State v. Wood
| Docket Number | 20210470 |
| Decision Date | 29 June 2023 |
| Citation | 2023 UT 15 |
| Parties | State of Utah, Appellee, v. Eugene Vincent Wood, Appellant. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Heard October 5, 2022
Attorneys:
Sean D. Reyes, Att'y Gen., Jeffrey D. Mann, Asst. Solic. Gen Bronwen L. Dromey, Salt Lake City, for appellee
Nathalie S. Skibine, Ralph W. Dellapiana, Salt Lake City, for appellant Justice Petersen authored the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice Durrant, Associate Chief Justice Pearce, Justice Hagen, and Justice Pohlman joined.
¶1 The question before us in this interlocutory appeal is whether the Salt Lake County Jail (jail) violated Utah's Interception of Communications Act (Interception Act or Act), which generally prohibits wiretapping, when it recorded calls made by inmate Eugene Vincent Wood on the jail's telephones. See Utah Code §§ 77-23a-1 to -16. The State wants to use some of the recordings as evidence against Wood in court. Wood moved to suppress the recordings, arguing that the jail's interception of his calls violated the Interception Act. If Wood is correct, then the Act requires that the recordings be suppressed.
¶2 As a matter of first impression, we hold that the jail's monitoring and recording of Wood's calls did not run afoul of the Act because it fell within the Act's consent exception. This exception provides that if one of the parties to a telephone call consents to the interception of the call, then the interception is lawful. That is what happened here. The jail notified Wood in numerous ways that it may record and monitor all non-legal inmate calls. Knowing this, Wood chose to use the jail's phones anyway. In doing so, he impliedly consented to the conditions the jail had placed on the use of its phones.
¶3 Accordingly, the jail's interception of Wood's calls did not violate the Interception Act. And the district court properly denied his motion to suppress the recordings. We affirm.
¶4 Eugene Wood was charged with kidnapping and assaulting his wife. In the criminal proceeding that followed, the district court entered a pretrial protective order that prohibited Wood from contacting his wife in any way. Despite this, Wood made hundreds of calls to his wife from the Salt Lake County Jail. The State alleges that during these calls, Wood threatened his wife, pressuring her to assert her spousal privilege and to refuse to cooperate with the prosecution. These conversations were recorded in accordance with the jail's policy of recording all inmate telephone calls, except those between inmates and attorneys.
¶5 When it became apparent to the State that Wood's wife would not cooperate with the prosecution, the State moved to admit recordings of several phone calls between Wood and his wife. The State also filed new charges based on the recordings: one count of tampering with a witness; two counts of retaliation against a witness, victim, or informant; and five counts of violating a pretrial protective order. Wood moved to suppress the recordings in both cases.
¶6 The district court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress. At the hearing, the jail's records supervisor testified about the jail's phone recording policy. She explained that the jail contracts with a private telephone carrier, Inmate Calling Solutions (ICS), to provide phone services to inmates. As part of its contract, ICS records and stores all calls made by inmates, except calls with an attorney. And jail staff monitor these calls to ensure facility safety. If staff learn of any suspected crimes occurring outside the jail, they must report it to the South Salt Lake Police Department; and if they learn of any suspected crimes occurring inside the jail, they must report it to the appropriate jail staff for further investigation.
¶7 The records supervisor also testified that she frequently provides recordings of inmate calls to law enforcement officers upon request. This disclosure process is governed by Utah's Government Records Access and Management Act (GRAMA). See Utah Code §§ 63G-2-101 to -901.
¶8 Finally, the records supervisor testified that inmates are warned in three different ways that their calls may be recorded and monitored. First, new inmates receive a handbook, which explains that "the jail may monitor and/or record telephone calls, except those made to a prisoner's attorney." Second, a placard located next to the telephones warns inmates that phone calls are recorded and subject to monitoring at any time. And third, a recording is played to both the inmate and the outside party before each call, which again notifies the inmate that the call is being recorded and is subject to monitoring.
¶9 To obtain the recordings at issue here, a deputy district attorney, through his paralegal, requested recordings of Wood's calls from the jail. He used GRAMA Form 007, "Prisoner Telephone Monitoring System Recording Request Form," in which he confirmed that he represented a government entity enforcing the law and that the recordings were necessary for an investigation. And the jail provided him with the recordings.
¶10 In response to the evidence adduced at the hearing, Wood argued that the deputy district attorney's failure to obtain a warrant or court order for the recordings violated the Interception Act. The State countered that a warrant was not necessary because the relevant phone calls fell under two exceptions to the Act: the consent exception and the law enforcement exception.
¶11 The district court agreed with the State's reasoning and denied Wood's motion to suppress. Regarding the consent exception, the court explained that Wood "impliedly consented to the interception of the phone calls by engaging in the calls despite [knowing] they could be intercepted." And the court also concluded that the calls were exempt under the law enforcement exception. See id. § 77-23a-3(8)(a)(ii).
¶12 Wood petitioned for permission to appeal the court's interlocutory order denying his motion to suppress, which we granted. The cases have been consolidated. On appeal, Wood challenges the district court's conclusions that (1) he consented to the recording and disclosure of his jail calls, (2) the Interception Act's law enforcement exception applied to the phone calls, and (3) the recordings could be disclosed to the deputy district attorney without a warrant.
¶13 We have jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(h).
¶14 "[T]he interpretation of a statute presents a question of law that we review for correctness." State v. Evans, 2021 UT 63, ¶ 20, 500 P.3d 811 (cleaned up). Thus, "we accord the trial court's legal conclusion[s] no particular deference on review." State v. Mitchell, 779 P.2d 1116, 1123 (Utah 1989) (cleaned up).
¶15 We first address Wood's argument that suppression was required because the jail violated the Interception Act when it recorded his calls and then disclosed them to the deputy district attorney. Wood asserts that neither the consent exception nor the law enforcement exception apply here. But we agree with the district court that Wood impliedly consented to the interception of his calls. We conclude that the jail sufficiently notified Wood that phone calls may be recorded and monitored. And by using the phones with this knowledge, Wood implicitly consented to the conditions the jail had placed upon use of its phones. Accordingly, we conclude that the interception falls within the Interception Act's consent exception. And consequently, the jail's disclosure of the calls to the deputy district attorney did not offend the statute.
¶16 Because we conclude that the consent exception applies here we need not consider Wood's second argument regarding the applicability of the law enforcement exception.
¶17 Next, we consider Wood's argument that another statute, Utah Code section 77-23b-4, provides an alternative basis to suppress the recordings because it independently required the State to get a warrant to obtain the recordings from the jail. We reject this argument because this statute does not provide for suppression as a remedy, and Wood has not persuaded us that it applies in these circumstances.
¶18 Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of Wood's motion to suppress the recordings of his jail calls.
¶19 Wood's primary argument is that the district court should have suppressed the recordings of his calls because the jail violated the Interception Act when it recorded and disclosed them. He asserts that because his calls were illegally intercepted and disclosed, the Interception Act prohibits the use of the contents of those calls in any court proceeding.
¶20 This is a question of first impression for this court. However, numerous federal appellate courts have addressed similar questions in the context of a nearly identical federal statute.
¶21 Utah's Interception Act mirrors Title III of the federal Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (Wiretap Act). See Utah Code §§ 77-23a-1 to -9; 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2523. Both statutes have nearly identical language making it "unlawful for a person to 'intercept' 'any wire, oral, or electronic communication'" without court-ordered authorization. Smith v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 251 F.3d 1047, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2511); accord Utah Code § 77-23a-4(1)(b)(i) ().
¶22 Both statutes define "intercept" as the "acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or...
To continue reading
Request your trial