State v. Wolleat

• Citation: 111 P.3d 1131,338 Or. 469
• Parties: STATE of Oregon, Respondent on Review, v. Richard James WOLLEAT, Petitioner on Review.
• Decision Date: 05 May 2005
• Court: Supreme Court of Oregon

111 P.3d 1131
338 Or. 469

STATE of Oregon, Respondent on Review,
v.
Richard James WOLLEAT, Petitioner on Review

(CC 01C42188; CA A116196; SC S50919).

Supreme Court of Oregon, En Banc.

Argued and Submitted September 14, 2004.

Decided May 5, 2005.

Monica L. Finch, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review. With her on the briefs were Peter A. Ozanne, Executive Director, and Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender, Office of Public Defense Services.

Stacey RJ Guise, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review. With her on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General.

KISTLER, J.

The question in this case is whether evidence that defendant dragged the victim

111 P.3d 1132

from one room to another during the course of an assault was sufficient to permit a reasonable juror to find that defendant had kidnapped the victim. The trial court denied defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal on the kidnapping charge, the jury found him guilty of kidnapping, and the Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. State v. Wolleat, 189 Or.App. 336, 75 P.3d 921 (2003). We allowed defendant's petition for review and now reverse

In reviewing defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal, we state the facts in the light most favorable to the state. State v. King, 307 Or. 332, 339, 768 P.2d 391 (1989). Defendant and the victim lived together and were engaged to be married. After spending the evening out drinking with friends, defendant returned home shortly after midnight. He went into the bedroom where the victim was sleeping, grabbed her by her hair, and pulled her out of bed. Still holding the victim by her hair, defendant dragged her approximately 15 to 20 feet from the bedroom into the living room, where he repeatedly struck her. The victim broke away from defendant and fled from the house.

The state charged defendant with fourth-degree assault and first-degree kidnapping. At the close of the state's case-in-chief, defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal on the kidnapping charge. To establish that defendant had committed first-degree kidnapping, as alleged in the indictment, the state had to prove that defendant (1) took the victim from one place to another; (2) with the intent to interfere substantially with her personal liberty; (3) without consent or legal authority; and (4) with the purpose of physically injuring her. ORS 163.225; ORS 163.235.¹

In moving for a judgment of acquittal, defendant did not dispute that a reasonable juror could find that he took the victim from one place to another. Rather, relying on State v. Garcia, 288 Or. 413, 605 P.2d 671 (1980), defendant argued that no reasonable juror could find that he had intended to interfere substantially with the victim's personal liberty.

The trial court denied defendant's motion, and the jury convicted him of assault and kidnapping. The Court of Appeals affirmed both convictions. Defendant petitioned for review, contending that there was insufficient evidence to submit the kidnapping charge to the jury.² We allowed defendant's petition for review to consider a recurring question: When will the movement of a person from one place to another during the commission of another crime, such as rape or assault, be sufficient to establish the crime of kidnapping?

In answering that question, both parties focus on the statutory phrase "with intent to interfere substantially with another's personal liberty." Relying on Garcia, defendant contends that the phrase reflects a legislative judgment that a brief movement or temporary detention that is incidental to the commission of another crime is insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish an intent to interfere substantially with the victim's personal liberty. Focusing on a footnote in Garcia, the state responds that a reasonable juror can infer an intent to interfere substantially from movement or detention whenever the

111 P.3d 1133

movement or detention is not "ordinarily inherent" in the commission of another crime

The parties' dispute turns initially on a question of statutory interpretation, and we begin, as usual, with the text and context of the statutes. See PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or. 606, 610-12, 859 P.2d 1143 (1993) (stating statutory construction methodology). The relevant portion of the kidnapping statutes provides that "[a] person commits the crime of kidnapping * * * if, with intent to interfere substantially with [the victim's] personal liberty, * * * the person * * * [t]akes the [victim] from one place to another." ORS 163.225(1).

As defined, the offense has two elements—a physical act and a mental state. The phrase "[t]akes the [victim] from one place to another" defines the act necessary to establish the crime of second-degree kidnapping.³ By its terms, the phrase does not require that a defendant take a victim a specific distance, nor does it require that the distance be substantial. Rather, the text states that moving a victim "from one place to another" will be sufficient to establish the element of asportation. Although the question of how far a defendant must move a victim to satisfy that element can present a close question, defendant has not contended that the movement in this case was insufficient, as a matter of law, to prove asportation. Accordingly, we do not address that issue further and turn to the mental element of the offense.

The phrase "intent to interfere substantially with [the victim's] personal liberty" defines the mental state that must accompany the act of moving the victim. One proposition is clear from the text of that phrase. In moving a victim from "one place to another," a defendant need not in fact interfere substantially with the victim's personal liberty in order to complete the crime of second-degree kidnapping: The intent to interfere substantially is sufficient. Beyond that, the meaning of the phrase is less certain. How much interference, if accomplished, would be "substantial," and what interests does the phrase "personal liberty" protect from the intended interference? "[S]ubstantially" is not an exact term, and the text of the kidnapping statutes provides no guidance on the extent of its reach. The phrase "personal liberty" also poses an interpretative issue. Viewed in the abstract, the words could include a broad range of liberty interests. Alternatively, the words could refer more narrowly to a person's right to be free from undesired restrictions on his or her movement.

Two sources bear on the meaning of "substantially" and "personal liberty." First, the kidnapping statutes are directed at restrictions on a person's freedom of movement. ORS 163.225 prohibits one person from taking another person from one place to another or secretly confining that person. That wording suggests that, when the legislature prohibited performing either of those acts with the intent to interfere substantially with another's "personal liberty," it did not use the term "liberty" in its broad sense. Rather, the legislature intended to refer more narrowly to interfering with a person's liberty to move freely.

This court's decision in Garcia also provides guidance. See State v. Snyder, 337 Or. 410, 417, 97 P.3d 1181 (2004) (considering prior statutory interpretation at first level of analysis). In Garcia, the defendant held a knife to the victim's throat and forced her to cross a street, walk two blocks, cross another street, and then go behind a house where the defendant raped and sodomized her. 288 Or. at 415, 605 P.2d 671. In determining whether the jury could find the defendant guilty of kidnapping in addition to rape and sodomy, the court looked to the legislative history of the kidnapping statutes and drew...