State v. Wood
| Decision Date | 02 September 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 19731,19731 |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Blaine Aaron WOOD, Defendant-Appellant. North Idaho, May 1993 Term |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Blaine Aaron Wood, pro se.
Larry EchoHawk, Idaho Atty. Gen., Douglas A. Werth, Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, for respondent State of Idaho.
Blaine Aaron Wood was sentenced to not less than fourteen years nor more than twenty-two
[125 Idaho 912] years for attempted first-degree murder. Wood appeals from the trial court's order denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence.
Wood was initially charged with robbery and attempted first-degree murder in connection with the May 23, 1989, robbery and shooting of a store owner in Laclede, Idaho. Wood was also charged with grand theft in connection with the theft of a 9mm semi-automatic pistol from a pawn shop on the day before the shooting. After charging Wood with these crimes, the State notified Wood it would seek an enhanced penalty of fifteen years because of the use of a firearm during an attempt to commit murder.
On June 19, 1989, as part of a negotiated plea agreement, Wood pleaded guilty to attempted first-degree murder. The robbery and grand theft charges were dismissed. The trial court accepted the State's firearm enhancement after Wood admitted shooting the store owner with a 9mm pistol.
At sentencing, the trial court stated that while it had advised Wood prior to accepting his guilty plea that the maximum penalty for attempted first-degree murder was one-half of a life sentence, Wood had not been sufficiently advised as to what the actual maximum was in terms of years. The trial court advised Wood that based upon his age and life expectancy of forty-five years, the maximum penalty he faced for attempted first-degree murder was twenty-two years and six months. The trial court then offered Wood the opportunity to withdraw his plea because of what the trial court perceived to be its error in failing to specify the actual number of years for the maximum penalty. Wood declined this offer.
The trial court next stated that in 1980, this Court ruled that the statutory enhancement penalty for use of a firearm does not apply to attempts to commit crimes. 1 The trial court advised that it would not apply the firearm enhancement to the present case and it inquired whether the parties intended to proceed with the plea agreement since it was predicated upon this enhancement. Both the State and Wood indicated their intention to proceed with sentencing with the understanding that the firearm enhancement was not applicable.
The trial court sentenced Wood to a term of not less than fourteen years nor more than twenty-two years. The trial court entered its written judgment and commitment on July 18, 1989. On December 9, 1991, Wood filed a motion for reduction of sentence and a motion for correction of illegal sentence, both under I.C.R. 35. The trial court dismissed the motion for reduction of sentence as untimely. The trial court denied the motion to correct the illegal sentence rejecting Wood's argument that a life term is the equivalent of thirty years and therefore, the sentence for an attempt to commit a crime punishable by life imprisonment is fifteen years.
On appeal, Wood contends that because his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum, the trial court erred in denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence.
Wood appeals from the trial court's order denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence. Although this motion was filed long after the 120 day time limit prescribed by I.C.R. 35 for motions to reduce a sentence, a motion for correction of an illegal sentence is not subject to this time constraint. I.C.R. 35; State v. Vetsch, 101 Idaho 595, 596, 618 P.2d 773, 774 (1980). An illegal Wood was sentenced to a term of not less than fourteen years nor more than twenty-two years upon his conviction for the crime of attempted first-degree murder. The term of imprisonment for an attempt to commit a crime, which is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for five years or more, may not exceed one-half the longest term of imprisonment prescribed upon conviction of the attempted offense. I.C. § 18-306. The longest term of imprisonment prescribed upon conviction of first-degree murder is life imprisonment. I.C. § 18-4004. Thus, the maximum term of imprisonment for attempted first-degree murder is one-half of a life sentence.
[125 Idaho 913] sentence may be corrected at any time. State v. Lee, 116 Idaho 515, 516, 777 P.2d 737, 738 (Ct.App.1989). The determination of whether a sentence is illegal involves a question of law over which our appellate courts exercise free review. Id
Wood argues his sentence is illegal because his maximum term of imprisonment, twenty-two years, is in excess of one-half of a life sentence. In support of this argument, Wood cites King v. State, 93 Idaho 87, 93, 456 P.2d 254, 260 (1969), in which the Court stated "sentences of thirty years or more must be treated for purposes of parole eligibility as effective life sentences." Wood argues that since thirty-year sentences are the equivalent of life sentences and attempted first-degree murder carries a maximum term of one-half of a life sentence, the maximum term of imprisonment for attempted first-degree murder is fifteen years.
Wood incorrectly interprets King. King does not hold that a life sentence is the equivalent of a thirty-year sentence. Instead, King held that for purposes of parole eligibility under the former I.C. § 20-223, a sentence of thirty years or more must be treated as a life sentence thus making a defendant serving a sentence of thirty years or more eligible for parole after ten years. Moreover, the quote from King identified by Wood no longer has precedential value in light of the adoption of the Unified Sentencing Act in 1986, codified at I.C. § 19-2513. 1986 Sess.Laws, ch. 232, § 3, p. 638.
The Court has previously recognized that a trial court is authorized to establish a base maximum sentence upon the conviction of an attempt to commit a crime punishable by life imprisonment. In State v. Hall, 88 Idaho 117, 397 P.2d 261 (1964), the defendant was convicted of attempted rape and he appealed arguing attempted rape is not a lesser included offense of the crime with which he was charged, assault with the intent to commit rape. The defendant argued that to hold otherwise would result in a situation where a greater penalty would be permitted for a lesser included offense; one-half of a life sentence for attempted rape is a greater sentence than one to fourteen years for assault with intent to commit rape. In response to this argument, the Court held:
While a sentence of one-half of a life sentence cannot be calculated, a court is authorized to fix a base maximum sentence, for the offense of rape, at less than life, which base maximum may then be used as the basis to compute the sentence of one-half of such base to be imposed by the court for the offense of "attempt to commit rape", and the actual sentence thus fixed may be less than the sentence imposed ... for the offense of "assault with intent to commit rape."
88 Idaho at 123, 397 P.2d at 264. In calculating the sentence to be imposed upon conviction for an attempt to commit a crime punishable by life imprisonment, Hall authorizes our sentencing courts to fix a base maximum which may then be used to compute the sentence of one-half of this base.
In the present case, the trial court correctly found that for the crime of attempted first-degree murder, the maximum penalty Wood faced was one-half of a life sentence. The trial court fixed a base maximum of forty-five years based upon Wood's age and life expectancy. The trial court advised Wood that the maximum penalty he faced for attempted first-degree murder was twenty-two years We find that the sentence of not less than fourteen years and not more than twenty-two years is within the statutory limits and is legal. The trial court properly denied Wood's motion to correct an illegal sentence.
[125 Idaho 914] and six months, one half the base maximum. The trial court then offered Wood the opportunity to withdraw his plea which he declined.
We affirm the trial court's denial of Wood's motion to correct an illegal sentence.
I agree with the majority that King v. State, 93 Idaho 87, 456 P.2d 254 (1969), in and of itself does not mandate that Wood be remanded for resentencing. 2 Nonetheless, other grounds not specifically articulated by Wood compel me to dissent because various aspects of sentencing a defendant to "half" of a life sentence by consulting actuarial tables are very troubling. Although Wood did not argue on the grounds set out below either at sentencing (where he was represented by counsel) or on appeal (where he proceeded pro se ), those grounds are jurisdictional, as explained below, and thus may not be waived. See State v. Mowrey, 91 Idaho 693, 429 P.2d 425 (1967); Crane Creek Country Club v. City of Boise, 121 Idaho 485, 826 P.2d 446 (1992) (Bakes, C.J., specially concurring) (); Nycum v. Triangle Dairy Co., 109 Idaho 858, 862, 712 P.2d 559, 562 (1985) (); cf. I.R.C.P. 12(h)(3) ().
It should first be noted that in 1902, the California Supreme Court...
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