.J. 624, 99 A. 3d 829 (2014). We also granted the motions of the Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey, the New Jersey State Bar Association, and the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey to participate as amici curiae.
Before addressing the parties' arguments on the constitutional standard governing the search of defendant's vehicle, we dispose of his challenge to the lawfulness of the stop, which was raised for the first time before the Appellate Division. Defendant did not challenge the validity of the motor-vehicle stop under N.J.S.A. 39:3–60 in either his brief or argument before the trial court. Defendant now claims that the mere filing of a motion to suppress under Rule 3:5–7(a) required the State "to...
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