State v. Wood
| Decision Date | 28 June 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 12734,12734 |
| Citation | 545 A.2d 1026,208 Conn. 125 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Steven J. WOOD. |
Jon C. Blue, Asst. Public Defender, with whom, on the brief, were Joseph M. Shortall, Chief Public Defender, and Joette Katz, Public Defender, and Gerard Smyth and Maria T. Madsen, Asst. Public Defenders, for appellant (defendant).
Susan E. Gill, Asst. State's Atty., with whom were Herbert G. Appleton, Asst. State's Atty., and, on the brief, Jack Fischer, Janine D'Angelo, Brett DeLallo and Eileen McCarthy Geel, Law Student Interns, for appellee (state).
Before PETERS, C.J., and ARTHUR H. HEALEY, CALLAHAN, GLASS and COVELLO, JJ.
The defendant, Steven J. Wood, was convicted by a jury of three counts of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a 1 and of one count of capital felony in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54b(8). 2 The jury also found the defendant guilty but not criminally responsible of a fourth count of murder pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1983) § 53a-13. 3 After the penalty phase of the proceedings, the jury found a mitigating factor, thereby eliminating the death penalty as a possible sentence. General Statutes (Rev. to 1983) § 53a-46a(f). On November 16, 1984, the court, Hammer, J., committed the defendant to the custody of the commissioner of correction for a total effective sentence of 120 years. 4
The jury could reasonably have found that on the evening of April 16, 1982, the defendant shot and killed his former wife, Rosa Wood, and her boyfriend, George Troie, on Farmington Avenue in West Hartford. The defendant then proceeded to the home on White Pine Lane he had shared with his former wife. Once there, he shot and killed his former mother-in-law, Patricia Voli. The defendant then shot and killed his fifteen year old daughter, Elisa Wood.
At trial, the defendant did not deny that he had caused the deaths, but asserted the alternative defenses of extreme emotional disturbance; General Statutes § 53a-54a(a); or lack of substantial capacity, due to a mental disease or defect, to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. General Statutes (Rev. to 1983) § 53a-13. After the rendering of judgment on his convictions, the defendant appealed to this court.
The defendant first claims that the trial court erred in denying his request to suspend the proceedings and direct the jury to read certain documentary evidence. The defendant had introduced as exhibits, for the purpose of establishing his state of mind, a journal and various unsent letters to his former wife written by him during the months prior to the homicides. The defendant had also introduced records of juvenile court proceedings and associated reports of child welfare agencies compiled during his troubled childhood. 5 The court admitted the journal and letters for the limited purpose of demonstrating the defendant's mental or emotional state during the time leading up to the homicides, while the juvenile court records were admitted for the purpose of showing the basis of expert opinion offered in testimony.
The defendant requested that the court suspend the proceedings to enable the jury to read these exhibits, and had prepared sixteen copies of the documents to facilitate this being done. As to the journal and letters, the state joined in the defendant's request. The court refused to suspend the proceedings, but did express willingness to consider proposed jury instructions concerning the reading of this evidence.
Later, the defendant requested that the court explicitly instruct the jury that they were required to read the journal, the letters and the juvenile records before beginning deliberations. In making this request, the defendant reiterated his position that "the proper time for the reading of these exhibits by the jury was at the time of their introduction as evidence...." The court declined to order the jurors to read the documents before deliberating. Instead, as part of its general charge, the court instructed the jury to give careful consideration to all the evidence presented during the trial--testimony, stipulations and exhibits. In its instructions to the jury, at the close of the trial, the court noted the voluminous nature of the documentary evidence that had been introduced. The court explained that the letters and journal entries had been copied so that there would be one packet of these materials per juror, in order to make efficient use of the jury's time. The jury was cautioned not to attach any particular significance to the fact that these exhibits had been copied in order to provide each juror with his or her own set of materials, while other documentary evidence had not been copied in this manner. 6 The defendant objected to the charge as given.
The defendant first claims that the trial court erred in refusing to direct the jury to read these documentary exhibits (1) prior to the conclusion of the experts' testimony or (2) prior to the commencement of deliberations. As to the requested order to have the exhibits read during the course of the experts' testimony, we note that "[t]he conduct of the trial must necessarily be left largely to the discretion of the presiding judge, a discretion which in its very nature cannot be made the subject of review by this court, except in a clear case of the abuse of that discretion." McKiernan v. Lehmaier, 85 Conn. 111, 119, 81 A. 969 (1911). "This court reviews the action of the trial court only as to whether that action cannot be supported in reason." DiPalma v. Wiesen, 163 Conn. 293, 299, 303 A.2d 709 (1972).
The record reveals ample support for the trial court's action. This very lengthy trial featured extensive testimony and documentary evidence much of which expressly and in detail discussed the contents of the exhibits. In the court's estimation, it would consume a half day for the jury to read the defendant's unsent letters to his former wife, letters that ranged from three to ten pages each, and the reports of various state agencies regarding the defendant's family history. It was within the court's discretion to have the trial continue without this significant interruption. Reasonable efforts in the conduct of a trial aimed at making efficient use of time are within the sound discretion of the court. Elliott v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 83 Conn. 320, 329, 76 A. 298 (1910).
Further, the court was mindful of the risk that reading the exhibits prior to the conclusion of the experts' testimony might prompt juror conversations about the exhibits' content. 7 Such conversations, taking place before all the evidence was presented and without the benefit of the court's instructions on the law, would jeopardize the defendant's right to a fair trial. State v. Castonguay, 194 Conn. 416, 433, 481 A.2d 56 (1984); State v. Washington, 182 Conn. 419, 424-27, 438 A.2d 1144 (1980). The trial court, in the exercise of prudence and caution, sought to minimize the risk of improper and premature juror discussions of the material contained in these exhibits. " ". DiPalma v. Wiesen, supra, 163 Conn. at 298-99, 303 A.2d 709. Given the testimony summarizing the documents, time constraints and the significant risk of premature discussion on the issues involved, we conclude that the trial court's decision that the jury should not have been required to read the defendant's letters and journal entries prior to the conclusion of the experts' testimony was a legitimate exercise of its discretion.
As to the defendant's request that the jury be instructed to read the exhibits in their entirety before commencing deliberations, we conclude that the trial court's decision on this matter was similarly within its sound discretion. Although the trial court did not expressly order the jury to read the full text of each and every exhibit, the court did instruct the jury to give careful consideration to all the evidence in the case. As part of its general remarks at the beginning of trial and again at its conclusion, the court advised the jurors to examine carefully each piece of evidence and to consider all the evidence presented, whether by means of testimony, stipulation or exhibits. The court cautioned the jury, however, not to attach undue weight to those exhibits that had been reproduced simply on the basis of their having been copied and distributed. While the instructions did not conform exactly to the proposed instructions requested by the defendant, "[i]nstructions to the jury need not be in the precise language of a request." State v. Bunkley, 202 Conn. 629, 658, 522 A.2d 795 (1987). We conclude that the instructions as given were adequate "to give the jury 'a clear understanding of the elements of the crime charged and the proper guidance' " to enable them to consider the evidence and reach a supportable verdict. Id., quoting State v. Avila, 166 Conn. 569, 574, 353 A.2d 776 (1974).
" 'Moreover, in reviewing jury instructions our task is also to view the charge itself as part of the whole trial.' " State v. Kurvin, 186 Conn. 555, 563, 442 A.2d 1327 (1982), quoting United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 674, 95 S.Ct. 1903, 44 L.Ed.2d 489 (1975); State v. Silano, 204 Conn. 769, 773, 529 A.2d 1283 (1987). In the context of a lengthy trial replete with massive documentary evidence, we conclude that the charge as given substantially complied with the defendant's request without misleading the jury into giving misguided and inappropriate deference to the documentary evidence introduced. See State v. Kurvin, supra, 186 Conn. at 561, 442 A.2d 1327 (...
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