State v. Wood
Decision Date | 08 February 1915 |
Docket Number | 20712 |
Citation | 136 La. 658,67 So. 542 |
Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
Parties | STATE v. WOOD |
(Syllabus by the Court.)
The offense denounced by Act No. 134 of 1890, s 1, is complete when a woman of previous chaste character is enticed by false representation 'from her father's home or from any other place (in Louisiana), * * * for the purpose of prostitution or for any unlawful sexual intercourse, at a house of ill fame, or at any other place of like character or elsewhere,' and, as affecting the completion and venue of the offense, it is immaterial whether, such woman having been so enticed from her home in this state to place in another state, further representations are there made to her, followed by her prostitution or unlawful sexual intercourse; but evidence of such happenings, though not essential thereto, is admissible in the prosecution of, as tending to establish, the offense.
This court is without jurisdiction to reverse the ruling of a trial judge in a criminal case, refusing a new trial, applied for upon the grounds that the jury failed to give the applicant the benefit of the reasonable doubt to which he was entitled (there being no complaint that the judge failed to give the proper instruction), and that the verdict was contrary to law and the evidence.
The venue need not be set out in the body of an indictment; it is sufficient that it appear in the margin.
The fact that the federal government has declared it an offense to induce women to travel from one state to another for immoral purposes does not affect the authority of the state of Louisiana to declare it an offense against her laws to entice a chaste woman from her home in Louisiana, by false representations, for such purposes. The laws neither conflict with each other nor cover the same subject, and in so far as they are directed against similar evils are easily reconciled.
Philip S. Pugh, L. H. Pugh, and Percy T. Ogden, all of Crowley, for appellant.
R. G. Pleasant, Atty. Gen., C. B. De Bellevue, Dist. Atty., of Crowley (G. A. Gondran, of New Orleans, of counsel), for the State.
O'NIELL, J., dissents and hands down reasons.
Defendant, having been convicted of abduction and sentenced to imprisonment at hard labor, presents his case to this court by means of three bills of exception, to wit, a bill to the overruling of his objection to the admission of certain testimony concerning happenings between him and the prosecutrix in the state of Texas, a bill to the overruling of a motion for new trial, and a bill to the overruling of a motion in arrest of judgment.
1. The indictment charges that defendant --
'did unlawfully, willfully, fraudulently, and by false representations, entice, abduct, induce from her mother's house one [giving the name], a young girl of previous chaste character, for the purpose of unlawful sexual intercourse, at a house or place in the city of Beaumont, state of Texas, and did then and there unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously, and by false representations, have unlawful sexual intercourse with the aforesaid _____.'
The statute under which the prosecution is conducted reads, in part (quoting from section 1):
'That any person who shall fraudulently, deceitfully or by any false representation, entice, abduct, induce, decoy, hire, engage, employ or take any woman of previous chaste character from her father's house, or from any other place where she may be, for the purpose of prostitution, or for any unlawful sexual intercourse, at a house of ill fame, or at any other place of like character, or elsewhere, * * * shall, on conviction, be punished,' etc.
The testimony to which the bill refers was that of the prosecuting witness who had been induced to leave her home, being the home of her mother, in Louisiana, and join the defendant in Beaumont, Tex., concerning promises made to, and sexual intercourse with, her at the place last mentioned. The statement per curiam, attached to the bill, reads, in part:
'The objection was overruled for the reason that the same promises that were made in Beaumont, Texas * * * were also made * * * in * * * Louisiana two or three days previous to those made * * * in Beaumont, the said promises being false, as was shown by the evidence, for the purpose of deceiving the said [prosecutrix] and to get her away from the home of her mother, * * * and to induce her to go to Beaumont, Tex., for immoral sexual intercourse, as shown from the evidence of the said [prosecutrix] and also from letters and telegrams introduced, showing said facts, and, also, that the evidence showed beyond peradventure of any doubt that said [prosecutrix] was a girl of previously chaste character, and only 17 years of age.'
The offense denounced by the statute and charged in the indictment was complete if the defendant, by any false representations, enticed the prosecutrix, she being a woman of previously chaste character, 'from her father's house, or from any other place [in Louisiana] * * * for the purpose of prostitution or for any unlawful sexual intercourse, at a house of ill fame, or at any other place of like character, or elsewhere;' and, as affecting the question of completion and venue, it was immaterial whether, the prosecutrix having been so enticed from her home in this state to a place in another state, further representations were there made to her, followed by her prostitution, or her unlawful sexual intercourse with the defendant; but evidence of those happenings, though not essential, was admissible as supporting the charge that it was for the purpose thus said to have been accomplished that the prosecutrix was enticed from her home in Louisiana. The objection to such evidence was therefore properly overruled.
2. The motion for new trial was predicated upon the alleged error which has been thus considered, and upon the further grounds that the jury did not give defendant the benefit of the reasonable doubt to which he was entitled, and that their verdict was contrary to law and the evidence. There is no complaint that the trial judge failed to instruct the jury that defendant was entitled to the benefit of any reasonable doubt that might be left in their minds, after hearing the evidence, and it was for them to determine whether such doubt existed; neither the trial court nor this court having any possible authority or capacity to determine that question for them. If, however, it be said that, upon the evidence adduced, the jury should have entertained such a doubt, and hence that their verdict should have been set aside by the trial court, and should now be set aside by this court, the answer is that, whilst the trial court might have set it aside upon that ground, this court has no such power; and the same law and jurisprudence apply to what is practically the same question, presented in the complaint, that the verdict was contrary to law and the evidence.
In State v. Peterson, 2 La.Ann. 922, it was said:
In State v. Ward, 14 La.Ann. 673:
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