State v. Wood

Decision Date22 October 1974
Citation327 A.2d 425,66 N.J. 8
PartiesSTATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Martin J. WOOD, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtNew Jersey Supreme Court

Peter P. Cascone, Jr., Trenton, for defendant-appellant (Stanley C. Van Ness, Public Defender, attorney).

Lowell Espey, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff-respondent (L. Steven Pessin, Deputy Atty. Gen., of counsel and on the brief; William F. Hyland, Atty. Gen., attorney).

PER CURIAM.

Defendant Martin J. Wood was convicted of second degree murder for the shooting death of Sally Ann Gulden and was sentenced to a term of 15 to 18 years in State Prison. On appeal to the Appellate Division his conviction was affirmed in a majority opinion. 130 N.J.Super. 401, 327 A.2d 440 (1973). One judge dissented on the ground that the trial court made improper and inadequate rulings in two instances involving the admissibility of evidence, and that defendant was prejudiced thereby. Defendant has appealed to this Court as of right. R. 2:2--1.

We have reviewed the issues raised and find no substantial merit in any of them basically for the same reasons expressed in the majority opinion of the Appellate Division.

We have also, Sua sponte, considered the weight of the evidence and are satisfied that the credible proofs fully support the finding of defendant's guilt.

Affirmed.

For affirmance: Chief Justice HUGHES and Justices JACOBS, HALL, MOUNTAIN, SULLIVAN and CLIFFORD--6.

For reversal: Justice PASHMAN--1.

PASHMAN, J. (dissenting).

I agree with Judge Halpern's dissenting opinion in the Appellate Division which concluded that defendant was deprived of a fair trial requiring a reversal of the conviction and a remand for a new trial. 130 N.J.Super. 401, 327 A.2d 440 (App.Div.1973). Specific references to the trial record further support this dissent.

The prosecutor read to the jury as 'past recollection recorded' a statement taken on September 30, 1970 from Jack Gulden, the victim's son, concerning a fight between the victim and defendant which allegedly occurred some time between early April and June 1, 1970. The following direct examination is the portion of the testimony on which the purported foundation for the reading of this highly damaging statement was laid:

Q Do you recall another incident that took place sometime between your mother and Mr. Wood?

A Another incident?

Q Yes.

A No, I can't.

Q Do you recall on September 30th, 1970--

MR. CASCONE: Your Honor. The question was asked and it was answered and he said he doesn't recall another incident and now the prosecutor is prompting and puts a statement in front of a man so the man can look at the statement.

THE COURT: All right, would you rephrase the question?

Q Okay, did you make that statement, Sir?

A I suppose I did.

Q Do you recall giving that statement?

A I recall giving it, yes.

Q And you signed it?

A Yes.

Q And that was a true statement when it was made?

A Yes.

Q And do you recall stating that--

MR. CASCONE: Your Honor--

THE COURT: Well, does that statement refresh your memory as to any incident concerning--

THE WITNESS: I don't remember that particular incident.

THE COURT: You have no present recollection after reading the statement as to that incident?

THE WITNESS: No.

Q Do you remember stating--

MR. CASCONE: The question has been asked and answered.

THE COURT: He already said he has no present recollection even after reading the statement.

Thereafter, out of the presence of the jury, the State sought to 'refresh' Gulden's memory. A reading of the transcript gives one an impression of confusion and uncertainty in the mind of this most important witness--the son of the victim. The trial judge noted in his ruling he 'did have a little concern with it (Gulden's statement) by reason of the fact that the witness couldn't remember an event such as this which we might say normally would be etched in a person's mind.' But the court concluded that this was a case for the application of 'past recollection recorded' exception to the hearsay rule.

Rule 63(1)(b)(i) clearly requires a statement read at the trial as 'past recollection recorded' to have been 'made at a time when the fact recorded in the writing actually occurred or...

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4 cases
  • State v. Loftin
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division
    • January 12, 1996
    ...defendant was charged with possession of marijuana); State v. Wood, 130 N.J.Super. 401, 410, 327 A.2d 440 (App.Div.1973), aff'd, 66 N.J. 8, 327 A.2d 425 (1974) (where cause of death in a murder case was by gunshot wound, other wrongful act evidence was allowed to show that defendant had pos......
  • State v. Hacker
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division
    • March 2, 1981
    ...past recollection recorded under Evid.R. 63(1)(b). See State v. Wood, 130 N.J.Super. 401, 408-410, 327 A.2d 440 (App.Div.), aff'd 66 N.J. 8, 327 A.2d 425 (1974). Therefore, it is immaterial that the witness was called by the trial judge. The evidence would have been admissible if Ms. Adcock......
  • State v. Carswell
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division
    • July 25, 1997
    ...certif. denied, 144 N.J. 175, 675 A.2d 1123 (1996); State v. Wood, 130 N.J.Super. 401, 410, 327 A.2d 440 (App.Div.1973), aff'd, 66 N.J. 8, 327 A.2d 425 (1974). Moreover, the testimony of LaToya and Stewart Bullock provided clear and convincing evidence to suggest that defendant owned the gu......
  • State v. Peltack
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division
    • February 8, 1980
    ...or as defendant asserted, an "honest mistake." In State v. Wood, 130 N.J.Super. 401, 327 A.2d 440 (App.Div.1973), aff'd o.b. 66 N.J. 8, 327 A.2d 425 (1974), it was held that the trial judge properly received evidence that some months before the homicide for which defendant was on trial an i......

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