State v. Wood
| Citation | 2010 WI 17,780 N.W.2d 63 |
| Decision Date | 19 March 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 2007AP2767-CR.,2007AP2767-CR. |
| Parties | STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. John A. WOOD, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin |
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For the defendant-appellant there were briefs by Kristen E. Lehker and Wessel, Lehker & Fumelle Inc., Madison, and oral argument by Kristen E. Lehker.
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by R. Duane Harlow, assistant attorney general, with whom on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Kristin Kerschensteiner and Disability Rights Wisconsin, Madison, and Michael Balch, James Grohsgal, New York, N.Y., on behalf of Disability Rights Wisconsin, the National Disability Rights Network, and the Judge David L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, and oral argument by James Grohsgal.
¶ 1
This case is before this court on certification from the court of appeals pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (2005-06).1 The defendant, John A. Wood (Wood), is committed to the custody of the Department of Health and Family Services (DHFS), after having been found not guilty of a crime by reason of mental disease or defect (hereinafter described as "NGI"). DHFS placed him at Mendota Mental Health Institute (Mendota), where he has been a patient since 1999.
¶ 2 In September 2006, Mendota filed a motion with the La Crosse County Circuit Court seeking an order authorizing it to administer psychotropic medication to Wood without his consent, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 971.17(3)(c). The circuit court, Judge Michael J. Mulroy presiding, found Wood incompetent to refuse medication and issued the requested order. Wood filed a motion for relief from the circuit court order. The circuit court denied that motion. Wood then appealed the denial of that motion and the order compelling medication to the court of appeals, which certified the following questions to us: Whether Wis. Stat. § 971.17(3)(c), which authorizes the involuntary medication of committed persons who are found NGI of a crime and who are found to be incompetent to refuse treatment or medication, violates due process in two respects: (1) by allowing involuntary medication without a finding of dangerousness and (2) by failing to provide a mechanism for periodic review of the medication order.2 In addition to the constitutional questions, Wood raises several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based on his trial attorney's failure to raise the constitutional due process arguments, along with other alleged failings. He asks that the order compelling involuntary medication be vacated.
¶ 3 After this court accepted certification, but before oral argument, the State filed a motion to supplement the record with evidence pertaining to an April 22, 1997, administrative directive (hereinafter described as "AD-11-97" or "the directive"). The directive sets forth the procedure for Mendota staff to follow when assessing whether to seek an order for compelled involuntary medication and treatment and when administering medication and treatment pursuant to such an order. We remanded this case to supplement the record with that evidence, and the La Crosse County Circuit Court, Judge Ramona A. Gonzalez presiding, held a hearing in order to supplement the record in accordance with our remand order. Subsequent to that hearing, Wood submitted a supplemental brief to this court arguing that, to the extent that an internal policy such as AD-11-97 has the force of law, it likewise is invalid on substantive and procedural due process grounds because it fails to require a finding of dangerousness and to provide a mechanism for periodic review of the order.
¶ 4 We are satisfied that Wis. Stat. § 971.17(3)(c) and AD-11-97 comport with the due process provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution for two reasons. First, we conclude that due process does not require a finding of dangerousness to issue an order compelling involuntary medication of a person committed under Wis. Stat. ch. 971. Even if due process required such a finding, there would be no violation because the statutory language of Wis. Stat. § 971.17(3)(c), along with AD-11-97, effectively provide for such a finding. Second, we conclude that due process requires periodic review of the compelled involuntary medication order, and that Wis. Stat. § 971.17(3)(c) and AD-11-97 satisfy that requirement as well. Additionally, we are satisfied that Wood did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, we hold that Wis. Stat. § 971.17(3)(c), along with AD-11-97, comport with substantive and procedural due process facially and as applied here. We also affirm the circuit court's orders compelling involuntary medication and denying Wood's motion for relief from the involuntary medication order.
¶ 5 Wood, who is 55 years old, has suffered from paranoid schizophrenia since at least his early twenties. In January 1978, while delusional from his mental illness, he beat his stepfather to death with a brick. He was found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect (NGI) in regard to the charge of second-degree homicide and was committed to the custody of the Department of Health and Social Services, which placed him in institutional care at Mendota for 13 1/2 years.3 He was granted conditional release in 1991 and lived in a supervised housing situation in Madison and then in Florida for several years. During that time, he initially remained on his medication and held a job, but, as he later told an examiner, he eventually stopped working and tapered off his medication. By the time Wood returned to Wisconsin in 1998, his mental health had deteriorated significantly. According to reports from examiners at Mendota, in January of that year, Wood was arrested in Viroqua, Wisconsin for disorderly conduct after exhibiting "bizarre" and potentially threatening behavior.
¶ 6 Following that arrest, Wood was admitted to Franciscan Skemp Medical Center in La Crosse "in an obvious psychotic state," according to the psychiatrist who treated him. Within less than a month, he sexually assaulted a female patient in the same facility. In January 1999, he was found NGI for that crime, and the La Crosse County Circuit Court held a commitment hearing pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 971.17(3) (1997-98). The court concluded that Wood posed a significant risk of danger to others and committed him to the custody of DHFS for a period of up to 160 months—two-thirds the maximum sentence for that crime pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 971.17(1)(a) (1997-98)—or not beyond September 2011. Wood remains at Mendota, which is where DHFS placed him in April 1999.
¶ 7 Since the start of that second commitment period, Wood has filed seven petitions for conditional release, none of which the circuit court granted.4 For each of those petitions, the circuit court appointed counsel and received reports from social workers and psychiatrists involved in Wood's treatment regarding Wood's condition, progress in treatment, and potential ability to function safely outside of Mendota. The information contained in the reports was consistent in four respects. First, the examiners believed that Wood was undermedicated; they indicated that he steadfastly refused to increase dosages despite staff recommendations to do so. Second, the reports indicated that although Wood's condition had not deteriorated enough to require a compelled medication order, his perpetually undermedicated state prevented him from being a candidate for conditional release. Third, Wood continued to deny responsibility for his past crimes and showed little insight into his treatment needs. Fourth, the evaluators consistently opined that Wood lacked the emotional stability necessary to be successful if granted conditional release.
¶ 8 In September 2006, Dr. Brad Smith, the forensic clinical director at Mendota, petitioned the circuit court to issue an order authorizing the administration of medication and treatment without Wood's consent pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 971.17(3)(c). Dr. Smith cited Wood's declining mental state, the escalation of his symptoms, and evidence that he had stopped taking his medication entirely. After holding a hearing on the petition, the La Crosse County Circuit Court, Judge Michael J. Mulroy presiding, found that the medication would have therapeutic value and that Wood was not competent to refuse treatment or medication. It issued an order authorizing DHFS to administer medication to Wood without his consent. Wood filed a motion for relief,5 arguing that Wis. Stat. § 971.17(3)(c) is unconstitutional and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise that argument and for other reasons. The circuit court denied that motion.
¶ 9 Wood appealed to the court of appeals, which certified the matter to this court. After filing briefs with this court, the State filed a motion to supplement the record with AD-11-97, which is an administrative directive maintained by DHFS that sets forth the procedure for staff at Mendota to follow when seeking an order to compel medication and treatment of forensic NGI patients and administering medication and treatment to them pursuant to such an order.6 Wood agreed that AD-11-97 was germane to the issues presented. We remanded the matter. The La Crosse County Circuit Court, Judge Ramona A. Gonzalez presiding, held a hearing in May 2009 to supplement the record with evidence related to AD-11-97.7
¶ 10 At that hearing, Dr. Smith testified that Mendota staff followed the protocol set forth in AD-11-97 before seeking the October 2006 order to involuntarily medicate Wood. Mendota had established a treatment team made up of a psychiatrist (Dr. Smith), a psychologist, a member of the nursing staff,...
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